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Executive Power and Modern Liberty in 
Jean-Louis Delolme’s Political Thought and its Reception 
Thesis Summary. 
 
Jean-Louis Delolme (1741-1806) is known as a theorist of balance of powers. The lack 
of contextualisation of his work is accompanied by contrasting interpretations of his politics as a 
republican, a liberal, a democrat and a monarchist. This thesis alternatively commences with his 
argument that the English system was the most democratic state that history ever witnessed. By 
locating his programme in the intellectual and historical context, it reveals his crucial account of 
the relationship between the executive power and the people’s power. The work unravels his 
claim by tracing his intellectual debt to the notion of the selfish system. The English experience, 
he argued, offers a glimpse into how modern free states might avoid the demise of ancient 
republics with institutional solutions to the selfish human nature. For him, the ideal of popular 
sovereignty was best preserved in England because it effectively controlled the most powerful 
political power in a constitution namely the legislative. Unlike in other free states, the “favourite 
of the people” could not usurp the constitution by claiming popular sovereignty, as the 
monarchical executive maintained an extra-parliamentary relationship to the subjects. 
Moreover, the people, instead of investing all political power in their representatives, exercised 
parts of their political power in the form of “public censorial power” supported liberty of the 
press to influence the motion of the government. The second half of the thesis is dedicated to his 
reception. His British reception reveals a divided legacy as an advocate for power and a 
champion of liberty of the press. His argument for a strong executive power was adopted by 
critics of “republican” constitutional reforms while his support of press freedom was praised by 
prominent government critics such as John Cartwright and Junius. His influence on the 
American founding generation saw the consolidation of his legacy as an advocate for power in 
the creation of the presidential office within the federal republic. Meanwhile, his notion of 
public censorial power became largely forgotten. By tracing the dynamism of his legacy on both 
sides of the Atlantic, the thesis sheds light on the dubious locus of executive power in modern 
representative democracy beyond the narrow framework of the state of exception by offering a 
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In his The Constitution of England (1771), Jean-Louis Delolme argued that once properly 
understood, “we shall find England to be in reality a more Democratical [sic] State than any other 
we are acquainted with.”1 The constitution did so, he claimed, by maintaining a constructive 
tension between the strong executive power and the people. Through the institutional arrangement 
of its legislative bicameral parliament, this tension propels the machine of the government and 
effectively keeps all powers in control. This “modern” interpretation of England as a 
representative democracy hitherto has not been seriously examined. The negligence is partly due 
to early interpretations of his work as sympathising with monarchism and its associated 
distinctions and orders.2 This approach also regards his positive account of a strong executive 
power as a simple indication of conservatism. This thesis, alternatively, takes his argument that 
the English system was a modern representative democracy as its point of departure. By 
examining Delolme’s work as a part of this long and convoluted tradition, the work contributes 
to several issues in the history of political thought. 
First, through the re-examination of Delolme’s programme, the thesis confronts the 
conceptual problem concerning the relationship between executive power and liberty in modern 
representative politics. Although there have been studies on the formation of modern executive 
power in the formative eighteenth century, “the first practical philosophies of executive power in 
an age of popular sovereignty” often focus on familiar figures like Jacques Necker and François 
Guizot in, for example, Rosanvallon’s Good Government (2018) despite Delolme’s important 
contribution to the debate.3 Moreover, literature on the topic often articulates this issue through 
the framework of the “state of exception”. Put simply, even during the case of emergency, how 
can extra-legal executive acts be reconciled with political legitimacy? This is especially 
problematic from the perspective of liberal constitutionalism which believes that the 
government’s prime duty is to protect individual liberty, especially against the arbitrariness of the 
rulers through rule of law. This approach, however, is trapped within the legalistic framework and 
 
1 Jean-Louis Delolme, The Constitution of England, ed., David Lieberman, (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 
2007), 280. Henceforth referred to as Constitution. 
2 This line of interpretation is found in, for example, Joyce Appleby, “The Jefferson-Adams Rupture and 
the First French Translation of John Adams' Defence,” American Historical Review, 73, no. 4 (1968): 
1084-091.  
3 Pierre Rosanvallon, Good Government: Democracy Beyond Elections, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 




fails to grasp the wider political implications and the historical context of the creation of modern 
executive power.  
It is unsurprising that the most prolific groups of scholars who work on this topic are from 
the field of American politics. The majority of the recent literature warns against the extensive 
interpretation of the presidential power especially after George W. Bush’s administration and the 
use of the executive power during the “War on Terror”.4 One of the few positive accounts of 
modern executive power and its extra-legal aspect is Harvey Mansfield’s Taming the Prince 
(1989).5 Mansfield supports his argument with a genealogical examination of the office from the 
absence of it in Aristotle’s work, its later revelation in Machiavelli’s The Prince (1513), and 
modern attempts to treat the office as an “errand boy” for legislative power especially after 
Rousseau’s Social Contract. For Mansfield, the errand boy interpretation of the office is 
dangerous because it only hinders proper understandings of the office which inevitably leads to 
the difficulty in creating effective limits to it. A more recent collection edited by Fatovic and 
Kleinerman, Extra-Legal Power and Legitimacy: Perspectives on Prerogative (2013), proposes 
that existing secondary literature neglects the distinction between legality and legitimacy and 
presumptuously assumes that liberalism is part and parcel with legalism. Consequently, it argues 
that most studies on modern executive power attempt to comprehend the act of executive 
discretions during emergency by wrestling it into the legal framework. Unlike Mansfield, Fatovic 
and Kleinerman’s collection proposes that the executive power within the liberal constitutional 
framework possesses “prerogative power” that can be exercised extra-legally but remains 
nonetheless constitutional. In short, the American Constitution already leaves room for the need 
of extra power of the executive in case of emergency.6 Although the 2013 work seemingly goes 
beyond Mansfield’s argument for the extra-legal power of this office, it still largely relies on 
emergency cases as the most revealing framework to understand the relation between modern 
executive power and its potential infringement of public liberty. 
Delolme remains one of the few who contended that the strong executive power is among the 
key components of a successful modern representative democracy as a part of the scheme to 
prevent a complete claim of popular sovereignty and in so doing, preserve it as the political ideal. 
 
4 John Yoo’s infamous legal interpretation of the executive power under George W. Bush during “War on 
Terror” prompts numerous studies in the framework of the state of exception. John Yoo, “My Gift to the 
Obama Presidency; Though the White House Won't Want to Admit It, Bush Lawyers Were Protecting the 
Executive's Power to Fight a Vigorous War on Terror,” Wall Street Journal, February 24, 2010. See, for 
example, Louis Fisher, “The Unitary Executive and Inherent Executive Power (Presidential Power in 
Historical Perspective: Reflections on Calabresi and Yoo's 'The Unitary Executive').” University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, 12, no. 2 (2010): 569-591.  
5 Harvey Mansfield, Taming the Prince: The Ambivalence of Modern Executive Power (Charles Village, 
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1993). 
6 Clement Fatovic and Benjamin A. Kleinerman eds, Extra-legal Power and Legitimacy: Perspectives on 




The contribution of the present study, however, is not to propose a simple solution to the problem 
of the executive power’s potential encroachment upon public liberty. Rather, Delolme’s 
examination of the English system expands our current rather narrow approach to the 
understanding of this office in the development of modern representative democracy. Through 
his work, the reader is reminded of the office’s link to public opinion in the form of the Crown’s 
royal relationship to its subjects, an extra-parliamentary scheme to alleviate the danger which 
popular politicians might create. 7  The executive power also functions to represent popular 
sovereignty in the form of “the depositary, of all the power and collective majesty of the Nation” 
in foreign affairs.8 In other words, Delolme’s positive account of the strong executive power 
stems from its ability to undermine popular support for prominent members of the parliament as 
well as to counterpoise the raw power of popular uprising.9 The thesis contextualises Delolme’s 
programme in the eighteenth-century debate on the locus of  executive power in modern politics 
with the goal to preserve the ideal of popular sovereignty. By uncovering his contribution to the 
debate, it also hopes to be a fruitful investigation for twenty-first century readers in light of the 
present crisis in political legitimacy and contrasting views on how popular sovereignty should be 
manifested in and beyond the parliament, a problem which shows no sign of abating.10  
To situate Delolme’s intervention into the history of representative democracy and the ideal 
of popular sovereignty, Richard Tuck’s The Sleeping Sovereign (2016) provides a helpful 
framework.11 In Tuck’s narrative, the defining characteristic of modern politics is the distinction 
between the sovereign and the government which allows the sovereign people to slumber in full 
authority as the government independently operates the business of the state. What unifies Jean 
Bodin, Thomas Hobbes, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau is the central role of political representation 
in carrying out the will of this dormant yet fully authoritative and crucially unitary popular 
sovereign.12 Notably, few of these authors were interested in the constitutive role of liberty of the 
press and public opinion in the function of a state. The essential characteristic of the sovereign in 
 
7 Delolme, 144. 
8 Ibid., 63. 
9 Ibid., 143. 
10 The recent example was the Brexit debate and the contrasting visions of sovereignty which different 
sides of the debate brought. For the outline of the debate see for example Jan Pieter Beetz, "Safeguarding, 
Shifting, Splitting or Sharing? Conflicting Conceptions of Popular Sovereignty in the EU-polity." Journal 
of European Integration, 41, no. 7 (2019): 937-53. 
11 Richard Tuck, The Sleeping Sovereign: The Invention of Modern Democracy, The Seeley Lectures 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
12 There is, of course, a distinction between Rousseau and Hobbes in their disagreement over the issue of 
representative sovereignty. For Rousseau “Sovereignty cannot be represented for the same reason that it 
cannot be alienated. It consists essentially in the general will, and the will cannot be represented. The will 
is either itself or something else; no middle ground is possible. The deputies of the people, therefore, 
neither are nor can be its representatives; they are nothing else but its commissaries. They cannot 
conclude anything definitively". Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Rousseau: 'The Social Contract' and Other 
Later Political Writings, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 114. Here the focus is on their 




this view is its unity, reflecting the centrality of the metaphor of the body politic as exemplified 
by the idea of the artificial person of the state in Hobbes’ case.13 The Sleeping Sovereign also 
provides a second, contrasting view to this understanding of popular sovereignty in the work of, 
for example, Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès who was critical of the Jacobins’ radical democratic 
project and saw representative politics as a superior form of government in its own right.14 In this 
second view, popular sovereignty is expressed via its various representatives. These 
representatives crucially reside in several sites simultaneously in the political system. These 
contestants such as Parliament and the head of the state, compete with one another without a clear 
winner to be the true representative of the people. In a similar vein, Bryan Garsten’s reading of 
Benjamin Constant and James Madison is in line with this second group of thinkers. 15 In this 
second line of interpretation of popular sovereignty, another important form of the representation 
of the people is public opinion. This special role of public opinion in modern politics is 
exemplified by the work of a nineteenth-century legal scholar, Francis Lieber.16 For him, the legal 
system and the government was “that institution or contrivance, through which the state, that is 
jural society, acts in all cases in which it does not act by direct operation of its sovereignty…” 
when in other cases society operates by and large directly through public opinion.17 In this 
understanding, the government becomes even a lesser form of a representative of the people while 
the idea of the civil society became increasingly important at the dawn of the nineteenth century.18  
The present work on Delolme’s political thought, however, nuances this dichotomous 
understanding of popular sovereignty in the development of modern representative democracy. 
In his account, one finds both the underlying theme of the sleeping sovereign as well as the central 
role of public opinion as “public censorial power” which the people themselves exercise to ensure 
that the government works for the public interest.19 For him, popular sovereignty is the power to 
 
13 Quentin Skinner, “Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person of the State,” Journal of Political 
Philosophy 7, no. 1 (1999): 1-29. 
14 Nadia Urbinati, Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2008), 113-114. Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, Michael Sonenscher ed., Political Writings: 
Including the Debate between Sieyès and Tom Paine in 1791 (Indianapolis, Ind.; Cambridge: Hackett 
Publishing, 2003).  
15 Bryan Garsten, “Representative Government and Popular Sovereignty,” in Political Representation, 
ed., Ian Shapiro, Susan C. Stokes, Elisabeth Jean Wood, and Alexander S. Kirshner, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010) 90–110.  
16 Tuck, The Sleeping Sovereign, 255-6. 
17 Francis Lieber, Manual of Political Ethics, Designed Chiefly for the Use of Colleges and Students at 
Law, Vol. 1, (New Jersey: The Law Book Exchange Ltd., 2003), 273. cited in C. B. Robson, “Francis 
Lieber's Theories of Society, Government, and Liberty,” The Journal of Politics 4, no. 2 (1942): 227-49. 
The notion of “jural society” connotes the centrality of the rule of law as the foundation of it. For Lieber’s 
opinion on the task of political science to find an ethical foundation for a modern state as a necessary 
corner of the civil society see James Farr, “Francis Lieber and the interpretation of American political 
science.” The Journal of Politics 52, no. 4 (1990): 1027-1049. 
18 More on the topic see C. B. Robinson, “Francis Lieber's Theories of Society, Government, and 
Liberty." The Journal of Politics 4, no. 2 (1942): 227-49. 




awe but not to act. “The Power of the People is not when they strike, but when they keep in awe: 
it is when they can overthrow everything, that they never need to move.”20 He contended that the 
sovereign people inevitably transform into a tool which popular leaders exploit for their private 
interest. Popular sovereignty retains its meaning only in a static state similar to the notion of 
potential energy in physics. In this regard Delolme’s account of English popular sovereignty 
strikingly resonates with Tuck’s sleeping sovereignty. However, unlike his predecessors and 
contemporaries who focused on the unitary but rather static and distant nature of the sleeping 
sovereign, Delolme painted a different picture based on his examination of English constitutional 
history. His account reveals how English modern liberty depended on the expressions of popular 
sovereignty through public opinion as well as the threat of popular resistance.21 These forms of 
expression allow the people to influence the motions of the government with minimum risks of 
constitutional usurpations. Moreover, Delolme’s sleeping sovereign is described to be harmful 
once woken up. While Rousseau’s sleeping sovereign and representative democracy was a 
reluctant second-best form of republicanism, Delolme’s sleeping sovereign lies in lethargy for the 
benefit of the public.22 This different starting point paves the way for his novel understanding of 
the constitutional arrangement of powers including the function of the executive power in 
preserving the constitutional balance. By insisting that liberty is augmented through 
representative politics according to this understanding of popular sovereignty, the next question 
is how to make the parliament work for the people. It is worth pointing out that in his analysis, 
the goal of the parliament is not to resemble the body of the people since to perfectly represent 
the sleeping sovereign is to defeat its own raison d’être. Rather, the question here is how to best 
prevent the parliament from being a vehicle of the politicians’ private interest. For Delolme, the 
English experience pointed to executive power.  
The second contribution of this thesis is achieved through its contextualist approach. It reveals 
Delolme’s in-depth engagement with the Enlightenment debate on the relationship between 
human nature and history and its implication for the study of politics. The issue was central to the 
formation of modern representative politics because it was part and parcel with the question on 
the compatibility of republican principles with the modern world, especially as the ideological 
baseline for constitutional programmes. This philosophical concern was crucial to the political 
context of the late-eighteenth century with the emergence of America as a modern republic. Prior 
 
20 Ibid., 219. 
21 Delolme did not endorse actual popular uprisings on the ground that it paves the way to power for 
demagogues but he strongly supports the utility of the threat of popular resistance as an effective tool to 
keep the rulers in check. On the relationship between popular resistance, liberty of the press and its role in 
the English system see chapter four. 
22 For Rousseau, representative politics can be seen as a legacy of post-Roman feudalism and in that 
regard, a regression. See Nadia Urbinati, “Rousseau on the Risks of Representing the 




to this study, Delolme’s constitutional thinking is often examined as a theoretical proposition, 
separated from his historical analysis, as well as the context in which it was formed. This approach 
is exemplified by Vile’s Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1977). Delolme is 
described as an inept disciple of Montesquieu. Vile’s argument is based on the claim the 
Delolme’s analysis erroneously endorses the obsolete seventeenth-century strict separation of 
powers based on the division of functions.23 This line of enquiry is reductive and often leads to 
misunderstandings of Delolme’s programme due to its limited constitutionalist scope.  
 Alternatively, this thesis traces Delolme’s intellectual debt to the notion of science of man 
and politics, acknowledging his serious engagement with thinkers like David Hume and Adam 
Smith. He founded his programme on the understanding of human nature as passion-driven on 
one hand, and the legacy of English liberty, on the other. Since human nature is immutable, the 
secret behind the English system, he argued, must lie in the arrangement of its institutions. His 
science of politics approaches political institutions as embodied history, which can only be 
examined retrospectively. This premise prompted him to re-work the history of English liberty 
which he believed, originated from the resistance against the Norman Conquest. The first two 
chapters of the thesis are dedicated to uncovering his distinct intervention into the long-standing 
debate on the history of English liberty. They also reveal how his science of politics and its 
treatment of history is proposed as a superior approach to the language of civic republicanism 
found in other contemporary analyses of English constitution. Chapter three is dedicated to his 
critique of rival accounts in the work of Rousseau, Hume, and Montesquieu. Unlike the limited 
constitutionalist approach, by uncovering his methodology, the thesis acknowledges his 
constructive criticism of civic republican language and how it informs his stance on the 
superiority of modern representative constitution to popular politics.  
Delolme’s objective in presenting the English model as the paradigm for the possibility of 
liberty in the modern world is best understood in tandem with the legacy of English liberty in the 
eighteenth century. Voltaire, for example, praised the English as “the only people upon earth who 
have been able to prescribe limits to the power of Kings by resisting them; and who, by a series 
of struggles, have at last establish'd that wise government.”24  This reputation, however, was 
extremely controversial.25  Despite his high praise of the English system, Montesquieu also 
famously warned against the future of its downfall, should the legislative become more corrupt 
 
23 Maurice Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 
1991), 115. Vile’s passing comments on Delolme, while neglecting entirely his positive account of the 
Humean king-in-parliament scheme as a useful check mechanism, sheds light on his influential American 
reception. 
24 Voltaire, Letters Concerning the English Nation, ed. Nicholas Cronk (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 
1999), 34. 
25 See, for example, David Williams, “French Opinion Concerning the English Constitution in the 




than the executive. 26  The English system as a commercial, quasi-republican state was also 
criticised of its tendency towards instability by Scottish historians including Adam Ferguson in 
his Essay on the History of Civil Society.27 Its reliance upon the detrimental logic of war finance 
and public debt is also elaborated in Hume’s “Of Civil Liberty” as discussed in Before the Deluge 
(2007).28 Delolme’s Constitution proposes an alternative view of the English system as a modern 
free constitution which successfully preserves the ideal of popular sovereignty through its 
institutional arrangement. In order to fully appreciate Delolme’s originality in his analysis of the 
English system and its political impact on the contemporary constitutional debates, a thorough 
examination of his reception which is free from the limitations of previous approaches are 
required. 
The final chapters of the thesis reveal how his work greatly contributed to the development 
of modern republicanism in America as well as the more intricate British debates about 
monarchical and parliamentary power during the formative years of 1780s. In this regard, 
Delolme’s work and its reception also significantly provides a window for observing some of the 
tensions in the ideas of modern liberty and modern republicanism. In Britain, his analysis of the 
benefit of English monarchical executive power was employed to address the problem of 
legislative despotism and the limits of republicanism as an ideological baseline for constitutional 
reform programmes. However, his notion of “public censorial power” and liberty of the press also 
attracted the attention of some constitutional reform enthusiasts. They were highly praised by 
prominent critics of George III such as Junius and John Cartwright as well as Jeremy Bentham 
and John Lind. Finally, chapter six on the American reception saw the adaptation and 
transformation of his analysis of the executive power in the debate on the American presidential 
office. Through the reading of Alexander Hamilton, John Adams, and the Jeffersonian circle, 
Delolme’s work was associated with a vision for modern republicanism for a large-scale, 
commerce-based state, which benefits from the constructive tension between the executive power 
and the people. This vision was criticised by John Stevens in his Observations on Government: 
Including Some Animadversions on Mr. Adams's Defence of the Constitutions of Government of 
the United States of America: and on Mr. De Lolme's Constitution of England (1787). Its French 
translation and commentary by the Jeffersonian circle employs Delolme’s account of modern 
republicanism to juxtapose with their agriculture-based, egalitarian republicanism which they 
 
26 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. and ed. Ann M. Cohler, Basia Miller, Harold Summel 
Stone. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989 [1748]), book 11, chapter 6, 166. 
27 See, for example, Iain McDaniel, Adam Ferguson in the Scottish Enlightenment, (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2013), 54-63. 
28 David Hume, “Of Civil Liberty” in Hume, Essays: Moral, Political and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985), 96. More on the future of the English model and its critics in the 
eighteenth century see Michael Sonenscher, Before the Deluge: Public Debt, Inequality, and the 




deemed to be a better model for France amidst the vehement discussions about constitutional 
reforms pre-1789. Overall, the final chapter on Delolme’s reception also reflects the decline in 
historical thinking of liberal constitutionalism, as it shows the complete separation of his account 
of executive power from the historical analysis that gives rise to it.  
By weaving together bits and pieces of his programme previously overlooked or studied 
incomprehensively, the thesis tells a story of a distinct and largely forgotten variant of an 
argument for representative democracy. His programme places an active but limited executive 
power and the “public censorial power” as key components in keeping the legislative power from 
claiming the sole right as the representative of popular sovereignty. In this regard, contemporary 
American politics operates contra to Delolme’s argument for representative democracy because 
the Presidential office is the closest indicator of popularity under the current electoral system.29 
As for the British counterpart, in a different parliamentary form but within similar trend, the 
executive power of the cabinet also has a strong link to popular support by the turn of the twentieth 
century with the rise of professional politicians coincided with the victory of mass democracy 
exemplified by the successful career of William Gladstone. 30  William Selinger in his 
Parliamentarism: From Burke to Weber (2019) points out the neglected ideal of deliberative 
parliamentarism and the gradual rise to prominence of the plebiscitary executive with the 
establishment of mass democracy in his examination of Max Weber’s Politics as a Vocation 
(1919).31 Delolme’s Constitution, in this regard, also presents twenty-first century readers with 
an entry point into early forms of modern representative politics in the eighteenth century and its  
difficult relationship to executive power, as well as its antagonism against popular politics –  
whether in the form of popular politicians or popular uprisings led by demagogues. In Delolme’s 
view, a modern representative constitution is always at risk when any political body can totally 
claim the popular support and effectively, the sovereign power. The monarchical executive power 
of the English system therefore was not there to be revered but to be an object of jealousy.32 
English liberty was the result of an institutional design which channelled the distrust inherent in 
human nature for the public good. This scheme was explicit when popular politicians like the 
Duke of Marlborough, despite his military success and overwhelming popular support, did not 
pose a threat to the constitution because of the existence of the monarchical executive power.33  
 
29 Although the creation of the electoral college was presented as a compromise between direct popular 
vote and American states’ local representative, compared to other offices in the American complex 
system, the American president is closest to holding a true popular support.  
30 William Selinger, Parliamentarism: From Burke to Weber, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2019), 196.  
31 Ibid. 
32 Delolme, Constitution, 145. 




The contribution that the thesis makes to the study on the history of political thought can also 
be understood as a part of the recent scholarly interest in the relationship between republicanism 
and liberalism. Most notably, Liberal Beginnings: Making a Republic for the Modern (2008) 
explores canonical authors from Adam Smith, Benjamin Constant to James Madison for their 
evaluation of republican principles in the light of the new ideal of individual negative liberty as 
the political end of a modern constitution. 34  The study of this republicanism-liberalism 
convergence is more than ever relevant amidst the present crisis of liberalism which calls for the 
re-evaluation of the tradition and its critique as examined in the work of, among others, Philip 
Pettit and Quentin Skinner.35  While liberty has proved to be a fruitful starting point in the 
investigation into this intellectual convergence, its philosophical focus often eclipses the extent 
to which the English model had on the development of liberalism. Selinger’s Parliamentarism: 
From Burke to Weber has recently pointed out this gap in the literature and provides an in-depth 
historical examination of the “concrete, overarching project” of parliamentarism in its own right 
without which liberalism as we know it would not have been possible. The present work, instead, 
turns to the topic of executive power as a guiding question in this important line of research on 
the contribution of republicanism and its critique to liberalism. Alternatively, this thesis aims to 
demonstrate how the formation of modern executive power was also a crucial point of connection 
between republicanism and liberalism and in doing so, also broaden present studies on the topic 
beyond the framework of the state of exception by uncovering its function to prevent 
constitutional usurpations caused by potential factional claims of popular sovereignty. 
Just as some scholars trace the origin of American presidential power back to the British royal 
prerogative, the thesis sheds light on its ambiguous locus in representative democracy through the 
transformation of the English royal executive power into the First Magistrate.36  This formation 
of the English modern executive power in Constitution is best understood in tandem with 
Delolme’s concern with the threat of legislative despotism.37 Through the present study on his 
political thought and its reception, one can reflect on the absence of this strand of representative 
democracy which explicitly warns against the mixture of popular support with any constitutional 
power and the implications it echoes in today’s politics in time of the rise of plebiscitary executive. 
 
34 Andreas Kalyvas and Ira Katznelson, Liberal Beginnings: Making a Republic for the Moderns, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
35 Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999). Quentin Skinner. Liberty before Liberalism. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1998). 
36 Delolme, Constitution, 67, 73. 
37 William Scheuerman, “American Kingship? Monarchical Origins of Modern Presidentialism,” Polity 
37, no. 1 (2005): 24-53. On the political agenda of the Economical Reform to reduce the political power 
of George III see Ian R. Christie, “III. Economical Reform and ‘The Influence of the Crown’, 1780,” 
Cambridge Historical Journal 12, no. 2 (1956): 144-54. On the relationship between Delolme’s account 






Scholarly Context and Literature Review. 
 
Secondary literature disagrees on Delolme’s politics. While some insist on the conservative 
and “monarchist” nature of his writing, others emphasize the liberal tendency of his constitutional 
ideas on checks and balances. The dispute concerning the nature of his work stems partly from 
the inadequate contextualization which leads to several and often contradictory interpretations. 
This section uses the question on the nature of Delolme’s political thought to navigate the 
scholarly context and the literature review, in order to highlight the thesis’ alternative view on his 
work. Instead of focusing on the terminological issue of republicanism, liberalism, or 
conservatism, the thesis reveals that the central theme of his work is the distinction between 
popular sovereignty and government in a modern representative constitution, and how the 
executive power can play a positive role in this political order. This theme cuts across forms of 
government as well as the categories of republicanism, conservatism, and liberalism. This is 
reflected in, for example, the reception of his arguments about the English monarchial executive 
power in the debate on the American presidential office.  
The first reading perceives him as Montesquieu’s disciple. This approach also often regards 
his work as supportive of the feudal society of orders, with the people, the nobility, and the king. 
Constitution was a lesser Spirit of the Laws and a blatant endorsement of the British Empire, 
turning a blind eye to its many flaws.38 Delolme’s language of checks and balances as well as the 
metaphor of the constitution as a machine was perceived as following Montesquieu’s preference 
for social orders that underpin the balanced constitution.39  This first approach includes Karl 
Marx’s 1848 The Crisis and the Counter- Revolution which vehemently criticises Delolme and 
Montesquieu together. “the Montesquieu-Delolme worm-eaten theory” for Marx was nothing 
other than “worn-out phrases and long exploded fictions!” 40  In this reading, Delolme’s 
constitutional theory which praises the English system wrongly assumes the significance of the 
institution of the Crown in any modern constitutional theory. Thomas Carlyle’s Signs of the Times 
(1829) similarly categorises Delolme’s political writing alongside other authors who favoured 
 
38 See, for example, Weekly Political Register, Volume 6, ed. William Cobbett 1804, (London, 1804), 
804. Delolme, along with Montesquieu and Blackstone, are portrayed as sarcastically as ‘those eloquent 
panegyrists of our Constitution’ who failed to see the reality of the oppressive British laws in Ireland.  
39 More on the topic see Montesquieu's science of politics: Essays on the Spirit of Laws, Cecil Courney, 
Paul A. Rahe, Michael A. Mosher, Sharon Krause, Rebecca E. Kingston, Catherine Larrere, and Iris Cox 
ed., (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000).  
40 Karl Marx, Neue Rheinische Zeitung, 13 September 1848, the Marxists’ Internet archive, accessed May 




Montesquieu-inspired science of politics or what Carlyle dubbed the language of “Mechanism”. 
These authors relied on the metaphor of the society as a machine for their political enquiries. 
Carlyle was critical of this new approach as it neglects the moral aspect of the political life. In the 
nineteenth century, “[n]owhere…is the deep, almost exclusive faith we have in Mechanism more 
visible than in the Politics of the time.” The metaphor of the “Machine of the Society” rendered 
the philosophy of the age not; “a Socrates, a Plato, a Hooker, or Taylor who inculcates on men 
the necessity and the infinite worth of moral goodness…but a Smith, a Delolme, a Bentham, who 
chiefly inculcates the reverse of this,---that our happiness depends entirely on external 
circumstances; nay, that the strength and dignity of the mind within us is itself the creature and 
consequence of these.”41  
This first line of enquiry continues in the later work of Joyce Appleby. She reads Constitution 
in the context of the American founding generation, under the label of a conservative and a 
monarchist who wanted to preserve the feudal social orders incompatible with the modern world. 
Her argument is informed by Delolme’s reception by John Adams as well as critics of his work 
such as Thomas Jefferson’s and his allies including Marquis de Condorcet and Philip Mazzei.42 
In Appleby’s narrative, Delolme’s contention for a strong and unitary executive power is 
explained by his penchant for monarchy and “a balanced government of commons, lords, and 
king, as in England”.43 Her detailed historical investigation sets the main tenet for subsequent 
studies on Delolme by scholars on constitutional theory especially in the North American context 
with a strong focus on the subject of the monarchical root of modern republican executive 
power.44 However, it relies on the interpretation of his work by the Jeffersonian circle and does 
not seriously engage with Constitution and its arguments in their own rights nor its various 
political roles on the other side of the Atlantic. 
The second reading emphasises on Delolme’s quest for political stability through the 
arrangement of powers in the modern republican constitution. This line of enquiry benefits from 
a more rigorous contextualization of his work, revealing its influence in the debates on the English 
model its applicability on the continent. 45 Iain McDaniel’s “Jean-Louis Delolme and the Political 
 
41 Thomas Carlyle, “Signs of the Times,” Edinburgh Review 49 (1829). 
42 Joyce Appleby, “The Jefferson-Adams Rupture and the First French Translation of John Adams' 
Defence.”, The American Historical Review 73, no. 4 (1968): 1084-091. For the criticism of Delolme by 
the Jeffersonian circle see Chapter Six. 
43 Ibid., 1088. 
44 For Delolme’s “Hobbesian” influence on the Canadian constitutional design see Gregory Millard, “The 
Canadian Federalist Experiment: From Defiant Monarchy to Reluctant Republic.” The American Review 
of Canadian Studies 36, no. 4 (Winter, 2006): 698.  
45 Delolme played crucial roles in the late eighteenth as well as in the nineteenth century European 
politics which requires future research. However, it lies outside the scope of this present thesis which uses 
the topic of executive power and its relationship to modern constitutional liberty to navigate his political 
thought and its reception in Britain and America. There have been studies on Delolme’s reception in 




Science of the English Empire” sheds light on the relationship between Delolme’s idea of science 
of politics and the concern about the stability of modern extensive empires. It also crucially 
challenges previous assumption about Montesquieu’s influence on his work by highlighting 
Delolme’s extensive critique of Spirit of the Laws. 46  R.R. Palmer’s the Age of Democratic 
Revolution (1959) explores Delolme’s Genevan background and its influence on his analysis in 
Constitution. For Palmer, what persists throughout his work both as a young citizen of Geneva 
and later as an English “subject by choice” is his “intense dislike of government by oligarchy, 
coterie, or self-perpetuating aristocracy.”47 For Palmer, this opinion, rather than monarchism, was 
shared by John Adams which explains Delolme’s positive reception by the framer. Delolme 
uniquely contributed to the debate on the problem of legislative despotism inherent in modern 
representative constitution through his analysis on the English monarchical executive power.  
William Selinger’s Parliamentarism: From Burke to Weber (2019) brings to the fore the 
concrete project of parliamentarism as the forgotten aspect of liberalism during its formative years 
in the eighteenth century to cope with the issue of stability in the large-scale modern state. The 
English parliamentary system was central to this project. He accredits Delolme for acknowledging 
and embracing the rise of the English legislative power as the most dominant branch of the 
English constitution, creating a new kind of constitutional balance with the rise of the legislative 
power post-1688.48  While it is true that Delolme recognised the establishment of legislative 
supremacy in England, he was far more concerned about new kinds of despotism which this new 
constitutional arrangement brought about than Selinger’s reading suggests. Richard Whatmore’s 
Against War and Empire (2012) tells a story of how Delolme was a part of the history of the small 
republic of Geneva and its intellectual influence on the European constitutional thinking. 
Delolme’s programme, it is argued, envisions the English model as “the only republic worth this 
name in the modern world.”49 In “The role of Britain in the political thought of the Genevan exiles 
 
Englands (Berlin: Ebering, 1934) and Jean-Pierre Machelon’s Les idées politiques de Jean-Louis de 
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Virtue for Courageous Minds: Moderation in French Political Thought, 1748–1830, (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2012), 94-96. 
46 Iain McDaniel. “Jean-Louis Delolme and the Political Science o the English Empire”, The Historical 
Journal 55, no. 1 (2012): 21-44. 
47 R.R. Palmer, The Age of Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760-
1800, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), 146. Delolme signed the dedication to 
the king of the 1784 edition as Subject by Choice. 
48 William Selinger, Parliamentarism: From Burke to Weber, (London: Cambridge University Press, 
2019), 39-48. 
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of 1782”, he employs the Genevan question concerning the distinction between government and 
sovereignty to navigate the intellectual formation of Geneva’s political exiles. Delolme 
exemplifies a departure from the tradition of unitary sovereignty to the balance of sovereign 
authorities characteristic of the English system. The English representative constitution, for him, 
was superior to a popular constitution because it could prevent abuse of power at the expense of 
public liberty more effectively.50  All in all, the question of political stability for a modern 
representative constitution dominates this main line of investigation which perceives Delolme as 
a modern republican author. While the rigorous contextualisation of his work successfully reveals 
the complexity of his project than previously assumed by the nineteenth-century readers, this line 
of investigation still largely focuses on the parliamentary powers of the executive power and the 
legislative power with little engagement with the realm of civil society in his analysis of the 
English system. 
The last line of investigation focuses on Delolme’s notion of public opinion and the notion of 
public censorial power. Carl Schmitt’s 1928 Constitutional Theory interestingly makes a remark 
on Delolme’s notion of “censorial power” as an example of how the eighteenth-century 
enlightened despotism was accompanied by the institutionalisation of enlightened public opinion 
as a mechanism to control state power. “Delolme speaks for the fact that the people exercise their 
special authority through public opinion, the power to censure. In the liberal demands of the 
nineteenth century, the idea of liberal freedom combines with this democratic idea.”51 Schmitt 
intriguingly acknowledges the democratic elements inherent in the eighteenth-century notion of 
enlightened public opinion and its power in shaping the parliamentary agenda. However, he did 
not engage further with Constitution and the relationship of this censorial power to other 
constitutional powers.  Similarly, “Liberty, metaphor, and mechanism: ‘checks and balances’ and 
the origins of modern constitutionalism” highlights Delolme’s originality in recognising the 
dynamic nature of the English constitutional balance of power with its feedback mechanism from 
the public opinion.52  
Using the topic of executive power as its point of departure, as it is one of the most 
underexamined and controversial constitutional powers in modern representative democracy, the 
thesis moves Delolme out of Montesquieu’s shadow. It weaves together elements of his 
programme namely the executive power, national union, public opinion and the meaning of 
 
50 Richard Whatmore, “The Role of Britain in the Political Thought of the Genevan Exiles of 1782” in 
Genève, Lieu D'Angleterre, 1725-1814: Geneva, an English Enclave, 1725-1814, Valérie Cossy, Bela 
Kapossy, and Richard Whatmore ed., (Geneva: Slatkine, 2009). 
51 Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, Jeffrey Seitzer ed. (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 
2008), 277. 
52 David Wootton, “Liberty, metaphor, and mechanism: ‘checks and balances’ and the origins of modern 
constitutionalism” in Liberty and American Experience in the Eighteenth Century, David Womersly ed. 




representation, previously examined individually and often outside its historical context. In doing 
so, thesis uncovers his significance to the eighteenth-century enlightenment political thought   and 
broadens the horizon of contemporary scholarship on the idea of executive power and its 
relationship to modern constitutional liberty. His programme epitomises early attempts to explain 
the relationship between popular sovereignty and political representation positively to 
demonstrate the superiority of modern states to its popular counterparts. This mission of his 
political writing explains the confusion about the nature of his work in secondary literature which 
argues that his work was everything from liberal, conservative, monarchist, to republican, as it 
























Science of Politics and Executive Power 
 
The chapter locates Delolme’s science of politics in the broader Enlightenment debate 
about self-interest and sociability and the post-Hobbesian development of passion-driven science 
of man and its implications to constitutional thinking. István Hont demonstrates how the 
formation of the modern state theories rely on the philosophical foundation of Hobbes’ 
representative sovereignty which has adapted itself to the rise of commercial society in the 
eighteenth century.53 By seeing Delolme’s work in the light of this tradition, we can see the wide 
scope of his inquiry which goes well beyond the interplay of the legislative and the executive 
power in the parliament. In Constitution, one begins to see the importance of extra-parliamentary 
political powers as well as the notion of commercial society to his study of politics. Prior to the 
present study, the centrality of civil society to Delolme’s programme has scarcely been examined. 
His argument for a unitary executive power is often read as a part of the literature on liberal 
constitutional checks and balances. The main goal of this chapter is to reveal how although his 
work shares several characteristics with the thinkers who believed in the passion-driven human 
nature exemplified by Thomas Hobbes, he did not come to similar authoritative conclusions. 
Instead, he argued that the legacy of English liberty once properly examined revealed that the 
deprived human nature could be managed by institutional arrangements. This institutional 
approach focuses on different kinds of powers at work in a political system regardless of the form 
of the government and later, allowed him to put forward a unique account of modern executive 
power and its constructive tension with powers in the realm of the civil society.  
 
Jean-Louis Delolme: A Member of the Council of Two Hundred, A Représentant, and An 
English Subject by Choice.54 
 
I begin with some personal background of Jean-Louis Delolme because his experience in 
Geneva and later, England, was crucial to the formation of his science of politics and his 
understanding of modern liberty. In some interpretations, his exile to England led to his 
 
53 Isván Hont, “Jealousy of Trade: An Introduction,” in Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and 
the Nation-state in Historical Perspective, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 1-156.  
54 The dedication page of the 1784 edition of Constitution was signed “Subject by Choice, J.L. DE 




abandoning of republicanism.55 However, agreeing with the analysis of Palmer in The Age of 
Democratic Revolution, the present work argues that the continuity in Delolme’s political thought 
remains in his antagonism against the rule of the few especially in disguise of a republic.56 This 
concern about powerful elites remained the central issue in his political writing and was the reason 
behind his preference for a “science of politics”. This is because a science of politics, in his view, 
sees beyond the form of the government in its examination of liberty. His early years in Geneva 
witnessed the republic being torn between the ruling elites of the small councils (the Council of 
the Two Hundred and the Council of the Twenty-Five) and the General Council of all the 
citizens.57 Delolme himself was a member of the Council of the Two-Hundred but he sympathised 
with the cause of the democratic représentants.58 Being a citizen of Geneva in the eighteenth 
century and active in the political struggle meant that he was familiar with the question of popular 
sovereignty which was at the heart of the debate between the ruling elites and the general 
council.59  
By the time he was twenty-two in 1762, Geneva had seen serious political challenges 
against the ruling patrician oligarchs. Delolme penned several pamphlets, arguing for the cause 
of the représentants to reform the constitution to its original popular sovereignty principle.60 The 
last one was titled La purification des trois points de droit souillés par un anonyme which resulted 
in his exile from Geneva to England. In the pamphlet, the young Delolme directly addressed the 
question concerning the nature of the constitution and the expression of popular sovereignty in 
the constitution of the Genevan Republic. He wrote: “What, sir, is the Constitution? What is it 
this unknown Being that assigns functions to the General Council, to the Sovereign of the 
Republic? It is the nymph from whom Numa is said to have received his laws?...The Constitution 
is the totality of Laws, or Law in the collective sense. Law is the will of the Sovereign. The 
Sovereign in Geneva is the General Council.”61  
 
55 This reading is exemplified by William Selinger in his Parliamentarism: From Burke to Weber, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 40.  
56 R.R. Palmer, The Age of Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America 1760-
1800, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 109. 
57 It should be reminded that who counted as citizens were in reality a small fraction of the population of 
Geneva. 
58 Richard Whatmore, Against War and Empire: Geneva, Britain, and France in the Eighteenth Century, 
(New Haven, Connecticut; London: Yale University Press, 2012), 112. 
59 Richard Tuck, The Sleeping Sovereign: The Invention of Modern Democracy, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), 121. 
60 For the Delolme as a part of the Genevan-British intellectual and political connections see Richard 
Whatmroe, Against War and Empire: Geneva, Britain, and France in the Eighteenth Century, (2012), 
112-133. 
61 Jean-Louis Delolme, La purification des trois points de droit souillés par un anonyme, (Geneva, 1767) 
English translation from R.R. Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of 
Europe and America, 1760-1800, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 102. This Genevan 
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His understanding of popular sovereignty before his exile to England, according to Joseph 
de Maistre, was probably directly influenced by Rousseau as he was Rousseau’s former disciple 
when he was in Geneva.62 Nonetheless, from the Genevan experience, he also formed a lifelong 
belief that political liberty cannot be subsisted simply by the correct form (namely the republican 
form) of the government. In his motherland, he witnessed how “the outward form” of the 
government was not a guarantee of political liberty. In England, Delolme became acquainted with 
critics of the English constitution including Jeremy Bentham and Samuel Romilly, a prominent 
legal reformer and a close friend of Bentham. He started writing Constitution one year after he 
came to England. The commercial success of the work despite its rough start came as a surprise 
even to its own author. Disappointed with the failure to secure a patronage which drove him to 
opt for the subscription scheme, Delolme wrote in the Advertisement of the 1784 English edition 
of the book that “I was preparing to boil my tea kettle with it [the printed copies]…”63 This 
amusing anecdote is also referred to in one of Delolme’s letters to Benjamin Franklin. He wrote: 
“I wish the Preface may amuse you: my design, in the first part of it, was to make the reader Smile, 
and at the Same time to Speak the truth.”64  
Although his life in England led to res angusta domi, he managed to stay within London’s 
intellectual milieu.65 This Genevan background as well as his personal relationship with political 
writers in London shaped his philosophical foundations, which have been overlooked by 
secondary literature. This chapter focuses on one important aspect of these foundations, namely 
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The Scottish Enlightenment and Science of Politics. 
 
Delolme made several references to David Hume’s political essays, William Robertson’s 
History of Scotland (1758) as well as Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations (1776) in his political writing, especially in Constitution. From this, we know 
that Delolme engaged with the work of at least some of the most prominent authors of the Scottish 
Enlightenment. Moreover, he expressed his interest in Scotland as a part of “the British Empire 
in Europe”, which was also the title of his essay published in Dublin in 1787. It was also later 
incorporated as an introduction to the re-printing of Daniel Defoe’s History of the Union.66 
Delolme’s Constitution was also well-received in Scotland after its first English edition was 
published in 1775. For example, there was an extensive book review of his masterpiece in The 
Edinburgh Magazine by Gilbert Stewart. 67  More importantly, Delolme’s terminology in 
Constitution also proves beyond doubt that he was influenced by the Scottish Enlightenment 
tradition. Before the investigation on Delolme’s appropriation as well as adaptation of science of 
politics, I first examine the notion of science of politics and its formation in Scotland to 
demonstrate why it became an attractive approach for Delolme and his delineation of the English 
system. 
Although Delolme’s work is often associated with the constitutional balance of powers 
between the legislative and the executive by legal scholars, the scope of his Constitution in fact 
covers the sphere of what is called civil society today.68 This overlooked aspect of his science of 
politics might be the result of the lack of interest in the historical and intellectual context of his 
work which the present study aims to rectify. Considering his interest in the Scottish 
Enlightenment thinkers as above mentioned, it is likely that Delolme was inspired by the tradition 
and its treatment of the notion of the public which forms a crucial part in his delineation of the 
English system. Scotland after the 1707 Act of Union faced an intellectual challenge in their 
approach to the study of politics. When the centre of politics was shifted to Westminster, the 
change also compelled the Scottish literati to theorise the emerging and intellectually vibrant 
public discussions beyond the topic of Scottish parliamentary politics.69 It gave birth to rich 
 
66 This particular text is discussed in detail in Chapter Two. 
67 Delolme, Jean-Louis, An Essay Containing A Few Strictures on the Union of Scotland With England 
and On the Present Situation of Ireland Being and Introduction to Defoe’s History of the Union, (London, 
1786) Later republished as The British Empire in Europe Part I, II and III, (Dublin, 1787). 
68 Most literature on Delolme which examines his work under the topic of separation of powers rarely 
addresses the role of the public in his constitutional theory and mostly focuses on his account of the 
relationship between the executive and the legislative. See, for example, Maurice John Crawley Vile. 
Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 105-106.  
69 Fania Oz-Salberger, “The political theory of the Scottish Enlightenment”, in The Cambridge 




theoretical understandings of the idea of civil society which takes deep roots in this tradition and 
remains one of its most well-known aspects.70 One of the works that best exemplifies this legacy 
of the Scottish Enlightenment is Adam Ferguson’s An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1723-
1816).71  
Beyond the scope of science of politics, Delolme was also influenced by the tradition’s 
scientific inspiration which seeks to explain politics in a similar manner that a scientist treats 
nature. The paradigm shift was caused by the established role of Newtonian physics as well as 
the later discovery of the gravitational force by the late-eighteenth century among the Scottish 
intellectual milieu. The Scottish Enlightenment’s scientific aspiration is best exemplified by the 
fascination with, and the adaptation of, the Newtonian framework derived from his discovery of 
the laws of motion. This framework assumes that like the three governing laws of motion in the 
natural world, social phenomena can also be comprehended in terms of their relation to a set of 
general laws waiting to be discovered. The possibility of this claim was further proven by 
Newton’s later discovery of the gravitational force. This idea of general laws is also underpinned 
by the normative belief in progress and the mission of “the enlightened” to dispel darkness, a 
metaphor for superstitions and ignorance, with the light of reason. This normative aspect of the 
scientific aspiration is explicit in Alexander Pope’s epitaph on Newton: “NATURE and Nature’s 
Laws lay hid in Night: God said, “Let Newton be!” and all was light.”72 This sense of mission 
and the belief in progress is an important characteristic which the Scottish Enlightenment shared 
with the larger European Enlightenment.  
David Hume in his That Politics Might be Reduced to Science (1741) best captures this 
scientific aspiration in the modern study of politics and its relation to the historical-comparative 
approach. Since human nature, like governing laws in science exemplified by the laws of motion, 
remains unchanged, the success and failure of different kinds of government in preserving the 
well-being of citizens should depend upon the way in which the political system is organised. The 
topic becomes particularly important for the modern audience amidst the decline of absolute 
government. “All absolute governments must very much depend on the administration; and this 
is one of the great inconveniences attending that form of government. But a republican and free 
government would be an obvious absurdity, if the particular checks and controuls, provided by 
the constitution, had really no influence, and made it not the interest, even of bad men, to act for 
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the public good. Such is the intention of these forms of government, and such is their real effect, 
where they are wisely constituted.”73 This particular quote captures an important aspect of the 
foundation of Delolme’s constitutional thinking which believes in the institutional remedy to the 
passion-driven human nature in the realm of politics. 
Delolme himself was also fascinated with the rise of modern science especially on 
mechanics. One record mentions his interest in mechanical designs which he attempted to get 
patents although unsuccessfully.74 His interest in natural science also was proven through his 
commission paid by Benjamin Franklin to translate Giovanni Battista Beccaria’s Dell’ 
Elettricismo naturale ed artificiale (On Natural and Artificial Electricity) (1753) into English.75 
His passion in natural science likely contributed to his later scholarly interest in the tradition of 
science of politics. Apart from his interest in natural science, another reason for Delolme’s interest 
in the work of the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers might derive from their shared concern about 
the inadequacy of civic virtues in understanding modern politics and the increasingly complex 
commercial society. Direct political participation in ancient republics no longer was the only 
criterion for liberty. To understand politics, he contended, one first has to re-think what underlying 
principles that govern people and their actions. 
 
Delolme’s Science of Politics. 
 
I begin this section by highlighting the difficulty in outlining Delolme’s understanding of 
science of man or a study on human nature because he purposefully did not cover it in Constitution. 
He explained that: 
To give a demonstration of the manner which all these things [components of the English system] 
are brought to bear and operated, is not…my design to attempt here [in Constitution]: the 
principles from which such demonstration is to be derived, supposed an enquiry into the nature of 
Man, and of human affairs, which rather belongs to Philosophy (though to a branch hitherto 
unexplored) than to Politics…It may, if the reader pleases, belong to the Science of Metapolitics; 
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in the same sense as we say Metaphysics; that is, the Science of those things which lie beyond 
physical, or substantial, things.”76 
He acknowledged the foundational role of “the knowledge of Man” to all other sciences, 
echoing Hume’s contention in his preface to his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739). Hume 
famously wrote that “all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature; and that 
however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or 
another. Even Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some measure 
dependent on the science of Man; since they lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged of 
by their powers and faculties.”77 Despite the intention not to discuss science on man, his idea of 
human nature can nonetheless be distilled from not only Constitution but also from his other 
overlooked work such as History of the Flagellants or Memorials of Human Superstition (1777). 
This aspect of his political writing has previously been neglected by scholars who often only focus 
on his contribution to the genre of balance of powers theory.78  
Delolme also further explained the relation between his science of politics and the 
understanding of human nature that: 
In general, the Science of Politics, considered as an exact Science, that is to say, as a Science capable 
of actual demonstration, is infinitely deeper than the reader so much perhaps as suspects. The 
knowledge of Man, on which such a Science, with its preliminary axioms and definitions, is to be 
grounded, has hitherto remained surprisingly imperfect: as one instance, how little Man is known to 
himself… still remains an equally inexplicable mystery.79 
The passage further reveals Delolme’s opinion on the current state of science of man which 
was incomplete due to previous misconceptions. The “preliminary axioms and definitions” on the 
study of human nature were mistaken, hence the need to ground the study of politics on a 
completely new footing. In this regard, the science of man was in an imperfect state, but this 
awareness also meant that it could, from this point in history, move into a progressive direction, 
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The Rise of Commercial Society and the Inadequacy of Civic Republicanism. 
  
Another important aspect of Delolme’s science of politics that this chapter hopes to reveal is 
how it was a response to the revived interest in civic republicanism during the American crisis. 
In the Advertisement of Constitution he wrote that “had the like arguments [of his] in favour of 
the existing Government of this Country, against republican principles, been shown to Charles 
the First, or his Ministers, at a certain period of his reign, they would have very willingly defrayed 
the expenses of the publication”, his science of politics aims at exposing defects of civic 
republicanism and its understanding of politics. 80  He also identified statesmen as his target 
audience and the ambition of the work to prevent civil upheaval and war which he associated with 
republican politics. The dangers of civic republicanism in the context of eighteenth century is 
twofold. First, politically it supported the “disunion of the Empire” at the expense of individual 
liberty as the direct cause of war.81 But more importantly, civic republicanism was an inadequate 
approach to the study of politics by the time of the late-eighteenth century. 
His science of man is critical of the idea of self-determination and direct participation in the 
law-making process as liberty as the starting point in political inquiries. Instead, he endorsed a 
negative definition of liberty as the absence of impediments, resonating with Hobbes.82 This genre 
of literature is exemplified by Richard Price’s Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty 
(1776).83 Delolme’s project alternatively aims to understand human nature and its relation to the 
society beyond one’s direct political participation in the polis. For him, the language of civic 
virtue cannot capture the complexity of the emerging commercial society, especially its role in 
shaping mores and consequently, politics. In other words, his analysis of English constitutional 
history also hopes to reveal how forces beyond the parliament shaped the modern constitution. 
Commerce was among the most important factors. He observed how “Commerce, besides, with 
its attendant arts, and above all that of printing, diffused more salutary notions throughout all 
orders of the people; a new light began to rise upon the Nation.”84 Due to “the unavoidable 
consequences of the progress of trade and civilization”, the study of human nature, therefore, can 
no longer be understood narrowly in relation to one’s direct participation in politics.85 His interest 
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in the rise of commercial society places him firmly alongside the like of Mandeville, Hume and 
Smith.  
The rise of commerce meant the study of politics has to take into account new forms of power 
beyond the parliament and crucially in the realm of the civil society. Following Mandeville, 
Delolme emphasised how public good and peace can be created by channelling passions via 
intricate institutional designs not limited to the law-making process.86 Acknowledging Delolme 
as a theorist of civil society, Helmut Pappe made an interesting remark on Delolme’s approach to 
the study of English history that, unlike Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England 
(1765-1770), Delolme’s approach is much more “sociological”. Pappe interestingly argued that:  
Blackstone had dealt with the formal institutions of the law and the constitution rather than their 
underlying reality. He was no sociologist who asks how people actually do behave, and how 
constitutions actually work. He failed to examine the psychological and sociological aspects which the 
eighteenth- century science of man, following Hobbes, Locke, Mandeville, Hume, Adam Smith, and 
their friends, had brought into being. In particular, the English constitution had been made a subject of 
sociological scrutiny by two foreign observers, Montesquieu and Rousseau. It was against the 
background of their work that Jean-Louis Delolme (1740-1806) wrote his searching examination of 
the Constitution de l'Angleterre in 1771.87 
This chapter, in this regard, pursues this line of enquiry which acknowledges the centrality of 
the realm of civil society in Delolme’s science of politics.  For him, commerce is a form of 
expression of the human need for esteem. The premise of approbation or esteem-seeking in 
commerce can be understood in the act of trade. Delolme gave an example of how “it is a common 
complaint made by every Trader in regard to his gain, as well as by every Great Men in regard to 
his emoluments…” that they do not receive fair returns or recognition.88 Interestingly, here he 
argued that financial transaction is only an expression of the underlying human nature which seeks 
approbation whether it is in the form of money or something else of value. Unlike previous 
approaches, Delolme’s understanding of human nature as approbation-seeking can explain both 
economic and political activities. In a revealing passage, he concluded that:  
To procure one’s notions and opinions to be attended to, and approved, by the circle of one’s 
acquaintance, is the universal wish of Mankind. Everyone shares this trait to be recognized, When the 
approbation of Mankind is in question, all persons, whatever their different ranks may be, consider 
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themselves as being engaged in the same career: they look upon themselves as being candidates for the 
very same kind of advantage: high and low, all are in that respect in a state of primaeval equality…89  
In politics, this yearning for approbation is translated into an inevitable quest for power. The 
need for approbation justifies Delolme’s selection of the English system as his topic because its 
subjects alone enjoyed an exceptional degree of liberty despite “the avarice and lust of dominion 
inherent in human Nature.”90 Unless, he argued, “we are at the same time also determined to 
believe ... that partial Nature forms Men in this Island, of quite other stuff than the selfish and 
ambitious one of which she ever made them in other Countries.”91 With this starting point inherent 
in human nature, Delolme’s work sometimes is perceived as a direct disciple of Hobbes. For 
example, one scholar argues that it was Delolme who introduced Canada’s first prime minister, 
John A. Macdonald, to the Hobbesian character of the English constitution with an emphasis on 
the benefit of the stability of the Crown to public liberty.92 It is true that Delolme’s understanding 
of human nature with its “avarice and lust of domination” indisputably resonates with Hobbes’ 
libido dominandi which arises first from the necessity of self-preservation.93 However, this kind 
of Hobbesian interpretation of Delolme risks overlooking his different political conclusion from 
Hobbes’, as it misses his important message, arguing that the English system was worthy of the 
modern world precisely because the stability of the English Crown uniquely stemmed from “free 
action, and not fear”94. The explicit rejection of fear as the foundation of the stability of the 
executive power in his account can be read as a deliberate rejection of the Hobbesian accusation. 
It also explains the absence of any references to Hobbes in all of his work despite blatant similarity 
in, for example, his definition of liberty.95 The significance of commerce in Delolme’s programme 
is also explicit in his account of the monarchical executive power which covers the role of “the 
superintendent of Commerce”.96 Although he only gave brief hints in Constitution, Delolme was 
well aware of how the rise of commercial civil society had transformed the scope of political 
analysis beyond the capacity of civic republicanism.  
For the political implications of the esteem-seeking human nature, Delolme differed from 
Hobbes because for him, in the realm of politics, the selfish quality of human nature has both 
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convenient and inconvenient effects. Although it gives rise to the endless quest for power, it also 
makes the people in power always prefer to have the approval of the public. In this regard, to put 
it in Hume’s words, their political authority is founded on public opinion regardless of the form 
of government.97 This desire for public approval is independent of how they choose to act on it. 
In other words, an absolute monarch might choose to execute dissidents, but they always prefer 
that the people approve of their ruling. For Delolme, this desire for approbation on the side of the 
politicians has remained true since antiquity. He argued that “This desire of having their ideas 
communicated to, and approved by, the Public, was very prevalent among the Great Men of the 
Roman Commonwealth, and afterwards with the Roman Emperors; however imperfect the means 
of obtaining these ends might be in those days, compared with those which are used in ours. The 
same desire has been equally remarkable among modern European Kings, not to speak of other 
parts of the World; and a long catalogue of Royal Authors may be produced. Ministers, especially 
after having lost their places, have shewn no less inclination than their Masters, to convince 
Mankind of the reality of their knowledge.”98 The task of the science of politics therefore is to 
identify the kind of power arrangement which channels these passions inherent in human nature 
for public interest. For him, “A Constitution [is] the more likely…to procure in general the 
happiness of the People, in that it has taken Mankind as they are, and has not endeavoured to 
prevent everything, but to regulate everything…”99 
Delolme’s account of human nature as esteem-seeking being can also be found in his lesser-
known work, History of the Flagellants or Memorials of Human Superstition (1777).100 The book 
is about the history of the practice of self-flagellation. He argued that the practice has a pagan 
origin and is contradictory to Christian principles. Far from the serious tone of Constitution, the 
work is a tongue-in-cheek investigation of the practice of flagellation through different kinds of 
texts including numerous tall tales such as “the broken spectre”. Scholars observe how this work 
was published for a financial purpose intending to be read for leisure in the form of popular history. 
While it is true that he struggled to make a living by writing, this chapter aims to reveal the 
continuity of his science of politics in this 1777 work. 101  Despite their seeming drastically 
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different themes, Flagellants share the same aspiration with The Constitution in the way that they 
both aim to distinguish what Delolme called “coefficients” or elements of one system that are not 
a part of that system from its core essence or “the true spirit” of it.102 From the broader perspective 
of the selfish system tradition, the work can be seen as a critique of moral rigidity which presents 
a flawed and therefore dangerous account of human nature. Like Mandeville, Delolme highlighted 
the inconsistencies between some interpretation of Christian principles that value extreme self-
restraints and revealed how they are, in fact, a form of moral narcissism.103  
In one footnote of Constitution, he argued that “Such new forms as may prove destructive of 
the real substance of a Government, may be unwarily adopted, in the same manner as the 
superstitious notions and practices described in my Work, intitled [sic] Memorials of Human 
Superstition, may be introduced into a Religion, so as to entirely subvert the true spirit of it.”104 
His opinion on Flagellants here reveals that despite the humorous tone of the work, it is still a 
continuation of his science of politics which changes its object of study from the history of English 
liberty to the history of Christianity. Flagellants aims to demonstrate that corporal punishment 
both inflicted upon by others and by one’s self “is an offspring of Idolatry and Superstition; that 
it ought to be banished from among Christians as an erroneous and dangerous exercise.”105 The 
book is presented with the objective to outline the debate on the benefits and disadvantages of the 
practice of flagellation in the hope that future generations will have the resources to compare it 
with the form of punishment of their own time. In the preface of the work, he wrote that “In the 
first place, I proposed to myself the information of Posterity. A Period will, sooner or later, arrive, 
at which the disciplining and flagellating practices now in use, and which have been so for so 
many centuries, will have been laid aside, and succeeded by others equally whimsical.”106 The 
preface also reiterates Delolme’s disapproval of severe corporal punishment which he explicitly 
condemned in Constitution. Delolme wrote highly of Cesare Beccaria’s famous An Essay on 
Crime and Punishment (1764) and its proposal for legal reform to eradicate “unnecessary 
circumstances of cruelty in all nations” found in their penal laws.107  The historical work is 
organised around several tales and anecdotes of the people of all ranks concerning which in one 
way or another, concerns corporal punishment and accommodates with Delolme’s own 
commentaries. I argue that a closer look at these comments also reveals the underlying 
approbation-seeking characteristic of human nature. 
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In one story, Delolme made a remark that “it really seems that there is a secret propensity in 
Mankind, for arduous modes of worship of all kinds. The observation has been made, that in the 
Science of Morals, speculatively considered, Men, whatever may be their private conduct, are 
most pleased with such maxims as are most rigid; and so, with respect to religious rites, do they 
seem to be most taken with, and most strongly to adhere to, such as are most laborious, and even 
painful.”108 Moreover, he emphasised the importance of the society in shaping one’s religious and 
moral practice, echoing the centrality of “approbation” as he commented on how man, regardless 
of what they do in private, like to be perceived by others as pious. For Delolme, this yearning for 
approbation manifests in religion in the form of the race to the bottom in demonstrating one’s 
moral rigidity. The practice becomes a vicious circle of the quest for approbation which further 
reinforces the sense of pride. He commented on how the practice of self-flagellation leads to a 
form of moral narcissism which stems from pathological obsession with one’s own actions, since 
self-punishment requires constant attention to and evaluation of, one’s self and actions in order 
to “justify” the purification ritual. Delolme argued that; “a too curious self-examination may also 
lead to…the acts of pride, vanity, self-admiration and complacency…Vanity and a disposition to 
admire one’s self, are dispositions that are but too general among Mankind; and there is hardly a 
time in life at which we may be said to be perfectly cured of such worldly affections.”109 Delolme 
argued here that the practice of self-flagellation has the opposite effect of what it intends to 
achieve, namely, to eradicate one’s attachment to worldly pain and pleasure. This vision of the 
society of the virtuous which places hope in man’s self-restraint, for Delolme, is doomed to fail 
due to its inability to understand pride inherent in human nature. Agreeing with Hobbes that pride 
always sabotages social cohesion, Delolme turned not to fear to fulfill his political programme in 
maintaining liberty under modern conditions but to regulate those passions via institutional 
arrangements.110 More importantly, the re-examination of Flagellants reveal the persistence of 
Delolme’s engagement with notions associated with the Scottish Enlightenment’s science of man 
such as approbation, esteem, and pride, which are central to his political analysis. 
 
Constitution as a System and a Machine. 
 
The success of the English parliament, Delolme argued, can be seen in the transformation of 
the representatives of the people’s private ambition into the interest of the subject. “Nothing can 
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be a better proof of the efficacy of the causes that produce the liberty of the English, and which 
will be explained hereafter, than those victories which the Parliament from time to time gains 
over itself, and in which the Members, forgetting all views of private ambition, only think of their 
interest as subjects.”111 The political architecture of the English parliament is not the subject 
matter of the chapter but here, the focus is on the underlying assumption about the transformative 
effect of political institutions in transposing passions into political interests. The latter, although 
driven by the thirst for power, are also guided and moderated by strategic calculation required in 
the political arena. This is when the state of nature becomes the political machine, as nature 
becomes civilisation. 
Following the tradition of pitching passions against passions, Delolme opted for the 
“mechanical language” to explain how powers are at work in a political system to emphasise the 
centrality of institutional design.112 The mechanical language broadly encompasses a large group 
of words which are connected by the central assumption that the constitution might be approached 
in the same way that a machine is understood through the interactions between its different 
components. It also often accompanies with the idea of politics as a system whose complex 
functions are governed by a certain set of laws. 113 Through the metaphor of the constitution as a 
machine, different kinds of power are explained in terms of “motions” and “equilibrium”. With 
this language, his science of politics allows for the discussion of liberty that is not restricted by 
the assumption about morality and virtues which he believed can easily “immediately cease with 
its cause” once the balance of powers is disturbed.114 In other words, his moral scepticism made 
him question its capacity to safeguard liberty. He then turned to institutional solutions. In 
explicating the “complicated fabric” of a free constitution, he found the metaphor of the machine 
a useful one not least because it allows a value-free discussion but also especially because it sets 
aside previous prejudice against the executive power often associated with the institution of the 
monarchy.115  In this part, I hope to elucidate how, for Delolme, the languages of “machine” and 
“system” do not imply universal truth nor mathematical certainty in the realm of politics. Rather, 
both are used mostly to allow for the discussion about the positive role of the executive power in 
maintaining the constitutional balance. 
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First, he used the idea of system to help get rid of the prejudices against the executive power 
by disregarding topics such as foreign dominion and military power. In doing so, he aimed to only 
keep the three powers within his “equation” of powers, namely the power of the people, the power 
of the elites, and the power of the Crown. Leaving the discussion of these constitutional powers 
to chapter four, here I focus on how his mechanical language paves the way for the discussion.  
Delolme described Constitution as “a Book on systematical [sic] politics” in the 
Advertisement of the 1772 edition.116 English constitutional history was described as “a system 
which is supposed to be so complicated as not to be understood, or developed,”117 Throughout the 
book, he used “political system” to describe the function of a political entity and how it is 
sustained by the action and reaction between different powers. Notably, Delolme categorised his 
science of politics as similar to Montesquieu’s in The Spirit of the Laws (1748) as they were both 
“systematic writers”. 118  However, he contended that his science of politics was superior to 
Montesquieu’s because his includes “the real foundations of Power”.119 By this, he referred to the 
causes which support the strength of these constitutional power such which lies beyond the 
parliament in the realm of civil society such as the House of Commons’ financial control of the 
Crown. The commercial society controls the executive power via the representatives of the 
people’s monopoly of the executive power’s subsidy, rendering it “in state of real dependence.”120  
Comparing himself with a mathematician, he explained how his predecessors failed to 
exclude terms which do not constitute the “equilibrium” of the government. His science of politics, 
therefore “begins with freeing his equation from coefficients…it may be advantageous to the 
inquirer after the causes that produce the equilibrium of a government, to have previously studied 
them, disengaged from the apparatus of fleets, armies, foreign trade, distant and extensive 
dominions, in a word from all those brilliant circumstances which so greatly affect the external 
appearance of a powerful Society” but do not constitute the balance of the constitution.121 
Delolme’s idea of system distinguishes important components from ornamental parts and in doing 
so, also sets his science of politics apart from its predecessors. In his view, the practice of science 
of politics progresses towards a more solid understanding of man and politics by disregarding 
elements which do not constitute the principles of the constitution. Another difference between 
his science of politics and that of the author of The Spirit of the Laws is how Delolme strongly 
focused on the institutional differences between France and England above other of their shared 
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characteristics. In this regard, Delolme’s approach had some similarity with that of Hume in his 
essay On National Character (1748) which argues that: 
To this difference in the original Constitution of France and England, that is, in the original power of 
their Kings, we are to attribute the difference, so little analogous to its original cause, of their present 
Constitutions. This it is which furnishes the solution of a problem which, I must confess, for a long 
time perplexed me, and explains the reason why, of two neighbouring Nations, situated almost under 
the same climate, and having one common origin, the one has attained the summit of liberty, the other 
has gradually sunk under an absolute Monarchy.122  
The topic of monarchical executive power becomes the perfect object of study for Delolme’s 
science of politics and its enquiry on the nature of modern liberty for many reasons. It brings to 
the fore the centrality of institutional arrangement of powers since other European monarchies 
did not enjoy this “summit of liberty” like England did. Moreover, by examining the nature of 
monarchical executive power, one can study the emerging idea of interest a restrictive mechanism 
as the princely power morphed to fit the modern mould.123  
Beyond the idea of politics as a system and which elements of the political society that 
constitutes it, science of politics also relies on the metaphor of the machine to explain the English 
constitutional balance.124 “[T]he stability of the Governing executive authority in England,” he 
argued “and the weight it gives to the whole machine of the State, has actually enabled the English 
Nation, considered as a free Nation, to enjoy several advantages which would really have been 
totally unattainable in the other States.”125 Delolme’s use of the metaphor belongs to what David 
Wootton calls the mechanical language. It is a part of the “a wider family of words” encompassing 
for example, “control,” “clog,” “counterpoise,” and “equilibrium” all of which rely on the 
metaphor of a constitution as a machine and, consequently, the predictability of its function once 
the principles are discovered.126 Delolme’s employment of the metaphor, however, does not aim 
at predictability. Instead, his description of the English constitution as a machine specifically 
intends to allow a positive account of a strong executive power, something which he found 
existing approaches did not allow him to do. In his account the weight of the Crown is the most 
important factor which makes the English system balanced and therefore, stable unlike any other 
systems before it.  
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Delolme’s interest in the idea of balance is introduced to the reader as early as the cover page 
of his book. There Delolme selected a part of Ovid’s Metamorphoses to be the epigraph of 
Constitution. The passage from Ovid was “Ponderibus librata suis”, and Delolme’s purpose was 
to compare the strength and balance of the English constitution with the perfection of how God 
created the universe; “Earth suspended in the sky, lying on her own foundation”.127 The emphasis 
here is how the English system, like Ovid’s description of the earth, is self-balanced. The idea of 
a self-balancing system connotes dynamism within the system.128 The metaphor of the machine 
helps him paint the picture of the English system which although highly dynamic as the 
constitutional powers “constantly balance each other”, managed to maintain the function of the 
government with few successful attempts to change the constitution. The dynamic nature of the 
machine of the constitution is due to its “springs” which are human passions. “It is upon the 
passions of Mankind, that is upon causes which are unalterable, that the action of the various parts 
of a State depends. The machine may vary as to its dimensions, but its movement and acting 
springs still remain intrinsically the same; and that time cannot be considered as lost, which has 
been spent in seeing them act and move in a narrower circle.”129 The foundation mentioned here 
is the universal human passions which is the unalterable cause. It also paves the way for the 
comparative study between ancient republics and the modern English system. Delolme’s positive 
account of the stability of the English system was written partly to offer a systematic analysis of 
the legacy of the political stability after the Hanoverian Succession in the first half of the 
eighteenth century. By using the metaphor of the machine with its component parts, Delolme 
argued how it was the executive power of the Crown which gave the necessary “weight” and 
stability to the machine of the British state.  
This metaphor of the machine and human passions as its moving springs leads to the 
assumption that he proposed a kind of constitutional equation which like a mathematical formula, 
can be adopted by any state to achieve the same result. This line of reading of Delolme’s 
constitutional theory, which divorces it from a serious examination of his methodology, risks 
assuming that for Delolme, a constitutional balance is conveniently achieved once a formula is 
discovered and only needs to be adopted in a different political system to achieve the same result. 
Delolme explicitly warned against this interpretation of his work. He contended that 
“The…advantages are peculiar to the English Government. To attempt to imitate them, or transfer 
them into other Countries, with that degree of extent to which they are carried in England, without 
at the same time transferring the whole Order and conjunction of circumstances in the English 
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Government, would prove unsuccessful attempts.”130 He gave historical examples to support this 
contention in his remark on Ireland. He argued that, “The Irish Nation have of late succeeded to 
imitate several very important regulations in the English Government, and are very desirous to 
render the assimilation complete: yet, it is possible, they will find many inconveniencies to arise 
from their endeavours, which do not take place in England, notwithstanding the very great general 
similarity of circumstances in the two kingdoms in many respects, and even also, we might add, 
notwithstanding the respectable power and weight the Crown derives from its British dominions, 
both for defending its prerogative in Ireland, and preventing anarchy.” 131  Similarly “in the 
American Colonies, several articles of English liberty already appear impracticable to be 
preserved in the new American Commonwealths.”132 Delolme’s science of politics emphasises 
how the differences in “circumstances” beyond political institution feed into and shape the 
constitution. Consequently, it explicitly warns against the presentation of the English model as a 
universal formula to be conveniently emulated by other nations. 
The assumption about human nature as approbation-seeking in science of man does not 
simply lead to science of politics’ aspiration for a model of a perfect constitution. For Delolme, 
approbation-seeking human nature is expressed in various forms in different realms such as in the 
economy and in politics and can have both negative as well as positive effects on public liberty 
depending on the institutional arrangements of that political system. More importantly, these 
institutions are not a simple manifestation of principles in the real world but rather, an 
accumulation of previous generations’ decisions as well as their unintended consequences.  
Alternatively, the present work reveals how Delolme’s approach to the study of political 
institutions as embodied history is an integral part of his science of politics. The mechanical 
language and the idea of system is employed to justify his selection of certain political institutions 
which are a part of the constitutional balance. In doing so, his science of politics allows for the 
discussion of the relationship between the institution of the crown and the powers in the realm of 
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Delolme as a Historian 
 
Introduction.   
 
This chapter examines Delolme’s contribution to the debate on the origin and nature of the 
English system. The topic significantly related to the central question of how liberty was to be 
preserved in modern representative politics in the late-eighteenth as well as in the early decades 
of the nineteenth century. A popular constitution was no longer an option for emerging states like 
America. Unprecedented in both its scale and heterogenous population, the new republic shaped 
its institutional arrangements, drawing lessons both from the principles and critique of the Old 
World political thought, as the rest of the world keenly observed. The applicability and durability 
of the English system therefore was also crucial to this discussion. While the topic was famously 
addressed by canonical figures like Montesquieu and Hume, Delolme was distinct in his 
incorporation of a strong executive power into his paradigm for the possibility of liberty in the 
modern world offered by the English experience. A closer look at his historical analysis of English 
constitutional history reveals an intriguing vision for a modern free state that consists of the strong 
but limited executive power, the bicameral legislative parliament which monopolised both 
military and financial power, and a rigorous and active public. All of this, he argued, was the 
institutional culmination of the unintended consequences of the resistance against the Norman 
Conquest back in 1066. This contention requires a careful contextualisation and analysis to see 
its relationship to his idea of the English constitutional balance. 
While the “checks and balances” aspect of his programme has been recognised, it is often 
divorced from his intricate historical analysis.133 Delolme can be studied as a theorist of checks 
and balances, but this reductive approach fails to grasp the historical analysis of the English 
executive power’s tension with the people and how it shaped what he titled the history of “public 
liberty”.134  In other words, the chapter argues that one can only fully understand his idea of a 
balanced constitution as a part of his attempt to answer the historical question of why the English 
system, unlike other European monarchies, did not descend into absolute monarchy and whether 
its success can be replicated in other modern states with different conditions. Through his 
narrative of the history of English negative liberty as an unintended consequence manifested in 
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the form of the political institutions of the English parliament, the chapter also elucidates his 
argument that a strong executive power is not only uncontradictory to modern liberty but also is 
requisite to it.  
 
The History of English Liberty Before Delolme’s Constitution. 
 
Delolme was well aware of the richness of the literature on the Anglo-Saxon origin of English 
history, as he addressed it on the very first page of Constitution. He made his standpoint clear that 
the Saxon Government “appears to have had little more affinity with the present Constitution.”135 
In doing so, he rejected an important historical argument which underpinned the Whig 
interpretation of parliamentary supremacy due to its ancient Saxon roots. The language of 
“ancient constitutionalism” argues that the origin of the English constitution was historically 
indeterminate but is allowed to be grasped in the mixtures of legal precedents and charters in the 
form of the common law tradition. One strand of this common law thinking also referred back to 
Tacitus’ Germania as an authoritative text in supporting the common lawyers’ historical argument 
that the Gothic witenagemot or the Saxon parliament was the origin of the English House of 
Commons. One example of a remnant of this line of argument can be found in Montesquieu’s 
eighteenth-century The Spirit of the Laws (1748) whose inquiry is in line with Tacitus’ argument 
that English liberty was found in the German forests.136 By rejecting the relevance of the Saxon 
era, Delolme aimed to lay his historical narrative of English liberty on a truly modern basis. In 
particular, he rejected the underlying argument that historical antecedents are the most important 
grounds for the modern political authority of the House of Commons. His account, as it will be 
discussed in the second part of the chapter, decisively steers the discussion towards its utility to 
control the royal executive power and protect the interest of the people. 
The Whig history of Saxon origins has to be understood in tandem with its rival account, 
namely the seventeenth-century Royalist narrative which aimed to justify the absolute power of 
the Stuart monarchs via their interpretation of the Norman Conquest. Robert Filmer in his 
Patriarcha (1620s-1630s) shunned the parliamentarian narratives of 1066 which rejected the 
comprehensiveness and transformative nature of the Duke of Normandy’s invasion. The royalist 
conquest reading of the event, instead, insists upon both the legality and legitimacy of royal 
prerogative and the king’s right to reject bills passed by the parliament as a political implication 
of 1066. According to this view, the Norman Conquest not only was a successful invasion but 
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also introduced feudalism to the island. Following this narrative, royalist historians argued that 
all subsequent political decisions and initiatives were to be understood in an absolute monarchical 
framework including the emergence of the House of Commons which is perceived as a gift from 
the king. Filmer’s defence of the doctrine of passive obedience prompted numerous responses 
from authors who supported the parliamentarian cause. Its intricate arguments provided abundant 
intellectual sources, adequate to sustain the life of the debate on the nature of political authority 
well into early eighteenth-century before the solidification of the victory of the moderate Whig 
ideology after the Hanoverian Succession in 1741.137 Delolme was careful not to mention any of 
the royalist associations with the Conquest reading of 1066 despite his agreement about the 
transformative nature of the event. To further distance himself from the royalist accusation, he 
explicitly rejected any relevance of “the Doctrine of Passive Obedience” and deemed it 
“superstitious”.138 His explicit rejection of passive obedience to the monarch anticipates his own 
novel account of the benefit of the executive power which is founded on “the more solid and 
durable foundations of the love of order, and a sense of the necessity of civil government among 
Mankind”.139 
The Whig authors of the seventeenth century produced a plethora of intellectual responses to 
counter Filmer’s royalist interpretation of the Norman Conquest and its consequent establishment 
of the absolute power of the monarch as the right of conquest. The historical work best 
exemplified this Whig response is the 1682 Argumentatum is Argumentatum Anti-Normannicum 
penned by William Atwood, Samuel Johnson, William Petyt as well as Edward Coke.140 The 
Argumentatum is to be understood in the light of the historical debate which underpinned the idea 
of political authority during the Exclusion Crisis in 1679-81. Putting aside the weakness of the 
historical evidence, Argumentatum provides clear historical and political conclusions as well as 
propositions from the side of the Whig historians. Above all, they attempted to prove that William 
I did not impose an entirely new legal system on the island and this was partly due to his failed 
attempt to take total control of the land because of native resistance. Argumentatum not only 
rejects the conquest theory’s main argument that the Norman invasion completely changed the 
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nature of the government including all political and social relations but also assigned agency to 
the natives. It argues that the combination of moderation on the part of William I and the wisdom 
of the English rendered total domination and regime change impossible. Delolme’s narrative was 
partly inspired by this argument although it rejects the overarching historical framework of 
ancient constitutionalism which is based on the pre-1066 existence of the parliament. The 
argument about the native resistance against foreign conquerors becomes the cornerstone of 
Delolme’s account of the event and how it gave birth to the English unique political system 
despite a shared feudal beginning with other European countries.  
After the Hanoverian Settlement in 1701, followed by the Hanoverian Succession in 1714, 
England enjoyed a relatively calmer political atmosphere. The political writing of Civil War 
radical Whigs like Sidney was replaced by the dominant moderate Whig ideology exemplified by 
the work of Rapin de Thoyras, with the belief in parliamentary supremacy, the mixed constitution, 
as well as the idea of limited monarchy. Under the Whig dominance, this period’s debate on the 
English constitution and liberty changed the focus from the origin to the balance of the 
constitution.141 The Septennial Act in 1716 fortified the political power of the moderate Whigs 
but at the same time, also saw the rise of the new Court-Country division which would bring the 
debate on the origin of the English liberty back to the political area most notably with the work 
of the Craftsman magazine authors, founded by the Tory Viscount of Bolingbroke and William 
Pulteney. 
It was the establishment of the idea of parliamentary sovereignty and especially legislative 
dominance as the result of the settlement after 1688 which prompted a new necessity to address 
the overpowering legislative without rejecting its supremacy, in the language of the checks and 
balances. This urgency was most explicit in light of Robert Walpole’s administration. 
Bolingbroke dedicated his work in the Craftsman to oppose Whig parliamentary dominance under 
the premiership of Walpole, which peaked with his success in influencing and manipulating the 
parliament via the king’s influence and the system of royal patronage due to his close relationship 
to George I and George II. His Remarks on the History of England is the historical branch of the 
same project to undermine Walpole’s administration. The work argues for the ancient history of 
“the spirit of English liberty” which has always been at odds with “the spirit of faction”. When 
faction is in power, the situation calls for its exposure since the spirit of faction is always disguised 
as a guardian of the national interest. Bolingbroke wrote: “The Republication of the Papers is 
therefore, at this Time, most especially, reasonable. If we do not take Advantage of the standing 
Water of Faction, the Tide will soon turn one Way or the other, and carry all before it.”142 By 
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approaching the debate on corruption beyond the realm of parliamentary politics using the 
language of the spirit of liberty and faction, he was able to turn Whig historiography against the 
Whig government by arguing that the Whig government under Walpole’s premiership betrayed 
the seventeenth-century Whig legacy as champion of liberty against monarchical despotism.  
The Remarks’ reworking of the history of England traces the two kinds of spirit which have 
always been at odds with each other since the Norman invasion. Remarks reworks the events of 
1066 by investigating existing narratives of the event before he concluded differently from the 
seventeenth century Argumentatum that William I did impose new laws after his successful 
invasion. He wrote “we may confess that he [William I]  imposed many new Laws and Customs; 
that he made very great Alterations in the whole Model of Government; and that he, as well as 
his two Sons, ruled, upon many Occasions like absolute, not limited, Monarchs.”143 Bolingbroke 
placed the antagonism between  the spirit of liberty and the spirit of faction at the centre of his 
philosophical history. The antagonism is manifested in history as, on one side, the encroachment 
of liberty by the Crown and the royalist politicians, and the protectors of ancient rights of the 
people (this includes, of course, the Bolingbroke-led opposition to the corrupted Walpolean 
parliamentary despotism) on the other.  
From the balanced constitution criteria, he argued that “Great Britain, according to our present 
constitution, cannot be undone by parliaments; for there is something, which a parliament cannot 
do. A parliament cannot annul the constitution . . . The legislative is a supreme, and may be called, 
in one sense, an absolute, but in none an arbitrary power.”144  This problem of the arbitrary 
legislative power and the inadequacy of existing theoretical frameworks to address it would 
become the subject matter of Delolme’s reworking of the English constitutional history and the 
background justification of his proposition for the strong executive power. Bolingbroke’s 
narrative anticipates the comparative method which contrasts the English constitutional history 
with other European monarchical experiences as well as ancient republics to argue for the 
superiority of the English system in preserving the kind of liberty that is useful for the moderns, 
namely legal protection of the person and their property.  
This new argument carefully avoids both the language of ancient constitutionalism as well as 
the absolutist implication of the seventeenth-century royalist interpretation of the Norman 
Conquest. John Hervey’s Ancient and Modern Liberty Stated and Compared (1734) best 
exemplifies this new narrative. It was written as a reaction from the side of Walpole to 
Bolingbroke’s polemics against the government. Before Ancient and Modern Liberty, Hervey 
published a more direct political attack on Bolingbroke and his circle titled Observations on the 
 
143 Henry St. John Bolingbroke, Remarks, 1747, 53. 




Writings of the Craftsmen (1730) focusing on exposing the unfairness and in his view, the 
historical errors which forms the basis of the Craftsmen’s polemics against Walpole.145 Hervey’s 
Ancient and Modern is more decisive in its tactic to rewrite history against Bolingbroke’s newly 
created antagonism between the spirit of liberty and the spirit of faction. Using the comparative 
method, Hervey aimed to demystify the valorisation of ancient liberty in the Whig narratives 
altogether. He turned Bolingbroke’s notion of the spirit of liberty against him by relocating the 
origin of English liberty to post-1688, thus rendering it essentially modern.  
Hervey discussed the perfect equilibrium between the anarchy of “natural liberty” and the 
extremism of order in the form of authoritarianism and how there “never was, nor perhaps ever 
will be, any Form of Government where this Medium was so exactly hit…” as much as “it is 
impossible to judge of any human Institution, any more than of any human Virtue, but by 
Comparison.”146 Due to the inherent imperfection of political reality, to make a judgement against 
the ideal, for Hervey, is unfruitful. Therefore, Hervey turned instead to the comparative method 
which is in this case, a comparison between ancient and modern liberty, with the latter defined as 
legal protection of individual liberty which is argued to be the aim of a modern constitution.  After 
stating the necessity of using the comparative method, Hervey went straight to his objective in 
writing this historical piece which is to demonstrate the errors in his contemporaries’ political 
nostalgia and its being exploited as weapons against the government: “…the modern Authors on 
this Subject [liberty] have often insisted on the Faults of the present Government, by extolling the 
Felicity of Times past, and particularly on the Chapter of Liberty.”147 
For Hervey, between the Norman Conquest of 1066 and pre-Restoration, “whatever Changes 
happen’d in the Government, those Changes were nothing more than from one Tyrant, or one 
Kind of Tyrant to another.”148 Hervey identified the English constitution prior to 1688 as an 
absolute monarchy, unlike the contemporary limited monarchy which he explicitly endorsed. 
Hervey, foreshadowing Delolme, not only attempted to demonstrate the pre-eminence of the 
modern constitution and politics in general but also to present the comparative method as the most 
effective approach to the study of politics and the historical origin of English liberty. While 
Bolingbroke traced liberty back to the distant past of the Saxon epoch to reveal the degeneration 
of the spirit of liberty, defeated by the spirit of party in his contemporary politics, Hervey argued 
that liberty for the people never existed until after the Glorious Revolution. He wrote: “From King 
James the Second’s Banishment, Abdication, Deposition, or whatever People please to call it, I 
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date the Birth of real Liberty in this Kingdom, or at least the Establishment, if not the 
Commencement, of every Privilege we now enjoy.”149  
While Hervey’s work was pioneering, it also clearly had a strong political objective in 
responding to Bolingbroke. Another project of the period which engaged in depth with this 
narrative of English liberty as modern liberty is David Hume’s voluminous History of England 
(1754-61). Hume also made Bolingbroke and his Craftsman the point of departure of his 
philosophical history. But unlike Hervey who opposed Bolingbroke’s politics in his historical 
writing, Hume deemed the political objective of the Tory opposition to be achieved at the expense 
of historical accuracy and more dangerously, it also exacerbated party feud.150 For him, the Stuart 
monarchs did not mistake the nature of the constitution.151 It was nonsensical to discuss English 
liberty before the victory of the parliamentarians after the seventeenth century. Modern politics 
only truly began after the legal restriction of the Crown and the rise to power of the House of 
Commons as a capable legislative body.  Hume’s narrative differs significantly from his 
predecessors who argued for the continuity of the English constitution and its Saxon freedom that 
only got usurped by tyrannical kings such as James II.152 Similar to Hervey, Hume considered his 
project to be that of updating the obsolete Whig, and subsequently the “Country”, version of 
English historiography. But while Hervey fervently asserted that modern politics is superior to its 
ancient counterpart, Hume was more sceptical of the fate of what he called public liberty as 
opposed to personal liberty in the modern world and the rise of commercial society.153  
Delolme contributed to the long historical and deeply political debate on the origin of English 
liberty. His main purpose was to put forward the argument that the strong but effectively limited 
executive power of the English system was an important factor behind the success of the English 
system in preserving liberty. As we know that he had read Hume’s History of England, it is 
possible that his choice to use the very term public liberty is also influenced by the Scottish 
historian’s work. However, Delolme was more optimistic about the rise of the commercial society 
and its role in supporting the formation of public liberty which manifested in the form of the 
English political institutions and their arrangement. 
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Delolme as a Historian of the English Constitutional Liberty. 
 
In his Against War and Empire, Richard Whatmore indicates how Delolme’s study of the 
history of English liberty relies on the idea of unintended consequences of the Norman Conquest. 
He contends that “de Lolme developed the argument that liberty in Britain was an unintended 
consequence of the importation of French despotism.”154 However, Whatmore does not specify 
how this played out in Delolme’s historical narrative of the origin of English liberty and 
constitution. This chapter hopes to shed light on this aspect of his programme which has 
previously been underexamined and how it is crucial to his argument that a strong and unitary 
executive power is central to the success of English liberty. 
Put simply, the existence of unintended consequences in history means the discrepancy 
between what one intends to do and the effects one produces on the society as a whole. John 
Burrow analysed the notion of unintended consequence as a moral complex: “A gap has been 
opened, a certain kind of innocence lost, and it cannot be closed so long as we retain the 
knowledge of it”. This is because the notion of unintended consequence also implies “a 
disjunction between what we morally admire and what we sociologically discern.”155 For Burrow, 
this moral complex also welcomes a new approach to the study of politics which analyses social 
phenomena from the perspective of an observer rather than a participant. The notion of unintended 
consequences also gives a utilitarian tone to the social analysis.  
The role of unintended consequence in the study of history was also examined by David Hume. 
In the political essay “Of the rise and progress of the arts and sciences” he argued that the 
difference between “causes” and “chances” is central to an enquiry into any human affairs. To 
distinguish the two, Hume provided the reader some clues: “What depends upon a few persons is, 
in a great measure, to be ascribed to chance, or secret and unknown causes: What arises from a 
great number, may often be accounted for by determinate and known causes.”156 The implication 
of this contention is that the focus of science of politics should not be on the effect of 
contingencies such as “the smallest incident in the health, education,  or  fortune of  a  particular  
person” upon the course of history. It also follows that the history of institutions, which reflect 
better “what arises from a great number” is more suitable as an object of study for the science of 
politics than the role of individuals. The history of political institutions as an appropriate object 
of study of the science of politics is also succinctly discussed by Adam Ferguson who explained 
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in one sentence how political institutions are past unintended consequences materialised: “nations 
stumble upon establishments, which are indeed the result of human action, but not the execution 
of any human design.”157 In Delolme’s work, we will see this critical distance at its finest in his 
examination of the institution of the Crown and the ripple effects of 1066 in the English 
constitutional fabric. More importantly, with this approach to the study of English constitutional 
history, Delolme aims to resolve the supposed “paradox” of why a strong executive power is not 
contradictory to liberty. 
Unintended consequence and chance are brought to the fore in Delolme’s analysis of the 
origin of English liberty as stemming from the native resistance against the Norman Conquest. 
But while human nature has “that secret disposition which prompts Mankind to resist and 
counteract their Superiors,” the English system benefited from this spirit of resistance unlike its 
predecessors because it uniquely enshrined each legacy of resistance in institutional forms. 
Delolme carefully examined the success of each political institution, its formation throughout 
history, and how it helps preserve liberty by striking the balance between the chaos of popular 
politics and the absence of liberty in tyrannical regimes. 1066, in this narrative, also was the 
underlying cause of the later successful union of interest between the people and the nobility in 
forming their alliance against monarchs leading to later effective institutional barriers against 
future encroachment on the liberty of the subjects. This “paradox” of strong monarchs as the root 
cause of English liberty is in fact not paradoxical at all once one adopts the stance of Delolme’s 
science of politics which argues that English liberty can only be understood retrospectively and 
comparatively through history.  
I begin chronologically with the interpretation and significance of the Norman Conquest in 
Delolme’s narrative. The account of this historic event significantly distinguishes Delolme’s 
narrative from his predecessors. He argued that “It is the era of the Conquest, that we are to look 
for the real foundation of the English constitution.”158 This contention distinguishes him from the 
Whig historiography which accentuates the Saxon roots of English liberty pre-1066. However, at 
the same time, he also rejected the royalist historian of the seventeenth-century conclusion of the 
conquest that subsequently, English liberty and the English constitution was the gift from the king. 
His narrative alternatively argued that English liberty stemmed from the spirit of resistance 
against the Conquest regardless of the Saxon root as well as the imposition of feudalism by the 
foreign kings. In this regard, he also proposed an alternative account of English theory of 
resistance that does not base its legitimacy on the idea of natural right but on the political utility 
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of resistance. He addressed the political implication of the historiography on the Norman 
Conquest on the very first page of Constitution: 
It has been a favourite thesis with many Writers, to pretend that the Saxon Government was, at the time 
of the Conquest, by no means subverted; that William of Normandy legally acceded to the Throne, and 
consequently to the engagements, of the Saxon Kings; and much argument has in particular been 
employed with regard to the word Conquest, which, it has been said, in the feudal sense only meant 
acquisition. These opinions have been particularly insisted upon in times of popular opposition: and, 
indeed, there was a far greater probability of success, in raising among the People the notions familiar 
to them of legal claims and long established customs, than in arguing with them from no less rational, 
but less determinate, and somewhat dangerous, doctrines, concerning the rights of Mankind, and the 
lawfulness of at all times opposing the force to an oppressive Government.159 
Delolme not only told the reader where he stood in the debate concerning the meaning of 
1066 but also how the language of ancient constitutionalism was exploited in support of popular 
“opposition”. Most likely, he addressed the seventeenth-century historical work on the nature of 
1066 and its importance in defining the nature of the English system. On one hand, James I’s 
1610 Speech to Parliament insists that it was an absolute monarchy. On the other hand, the 
common lawyers argued that the origin of the House of Commons is time immemorial. The 
passage reveals his awareness of the strong political implications in the historiography of the 
origin of English liberty. He acknowledged the magnitude of the transformative effect of the 
Conquest. After 1066, “almost the whole landed property in the Kingdom was at that time 
transferred to other hands, a new System of criminal Justice introduced, and the language of the 
law moreover altered, the revolution may be said to have been such as is not perhaps to be 
paralleled in the History of any other Country.”160 However, he was also quick to distinguish his 
narrative from the royalist conquest interpretation of 1066 which used it to justify the unlimited 
power of the king in absolute monarchy.  
Concerning methodology in acquiring the knowledge of the event, Delolme followed William 
Temple’s Introduction to the History of England (1695). Temple’s work was cited to demonstrate 
the untenable flaw that belied the truth of the ancient constitution narrative; how the ancient Saxon 
government had “left us in story… but like so many antique, broken, or defaced pictures, which 
may still represent something of the customs and fashions of those ages, though little of the true 
lines, proportions, or resemblance.”161 Temple’s opinion in the debate on the origin of the English 
constitution stands at odds with Delolme’s, since Temple also discussed the Gothic origin of the 
constitution.162 However, I argue that Delolme referred to Temple in his historical works, not for 
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his interpretations but for his methodology in writing history. Temple was one of the minority of 
antiquarians and historians of seventeenth-century England who was aware of the indefensibility 
of discussing the nature of pre-Norman Saxon government with any great confidence. 
Delolme did not the oppose the idea of resistance against tyrannical rulers but he questioned 
the utility of the doctrine of natural rights as the basis of a legitimate resistance. He commented 
on how the doctrine of natural right was exploited for the cause of popular resistance during the 
seventeenth century. Despite his critical tone of the doctrine of natural right which he deemed 
“somewhat dangerous”, his own account of resistance simply has a different focus away from the 
question of legitimacy. Instead, it emphasises the institutional implications of a resistance in the 
longue durée of English constitutional history. In other words, he was more interested in the 
unintended consequence of resistance and its role in shaping what he called “public liberty” than 
the question of the legitimacy of the resistance.  
Most importantly, 1066 also crucially shaped England into a unitary kingdom. This point and 
its later constitutional implications is conveyed through his comparative analysis between 
England and France and different fates of their royal powers. Delolme compared the 
establishment of liberty with the action of planting a seed to connote the long duration and the 
right historical conditions it requires before liberty flourishes. The event of the Norman Conquest 
initiated the feudal system which was a shared Northern European experience but what 
distinguished the course of English history from its continental European counterparts is “an 
immediate and sudden consequence of that conquest which introduced it.” In comparison with 
French feudalism which gradually formed itself, “the Kingdom of England, on the contrary, in 
consequence of the sudden and violent introduction of the same system, became a compound of 
parts united by the strongest ties, and the regal Authority, by the pressure of its immense weight, 
consolidated the whole into one compact dissoluble body.”163 The sudden formation of absolute 
monarchy in England imposed a thorough shock to the native nobility and commoners alike. The 
comprehensiveness of the new system forced the nobility to form “close and numerous 
confederacies…they even compelled to associate the People in them, and make them partners of 
public Liberty.”164 Delolme compared the weight of the royal authority and the spirit of liberty 
with how one grows a tree. The seed of liberty “In England…lying at a great depth, being covered 
with enormous weight [of the king]…It was the excessive power of the King which made England 
free, because it was this very excess  that gave rise to the spirit of union, and of concerted 
resistance…”165  
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The first implication of the Norman Conquest in Delolme’s narrative is its lasting effect on 
the nature of the English royal power. This union between the nobility and the people was made 
possible due to the exceptional formation of English feudalism which was abrupt and forceful, 
and it shaped the kind of state that England became, namely a unitary kingdom. “England was 
not, like France, an aggregation of a number of sovereignties: it formed but one State, and 
acknowledged but one Master, one general title. The same laws, the same kind of dependence, 
consequently the same notions, the same interests, prevailed throughout the whole.”166  The 
English unitary interest was formed in opposition to the centralised royal government. From the 
beginning, all subjects acknowledged the distinction between their cause and interest of the 
governmental body. This drastic separation of the people and the government was fundamental 
to the formation of the successful English representative system. 
Secondly, the Norman Conquest was a double-edged sword to the nobility. The concerted 
resistance between them and the commoners “insisted that, for the future, every individual should 
be intitled [sic] to the protection of the law” which unintendedly “become a bulwark which was, 
in time, to restrain their [the nobility’s] own.”167 This unintended consequence of the Norman 
Conquest is compared to the seed which requires the right conditions to grow. English liberty did 
not begin to emerge until “about forty years after the Conquest that we see the…causes begin to 
operate.”168 Resistance against 1066 in Delolme’s narrative functions similar to Montesquieu’s 
idea of spirit which guides the reader through the ups and downs of English constitutional history. 
The “spirit of liberty, union, and sober resistance”169 also led to the establishment of Magna Carta 
under the reign of King John (1116-1216). The event was portrayed as “a general confederacy” 
between subjects from all orders due to their shared interest in limiting the power of the despotic 
king. However, the union also crucially foreshadowed the decline of the ranking system as well 
as the rise of commercial society in which traditional rankings were replaced with more 
sophisticated forms of social classes. 
This “spirit of resistance” persisted and began to reveal its effect in the formation of the 
English House of Commons. In the reign of Edward, he argued that “the tide [a metaphor of the 
magnitude of feudalism imposed by 1066] was seen gradually to subside; the laws which protect 
the person and property of the individual, began to make their appearance” due to the new 
arrangement of power.170 This account of the establishment of a form of negative liberty within 
the legal framework is crucial to the English system. After 1215 the nascent form of the House of 
Commons emerged. In Delolme’s narrative, the early form of the House of Commons was an 
 
166 Ibid., 35. 
167 Ibid., 33. 
168 Ibid., 34. 
169 Ibid., 44. 




unintended consequence of Edward’s need to gain financial support for his war against Scotland. 
However, due to the economic and political aftermath of revolts by barons under the previous 
Henry III reign, Edward “In order to raise subsidies therefore, he was obliged to employ a new 
method, and to endeavour to obtain through the consent of the People, what his Predecessors had 
hitherto expected from their own power. The Sheriffs were ordered to invite the Towns and 
Boroughs of the different Counties to send Deputies to Parliament; and it is from this era that we 
are to date the origin of the House of Commons.”171 Here he agreed with the seventeenth-century 
royalist Robert Brady that the House of Commons was to be dated to the reign of Edward I.172 
However, in this new narrative, he crucially added the financial factor to counter the royalist 
interpretation that it was a gift by the king. Alternatively, he emphasised the pecuniary necessity 
which forced Edward to be more compromising with the people than previous monarchs. 
However, it was not until “Under Edward the Second, [when] the Commons began to annex 
petitions to the bills by which they granted subsidies” that they began to enjoy “the dawn of their 
legislative authority.”173 In Delolme’s narrative, the legal protection of the subjects, although 
legally asserted in the Habeas Corpus, did not materialize until the people had channels through 
which they could assert their political power and the House of Commons was one of those. 
Political institutions, he implied, were shaped by external forces beyond the realm of the 
government, one of the most important being economic power. 
Nonetheless, Delolme was also quick to suggest that the political power of the House of 
Commons was in its infancy and was a far cry from its modern form. The crucial point, for 
Delolme, was that it established a legal channel through which some part of the Commons could 
voice their concern legally:  
They were in those times called up only to provide for the wants of the King, and approve of the 
resolutions taken by him and the assembly of the Lords. But it was nevertheless a great point gained, 
to have obtained the right of uttering their complaints, assembled in a body and in a legal way—to have 
acquired, instead of the dangerous resource of insurrections, a lawful and regular means of influencing 
the motions of the Government, and thenceforth to have become a part of it.174  
Resonating with the earlier point about the utility of resistance in shaping institutional safeguards 
of public liberty, Delolme here contrasted it with the notion of insurrections which relies on the 
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creation of abnormality to gain its political momentum hence its inherent danger despite the 
shared goal of influencing the motion of the government. 
The origin of the English parliament therefore stemmed from the necessity to alleviate the 
risk of popular insurrection by incorporating the power of the people into the institutional fabric 
of the constitution. In Delolme’s account, the continuity was stressed between the ripple effects 
of the Norman Conquest and the formation of the English system including the institution of the 
House of Commons. The incorporation of the people’s power into the nascent form of the 
parliament helps support his argument that English liberty, as legal protection of the subject, was 
enhanced by the limitation of the monarchical executive power, not by the eradication of its. This 
point will be further developed in his account of English liberty after the Glorious Revolution 
concerning the military power. 
 
English Liberty after 1688 and the limitation of the monarchical power. 
 
The role of resistance in shaping English constitutional history is presented in Delolme’s 
treatment of monarchical executive power. The formation of the office reflects the future of the 
English system as representative and “democratical” [sic].175 Due to the office’s attachment to the 
institution of the Crown, English executive power was not only unified but also rendered itself a 
natural target of public scrutiny and, consequently, effective limitation. In Delolme’s historical 
analysis, the English executive power became effectively separated from the legislature with 
permanent distrust between the branches, which was crucial for the future English constitutional 
“system of distrust.”176 In other words, from the beginning, English executive power was formed 
in the way that it familiarised the people with their duty of popular oversight required for a 
successful modern representative politics. But for the executive power to work for public liberty, 
it first has to be defanged. Delolme claimed that the English system did so in the seventeenth 
century. 
 The era is central to his account of the development of English liberty because it saw the 
victory of the spirit of resistance against the encroachment of public liberty by despotic monarchs 
which culminated in further restrictions of their power, namely the civil control over military 
power. The scheme’s unintended consequence was that it made public opinion the only 
foundation of English political authority and makes English kings and queens modern monarchs 
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of limited power and in doing so, paves the way for the formation of modern executive power. 
This civil control of military power also further emphasises Delolme’s argument that the historical 
development of English liberty diverged from its continental European counterparts’ historical 
path. The development in the history of English liberty is crucial to his argument of the 
exceptionality of the English experience distinct from other European monarchies.177 Delolme’s 
reading of the spirit of resistance against the Norman Conquest as the guiding topic renders his 
account of the turbulent era of the seventeenth century distinct from the better known account of 
David Hume in The History of England which dates the origin of English liberty much later 
namely after 1688.  
Hume famously contended in his deathbed interview on 7 July 1776 that, he hoped to 
“…leave that history, of which you are pleased to speak so favourably, perfect as I can” and that 
he had become a greater friend to the Stuart family as his research deepened. The interview also 
recorded how Hume also hoped that his work would leave ‘the first two of the Stuart never again 
to be attacked.’”178 Delolme’s account of the Stuarts however did not quite grant this wish. The 
nature of the constitution under the Stuarts was a contested topic which has strong party 
implications. On one hand, Whig historians insisted that they violated the principles of the ancient 
constitution and therefore, the dethronement of James II was legitimate as a constitutional 
resistance against a despotic ruler. On the other hand, especially in Hume’s account, the monarchs 
did what was within their power in an absolute monarchy framework. While he shared the hope 
to write an English history to eliminate party bias with Hume, Delolme differed from him 
significantly on the nature and meaning of the seventeenth-century constitution. His narrative 
grants more emphasis on “the spirit of resistance” and its institutional embodiments than the 
civilising effect of commerce.  
Mr. Hume is rather too anxious in his wish to exculpate James the Second. He begins the conclusive 
character he gives of him, with representing him as a Prince whom we may safely pronounce more 
unfortunate than criminal. If we consider the solemn engagements entered into, not by his predecessors 
only, but by himself, which this Prince endeavoured to break, how cool and deliberate his attack on the 
liberties and religion of the People was, how unprovoked the attempt, and in short how totally destitute 
he was of any plea of self-defence or necessity, a plea to which most of the Princes who have been at 
variance with their Subjects had some sort of more or less distant claim, we shall look upon him as 
being perhaps the guiltiest Monarch that ever existed.179 
For Delolme, James II did violate the liberty of the people and the raison d'être of a political 
society which he declared earlier in the book to be the protection of the individuals as manifested 
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through the historical development of the English constitution. And crucially, this form of 
negative liberty can be traced as far back as to the thirteenth century. In Delolme’s narrative, the 
English limited monarchy and the materialisation of “the whole end and design of political 
societies” in the form of the equal legal protection of the subjects (found in Magna Carta and 
later confirmed in the Habeas Corpus) proved the nature of the English constitution as a limited 
monarchy before the reign of the Stuarts despite some encroachments under the Tudors.180 In this 
narrative, the later dethronement of Charles I was therefore constitutional. He explained how the 
commoners “Finding among themselves Men of the greatest capacity, they undertook that 
important task with method and by constitutional means; and thus, had Charles to cope with a 
whole Nation put in motion and directed by an assembly of Statesmen.”181  
He further explained how in this era, the spirit of liberty was supported by the remnant of the 
shared sentiment against the “established faith” of Catholicism in the Tudor reign of the previous 
century which saw the rise of the Church of England. “The notions of religion, by a singular 
concurrence, united with the love of liberty: the same spirit which had made an attack on the 
established faith, now directed itself to politics: the royal prerogatives were brought under the 
same examination as the doctrines of the Church of Rome had been submitted to; and as a 
superstitious religion had proved unable to support the test, so neither could an authority 
pretended unlimited, be expected to bear it.”182 Delolme’s narrative of the spirit of liberty allows 
the continuity of the English rejection of Catholicism with the later century resistance against the 
doctrine of divine right of kings famously outlined in James I’s 1609 speeches to the Parliament. 
This remark on the Tudor era is in stark contrast with Hume’s analysis of the same period. 
Remarkably, Delolme’s account rejects Hume’s emphasis on the rise of the intermediate rank due 
to commerce under the Tudor as an important point in the development of the English history. In 
Hume’s narrative, under the Tudors “The cities increased [sic]; the middle rank of men began to 
be rich and powerful; the prince, who, in effect, was the same with the law, was implicitly 
obeyed;…in the interval between the fall of the nobles and the rise of this order, the sovereign 
took advantage of the present situation, and assumed an authority almost absolute.”183 This shift 
in property relations caused by the emergence of this new class is crucial in Hume’s examination 
of the rise of the English commercial monarchy. For Delolme the rise of commerce was also 
acknowledged. However, in his narrative its importance is best reflected in the form of financial 
restrictions as a modern scheme to limit the power of the Crown by the representatives of the 
people. “[I]n these days,” he wrote “when everything is rated by pecuniary estimation, when gold 
is become the great moving spring of affairs, it may be safely affirmed, that he who depends on 
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the will of other men, with regard to so important an article, is, whatever his power may be in 
other respects, in a state of real dependence.”184 
Another legacy of 1688 that Delolme highlighted beyond the Habeas Corpus is the civil 
control over the army. After the dethroning of James II, the King’s standing army in peacetime 
became illegal, along with other new terms such as parliamentary control over tax imposition. It 
was another assertion of the contract between the Crown and the people beyond what has been 
achieved then violated by the Tudor monarchs. They “…repair the breaches that had been made 
in the Constitution, as well as to prevent new ones; and advantage was taken of the rare 
opportunity of entering into an original and express compact between King and People.”185 
Delolme argued that in a modern free state, the executive power of the crown cannot simply rest 
on military power, because that would fundamentally breach the historical contracts between the 
crown and the people. More importantly, holding military power is simply a weak basis for the 
political authority of the executive power. Delolme discussed this extensively in his analysis of 
English constitutional history during the Commonwealth period under Oliver Cromwell. Despite 
his military power, which allowed him to establish the Commonwealth, Cromwell struggled to 
establish his political power. “Even after he had purged, by the agency of Colonel Pride and two 
regiments, the Parliament that was sitting when his power became settled, thereby thrusting out 
all his opponents to the amount of about two hundred, he soon found his whole authority 
endangered by their proceedings, and was at last under a necessity of turning them out in the 
military manner with which everyone is acquainted” without any success in establishing his 
authority as a politician.186 In Delolme’s opinion, Cromwell could not master the art of political 
authority, which in modern politics derives its basis from public opinion and mandate. Delolme’s 
account of modern monarchical executive power categorically rejects the usefulness of military 
power in maintaining the political authority. He also further clarified this point in his criticism of 
Adam Smith’s alleged argument that “That degree of liberty which approaches to licentiousness, 
can be tolerated only in Countries where the Sovereign is secured by a well-regulated standing 
army.”187 Smith failed to take into account the historical circumstances which gave rise to the 
English monarchical power and deemed the monarch’s ability for “re-action” to the people’s 
“licentiousness” necessary and it can be easily supported by a standing army.188 Smith “has 
deemed a Government to be a simpler machine, and an army a simpler instrument, than they in 
reality are.”189 The army, Delolme warned, consists of soldiers who also are driven by the same 
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passions which drive all people to seek to promote their private interests. Only through complex 
arrangement of constitutional power, including a full civil control of military power, a modern 
executive power becomes useful in the preservation of public liberty. 
The settlement of the seventeenth century English Civil War resulted in the re-affirmation of 
English liberty in the form of both the legal protection of the subject in Habeas Corpus as well as 
the fortification of their political power through the rise in power of the House of Commons and 
their control of the king’s subsidy as well as the civil control over military power. In other words, 
in Delolme’s narrative, the English king post-1688 became fully a sovereign of a constitutional 
monarchy. To demonstrate the nature of the English limited monarchy and a free constitution, 
Delolme contrasted the English monarch with the French king who “never repairs to that 
Assembly [the Parliament of Paris], to signify his intentions, or hold a Lit de Justice, without the 
most over-awning circumstances of military apparatus and preparation, constantly choosing to 
make his appearance among them rather as a military General rather than a King.”190 For Delolme, 
the history of English liberty post-1688 even further distinguishes itself from other European 
experience despite their similar beginning as a form of feudal society. 
Delolme employed the comparative method to the study of European monarchies to 
demonstrate the differences of the English system that made the royal executive power useful for 
the formation of public liberty. Not only did he rely on a comparison between England and France 
to support his argument on the unique historical conditions and unintended consequences that 
gave rise to English liberty, he also conducted a comparative study between England and Sweden 
in his A Parallel between the English Constitution and the Former Government of Sweden 
(1772).191 This compact work further explicates how the fall of the nobility and the benefit of 
having a strong executive power is central to Delolme’s understanding of modern liberty. 
 
English Liberty and Swedish Liberty: A Parallel between the English Constitution and the 
Former Government of Sweden (1772). 
 
Beyond England, there are few better examples of a fusion between republicanism and 
monarchy than that seen in the eighteenth-century Sweden. This constitutional question is 
manifested in numerous titles the Age of Liberty was given; from a royal republic to aristocratic 
despotism (aristokratisk despotism) which was how Gustav III depicted the regime in the same 
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period.192 Sweden’s Age of Liberty was coined in 1750s to highlight how the Swedish constitution 
successfully limited royal power for the benefit of public liberty.193 Gabriel Bonnot Mably, for 
example, praised it as the best model of modern legislation, superior to the British constitution in 
its preservation of liberty.194 Delolme’s comparative work on Sweden and England, in this regard, 
also responds to such opinions held by Mably. The Swedish and the English constitutions had 
deeper meaning to the contemporaries as they were central to the eighteenth-century debate on 
the institutional designs that best preserve modern liberty.195  
In Parallel, Delolme aimed to delineate “real powers” at work in the two states to prove that 
the strong nobility can pose a formidable threat to a constitution especially when it is much 
stronger than the executive power of the Crown. He crucially challenged the previous diagnosis 
of English history by Hume and Montesquieu who contended that the weakness of the nobility as 
a mediating power results in the imbalance of the constitution after the reign of the Tudors. 
Delolme, however, did not reject the mediating role of the nobility but in the case of Sweden, he 
attempted to demonstrate how an overly powerful nobility can slowly perturb the constitutional 
checks and balances despite the republican “outward form” of the constitution. 196   More 
importantly, in this comparative study, he put forward the argument that the mere existence or the 
absence of the institution of the Crown matters little to the preservation of liberty. Rather one has 
to closely examine the distribution of legislative and executive power in different political bodies 
within the constitution. 
Delolme began by acknowledging the topicality of “the late revolution in Sweden” for his 
target audience which was the British public. The revolution here refers to the coup of Gustav III 
in August 1772 which effectively ended the Age of Liberty.197 Placing “Power” at the centre of 
his political analysis, Delolme firstly declared his interest in the study of power defined as “…not 
a subordinate and precarious power, as that, for instance, of a Minister; but of a self-existing 
executive authority, for which he or they who possess it are the only indebted to the Nation; and 
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with respect to the use of it, are dependent of [sic] no individual”.198 In Delolme’s programme, 
the executive power’s existence as an individual force distinct from the legislative power is crucial 
for the constitution to function based on mutual and constant vigilance between the two branches. 
This vision is decisively distinct from Rousseau’s account of the executive power as merely an 
executor of the legislative will or in Mansfield’s word, an errand boy interpretation of the office.199  
Delolme then outlined the relationship between his research topic and the method of studying 
it.  To examine real powers at work, he argued that one has to distinguish between the form of a 
constitution and how it works in practice. For Delolme, the delineation of real powers made his 
work stand out from other contemporary political writers. “Let us take care not to fall into an 
error, common indeed to those who have written on politicks. Imagining Government by the dint, 
and as it were, magical effect of an original convention, made once for all, in their inquiries on 
the liberties of the Nations, they never went farther than the perusal of the books in which the 
laws of those Nations were contained.”200 This can be read broadly as an attack on the social 
contract (or the “original convention”) outlooks on politics. Delolme insisted that English modern 
liberty can only be studied retrospectively through the historical and comparative method as 
opposed to the theoretical approach because there were elements of unintended consequence and 
the gap between theory and practice that were not captured in “the books in which the laws of 
those Nations were contained”. A Parallel already adumbrates Delolme’s paradoxical account of 
authority, resistance, stability, and liberty which is to be examined more closely in his 
Constitution. 
After establishing his method of study, Delolme demonstrated how during the Age of Liberty, 
the Swedish nobility took total control over the constitution because of their dominance in all 
political branches. The legislative branch consisted of the senates and numerous committees of 
which the members are the commons. This, in effect, weakened the unity of the commons and 
resulted in the nobility having a decisive majority in the legislative branch. This meant that, as 
the majority in the legislature, the nobility proposed laws for their own interest. In the executive 
branch, the Swedish king, unlike the English, could not appoint the members of the Privy Council 
nor could he select ministers. Moreover, unlike the English monarch, the Swedish king did not 
possess a prerogative:  
In consequence of such a union of the Executive Power, with the active part of the Legislative, that is, 
with the exclusive power of proposing laws and remedies, the whole force of Government becomes 
united with the only Power that might regulate and repress it. The Nobles, in their respective capacities, 
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wink at each other's oppressions; they wink likewise at the unjust exertions of the governing Power, 
because they are not exposed to them.201  
For Delolme, this is why the Swedish Age of Liberty was in fact, the age of the nobility’s 
exploiting the constitutional advantage under the protection of the republican form. Playing with 
the theme of the apparent and the actual, Delolme contended that in Sweden before the 1772 coup, 
“if, setting, aside the deception from the words Republick [sic], Assemblies of the People, or even 
of Peasants, we examine into the fact, we shall see the liberty of the subject, reduced to a mere 
shadow, never to have extended beyond the appearance of the privileges they had the name of 
enjoying.”202  
In conclusion, distinguishing himself from previous historians on the historical development 
of European monarchies, Delolme had a sceptical view on the nobility as a mediating power 
between the Crown and the commons. For him, the nobility becomes dangerous once a part of it 
has a share in the executive power. Although A Parallel as a historical writing is rather short and 
limited in terms of its references, it is beneficial for the study of oligarchical disposition of 
republicanism.  For Delolme, Sweden and England differed significantly by their effectiveness in 
controlling the nobility especially by the use of the executive power.  It resulted in the Swedish 
system’s failure to nurture individual liberty both during the Age of Liberty and after the coup 




Scottish and Irish Liberty in Delolme’s “A Few Strictures of the Union of Scotland with 
England and on the Present Situation of Ireland Being an Introduction to Defoe’s History 
of the Union (1786)”. 
 
The rise and fall of the nobility and the notion of the public also persist in Delolme’s historical 
work on Scotland and Ireland as a part of the British Empire. He welcomed the prospect of the 
legislative union between the two kingdoms. However, he was also concerned with the sovereign 
executive monarch that rules over two kingdoms, with independent parliaments. In this scenario, 
the royal executive power becomes financially independent and manoeuvres the military support 
of one kingdom against the other. He also warned against the distinctions between Scotland and 
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Ireland that would give rise to challenges which the Anglo-Scottish union did not encounter. The 
work, in this regard, ends the chapter with the question about the applicability of the English 
constitutional principles in different historical contexts which previously has been overlooked by 
constitutional theorists who mainly focused on his idea of a balanced constitution, divorced from 
the historical analysis. Moreover, it also reveals Delolme’s previously overlooked serious 
engagement with the constitutional structure of the post-imperial Britain after its loss of the 
American colonies and the continuity of his critique of what he deemed to be the republican 
reform of the constitution. The issue is a part of the wider problem concerning the preservation 
of peace in Europe after the Treaty of Paris. 
The essay is best understood in the historical context of Pitt’s 1785 commercial propositions 
which called for the military support of Ireland for the British Empire as well as a hereditary 
revenue that would increase according to the Irish economic growth in exchange of a free trade 
agreement within the British Empire. Its failure was followed by the government’s discussion on 
the future legislative union of the two kingdoms. The Irish issue came to the attention of the public 
after the loss of the American colonies inspired political movements in Ireland. Delolme’s essay 
was first published as an introduction to the re-publication of Defoe’s History of the Union of 
Great Britain which was first published in 1709 in celebration of the historic 1707 Union Act. 
The republication of it amidst the discussion about the Anglo-Irish union therefore was an apt 
selection. That Delolme, an author who was personally praised by Pitt in the parliament, was 
selected to contribute an introductory essay to the discussion, was therefore understandable. 
Despite his general supportive stance on the union, he also warned against complications that 
might arise due to the complex Anglo-Irish history. This might explain why his analysis on Ireland 
was cut short. From page 72 to the last page of 95, the essay was completed by another anonymous 
author. Thomas Busby claimed that his interview with “Mr. Spilsbury”, who was Delolme’s 
acquaintance revealed that he had a lawsuit with Stockdale who was the publisher.203 The Monthly 
Review of 1787 also points out the discrepancy between Delolme’s “impartial” observation on 
the subject of Ireland and the second half of the essay which explicitly supports Pitt’s position.204 
Nonetheless, this dispute did not obstruct the republication of this introduction as a standalone 
essay titled The British Empire in Europe (1787). In this new edition, Delolme kept the original 
essay on Scotland but the second part on Ireland has minor changes. For example, details of the 
1785 Navigation Act were added which is important to the present examination of the relationship 
between the executive power and foreign dominations. This chapter, therefore, will mostly rely 
on the 1787 version of the essay in its examination of Ireland.  
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Delolme continued his discussion on the independence of the executive power that rules over 
two kingdoms from his analysis which first appears in Constitution. “[U]nder Charles the First, 
the regal power was obliged to submit to the power of the People, the king possessed other 
dominions besides England, viz. Scotland and Ireland, and therefore seemed to enjoy the same 
advantages as the Kings of France, that of reigning over a divided Empire or Nation.”205 In this 
comparative work between the Anglo-Scottish and the Anglo-Irish history, the question of 
executive power, foreign dominions, and modern liberty was examined to inform the public of 
the pros and cons of Pitt’s proposition for the legislative union. 
The essay begins with his examination of the Anglo-Scottish relation up to the union in 1707. 
He first pointed to the geographical proximity which rendered the kingdom of Scotland a target 
of the ambition of English kings as far back as Edward I. The transformative event, however, was 
after the union of the Scottish and the English Crowns under James IV and I. After the union of 
the Crown, the military aggression between Scotland and England was transformed into the 
rivalry between the English and the Scottish subjects for the attention of the ruling monarch. “In 
the midst of this mutual rivalship [sic] and opposition, King James enjoyed a secured power: each 
Kingdom reciprocally supplying the means of keeping the other in awe and subjection.”206 This 
analysis echoes his account of the success of English liberty which stems from the unity of interest 
between the nobility and the people against the Norman kings. The union of the crowns, in 
contrast, initially brought prosperity to the monarch at the expense of the liberty of the subjects 
of both kingdoms. This analysis also resonates with his account of how the English constitution 
might lose its celebrated liberty with the initiation of the direct subsidy from the American 
colonies to George III if the monarchical executive power is freed from the financial control of 
the English parliament in Constitution.207 The unity and the strength of the executive power can 
only be channelled for the public good if it entirely depends on the House of Commons for subsidy. 
In this essay, the success of this principle is portrayed as deeply linked to the historical formation 
of the constitution. 
The unintended consequence of the 1603 union, nonetheless, began to emerge during the 
English Civil War which resulted in the defeat of the executive power by the united interest of 
the English and the Scottish subjects against the tyrannical monarch. Delolme here emphasised 
the alleged originality of his argument in linking the British dominion of Scotland and the union 
of the Crowns, to the defeat of Charles I. He claimed that:  
Historians have observed that the great internal change of circumstances that had taken place in 
England, about the times of Charles the First, hindered the situation of the King very difficult; but they 
 
205 Delolme, Constitution, 49. 
206 Delolme, A Few Strictures, 1786-7, 11. 




have not taken sufficient notice how much this difficulty was farther increased by the accession of 
another Kingdom. To have two Kingdoms to manage at once: the one [Scotland] full of the spirit of 
turbulence and restlessness and the other perfectly well disposed to imitate the example, was a task 
infinitely beyond the skill of Charles successfully to compass.208  
What other historians missed before him was how Scotland “thrown of her obedience” to 
England “at the time of the Revolution, or since, sufficiently prove that it was no unfavourable 
circumstance to English liberty.”209 The Scottish disobedience to Charles I also had an unintended 
consequence in the improvement of English liberty as the English subjects’ imitated the Scottish 
“spirit of anarchical turbulence” and united in their cause with the Scottish subjects against the 
monarch210. He explicitly identified the union of interest between the Scottish and the English 
subjects as the prime factor.211 This analysis is reminiscent of his account of the Norman Conquest 
and its by-product of uniting the subjects of all ranking against the foreign kings and giving birth 
to English liberty. The essay therefore reveals how his account of the executive power and the 
schemes to control it are intertwined with the historical examination of the power struggle 
between the rulers and the ruled.  
Nonetheless, the closer union between Scotland and England also later saw the rise of a new 
obstruction to liberty, namely the party spirit which is employed by Delolme to describe 
obstructions against the union of interest between the English and the Scottish subjects. By party 
spirit, he meant a kind of political passion which “pestered so many other free States, making of 
the same Nation as it were two distinct People.”212 In the case of Scotland, he referred to the 
increasing religious tension especially among the Catholics caused by the maltreatment of the 
English parliament. In Delolme’s account, the Act of Settlement of 1701 which disqualified future 
Catholic members of the royal family to inherit the throne was the trigger of this episode of the 
Anglo-Scottish dispute. The Scottish Parliament retaliated in the form of the 1707 Act of Security 
with the help of “Party in Scotland which gained popularity through its opposition to England.”213 
The Act demands free trade in exchange of Scotland’s acceptance of Queen Anne as the new 
monarch.214 Delolme described the act as “in reality, a Bill of exclusion against the Possessor of 
the Crown of England.”215 This prompted the English Parliament to issue the Alien Act of 1705 
which would treat Scottish people and their property in England as alien as well as threatening 
for intercepting the trade of Scotland to the countries at war with England, especially France. He 
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emphasised how “the complaints of the Scots...were not without some foundation” as the move 
of the seat of power to London after the unification of the Crown had damaging effects especially 
on the Scottish nobility’s political power. 216   
The political tension also coincided with England’s victory on the continent with the military 
success led by Duke of Marlborough over Louis XIV. England’s position of dominance rendered 
Scotland, now without the hope of the French support, with “no prospect of military exertions.”217 
It led to the Union Act of 1707 which had powerful political implications, especially to the Scots. 
In this narrative, the legislative union resulted in the decline and the eventual demise of the 
Scottish nobility due to new restrictions concerning their seat in the House of Lords. The Scottish 
peers “found themselves in a more disadvantageous situation in regard to receiving honours from 
the Crown than Scottish commoners.”218 The legislative union had the effect of destroying feudal 
orders in the Scottish society which the Scottish people benefited from. Delolme gave a highly 
positive account of the Union. He asserted that “Most of the People of Scotland might be said, in 
fact; to have acquired no individual freedom, nor even advantage by the Treaty of Union, until 
the passing of the Act we mention…The feudal Tenures of land by wardholding and Knight-
service, together with their incidents and casualties, which were another source of, oppression 
upon a numerous class of individuals, were also abolished at that time.”219 More importantly, the 
legislative union also rendered Westminster to be the sole financial source of the Crown and 
therefore had it sole control over the executive.220  
Resonating with his analysis of the English constitutional history, Delolme championed the 
decrease in the nobility of power and related it to the rise of modern liberty. This improvement of 
the Scottish liberty of the subject is portrayed as directly linked to the political union of the 
subjects of the two nations “at the expense of the Royal Authority” as well as the decline of the 
traditional nobility’s power. The “perpetual peace” gained by the Union also crucially certified 
“that new model of Government which was introduced by it.”221 His analysis of the Anglo-
Scottish Union ends with a recognition of the transformative effect of the union to the English 
system that had incorporated Scotland as a part of the empire with the success of the legislative 
union. Delolme’s examination of Anglo-Scottish union puts to the fore the unity of interest among 
all subjects against that of the Crown and the historical circumstances that allowed it to take form. 
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Only then foreign dominions would not harm the dependence of the executive power on the 
legislative. The process of the formation of the unity of public interest among all subjects was 
portrayed as gradual and often depends on factors beyond the control of political actors, reflecting 
the characteristic of his science of politics.  
These historical contingencies are put forward in his analysis of the Anglo-Irish history to 
call attention to the fact that such projects of legislative union might take time before liberty can 
benefit from it. He first examined the different conditions of Ireland and its relationship to 
England. First, Ireland was not as homogenous as Scotland and consisted of waves of colonial 
settlers, the most important one being the 1169 Norman invasion. During the lengthy course of 
time, these colonists became a part of the native and diverse population. In this period, Delolme 
proposed that the treatment of Ireland should be understood similarly to the British parliament’s 
relation to the American colonists.222 The natives of Ireland did not profess a united discontent 
against the ambition of the English kings due to the diversity of interests among different social 
groups. A serious attempt to conquer Ireland was only initiated after the Spanish threat of invasion 
due to its strategic location.223 However, the Protestant Reformation under Edward VI saw the 
beginning of the discontent which was exacerbated by the monarch’s meddling with the Irish 
parliament by setting up new counties resulting in the Protestant “artificial strength” as they had 
most seats in the Irish parliament despite their significantly smaller population in comparison to 
the Catholic counterpart. Instead of representing the Irish interest, the origin of the Irish 
parliament was to preserve the English interest.224  
Since then, the Irish Protestant-dominated Parliament under the control of English influence 
resulted in Ireland’s de facto submission. The Irish Parliament became the symbol of the English 
dominance on the island. It was a “Colonial Assembly” rather than a parliament.225 In Delolme’s 
narrative, the emphasis is on how the injustice done in the name of the Protestant cause was the 
source of the beginning of the political tension between the two nations which was never 
portrayed in the historiography. Sir John Davies, a legal architect under James I and a pioneer of 
the legal settlement in Ireland, produced the famous treaty Discovery of the True Cause why 
Ireland was never entirely Subdued till the beginning of His Majesty’s Reign in 1612. The work 
was also re-published in 1747 amidst the growing interest in Anglo-Irish relations.226 In this essay, 
the treatise was exposed for its contradictions and English bias. Delolme deemed the work to be 
not only incompetent but also malicious in its political intention.  It “contains continual 
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contradictions from the beginning to the end. He [Davies] calls the Kings of England from the 
reign of Henry the Second, Absolute Monarchs of Ireland, having in right all Royal and Imperial 
Jurisdiction there he brands the native Irish with the names of perfidious Rebels, wicked and 
ungrateful traitors, throughout his Book, and all for what? Because the Kings of England had 
conquered their Country: and yet the Book is purposefully written to point out the causes why 
they had not conquered it.”227 This imperial origin of the Irish parliament nonetheless was not 
opposed by the Irish natives because of the absence of a united interest due to the diversity of the 
population including the severe Protestant-Catholic division.  
 The turning point in Anglo-Irish relations commenced with the formation of the Irish public 
as well as the Irish interest against that of the English. In this regard, it differed from the formation 
of the Anglo-Scottish interest which was partly made possible with the historic union of the 
subjects against monarchical power during the English Civil War. The formation of the Irish 
public was made possible against the backdrop of the increasing English influence exemplified 
with Pitt’s commercial propositions in 1785. This discontent which was part and parcel of the 
formation of the Irish public interest against the English was captured as early as the publication 
of William Molyneux’s The Case with Ireland in 1698: “This Pamphlet, together with the high 
degree of notice that was taken of it by the English House of Commons, may be considered as 
having been the public opening of the controversy and the political contention between England 
and Ireland, at the beginning of this century.”228 The response of the English House of Commons 
was to declare the work to be “of dangerous consequence to the crown and people of England by 
denying the authority of the king and parliament of England to bind the kingdom and people of 
Ireland”.229 In doing so, the House of Commons helped to shape the Irish interest against not only 
the English people but also the Crown itself. The seventeenth century ended with the beginning 
of the Irish public’s increasing discontent with both the British parliament and the Crown. Unlike 
the Scottish and the English subjects’ experience during the English Civil War, the very origin of 
the Irish united interest was exclusively in opposition to the English nation as a whole.  
Another important difference from the Scottish case is that the Scottish nobility lost its 
traditional power after the 1707 Union while the Scottish people saw an increase in individual 
liberty at the expense of the nobility’s political power. The formation of the Irish interest, in 
contrast, saw the co-operation of the Irish “men of influence” with the Irish people. Delolme gave 
an account of Charles Lucas and his examination of the unlawfulness of several branches of power 
exercised by the Lord Mayor and the Alderman of Dublin. “His endeavours were acceptable to 
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the generality of the People, that, on the death of Sir James Somerville, in the year 1746, he 
received public invitations to declare himself a Candidate for the City of Dublin to which seat he 
was accordingly elected.”230 While he did not rule out Lucas’ political interest in this narrative, 
the focus was on how the English oppression encouraged the merging of personal ambition with 
the Irish public interest. In short, “there was a degree of similarity between his career and that of 
Mr. Wilkes.”231 Interestingly, he is portrayed in Delolme’s narrative as a result of the deep-rooted 
English influence in Irish politics rather than a political agent who simply exploited popular 
support for his personal ambition. The incorporation of Lucas into the parliamentary politics also 
epitomised the unity of interest between the political leaders and the people against the English 
interest. This solidification of Irish interest also further developed after the American Crisis and 
the British subsequent military defeat. “Men of influence in Ireland thought it advisable to seize 
as a proper opportunity for increasing both their own private consequence, and the particular 
advantages of that part of the Empire to which they belonged.”232 Taking further advantage with 
the 1778 establishment of the Volunteer Association, a local militia which originally was 
established during the war with the American colonies, the Irish took this opportunity in light of 
Britain’s recent defeat to demand legislative independence which became successful in 1782.233 
For Delolme, the Association effectively “had infused a new spirit into the Politics of Ireland” by 
combining the military strength, public support, and newly obtained political power by the Irish 
parliament.234 For Delolme, “The British Parliament, in their dealings with Ireland, had evidently 
availed themselves of the right of the strongest.”235 
While Delolme was generally supportive of the legislative union between Britain and Ireland, 
his caution is revealing. It comes from the perspective of someone who valued the recent 
experience of the loss of American settler colonies as well as the “success” of the Anglo-Scottish 
union in 1707, especially to the control of the executive power. He warned against the financial 
independence of the Crown due to its direct subsidy from foreign dominions like the American 
colonies. Similarly, Irish legislative independence might have meant a direct income to George 
III that came from another political body beyond the English House of Commons. The 
constitutional implication of the Crown’s financial independence, he argued, was overlooked: 
there would have been no necessity that the aids granted by Ireland and America should have risen to 
an equality with those granted by the British Parliament: it would have been sufficient, to produce the 
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effects we mention, that they had only borne a certain proportion with these latter, so far as to have 
conferred on the Crown a certain degree of independence, and at the same time have raised in the 
English Commons a correspondent sense of self-diffidence in the exercise of their undoubted privilege 




Delolme’s argument for strong and unitary executive power did not emerge from a historical 
vacuum. As this chapter reveals, he was deeply engaged with the historiographical controversies 
on the origin of English liberty. The resistance against the Norman Conquest is the beginning of 
English liberty in this narrative, as it was a union of interest between the people and the nobility 
against the Crown’s infringement upon liberty. This union of interest culminated in the legal 
protection of all subjects and the institutionalisation of the people’s control of monarchical 
executive power after 1688 as the House of Commons gradually rose to power. On the contrary, 
the Swedish Age of Liberty, in contrast to England, saw the nobility’s victory over both the 
monarch and the people despite the constitutional form of limited monarchy. The divided 
executive power and the ambiguity of the limitation of the power benefited the nobility as they 
gained control over both civil and military power at the expense of political liberty. The 
comparative study between Scotland and Ireland tells a similar story. Scotland’s formation of the 
public interest was at the expense of the Scottish nobility who lost their traditional political power 
as the centre of politics moved to Westminster and feudal ties were cut by the political 
transformation of the 1707 Union. In Ireland, by contrast, the formation of the Irish interest was 
between the Irish “powerful leaders” and the people against the whole of the English national 
interest. Delolme’s serious engagement with “real powers” and history of the struggle of powers 
beyond the legal texts, and understanding of politics narrowly as limited to the parliament, should 
be understood in tandem with his scepticism of rival analyses of the English constitution, which 
will be examined in the next chapter. 














Delolme engaged closely with other critics of the English system and regarded his 
contribution to the long-standing debate on the nature of the constitution to have great political 
implications beyond English national politics. With the re-evaluation of rival accounts of the 
English system, his programme presents the English model as a paradigm for the possibility of 
liberty in the modern world. The first part of his critique of Rousseau explores the continuity of 
the Genevan question concerning the expression of popular sovereignty in representative politics. 
For both of them, the issue directly links to the problem of constitutional “usurpation,” one of the 
key terms in Rousseau’s Social Contract.237  While both agreed on its topicality, Delolme’s 
analysis differs on its precise definition, which led to Delolme’s criticism of Rousseau’s account 
of the English system in Social Contract. In his critique of Hume, Delolme examines the 
representative mechanism and institutional arrangements that make the English constitution 
compatible with the ideal of popular sovereignty without compromising political stability. Unlike 
Hume who focused on “calculating their [the representatives] number and exterior functions” in 
his scheme of federalism, Delolme argued that Hume failed to grasp how the notion of interest 
was key to the success of the English representative mechanism. 238 The issue about the stability 
and duration of the English system is also further elaborated in Delolme’s criticism of 
Montesquieu’s famous prophecy of the downfall of the British Empire, which reflects his 
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Delolme’s Critique of Rousseau. 
 
The Genevan Question: Popular Sovereignty and Rule of the Few 
 
This section frames Delolme’s critique of Rousseau around the issue of constitutional 
usurpation, understood as the tendency for a person or a group of people to seize popular 
sovereignty, often in the name of the public good and stability. Back in Geneva during the 
turbulent years of the 1760s, the young Delolme witnessed the ruling Council of the Twenty-
Five’s gradual encroachment on the power of the General Council through their total control of 
the business of the state. Rousseau’s call for the supremacy of the legislative power as an 
expression of the people’s will in The Social Contract was received as a direct attack on the ruling 
power.239 Jean-Robert Tronchin’s critique of the work was responded to by Rousseau in his 
Lettres écrites de la montagne (1764). 240  Addressing the same problem of the aristocratic 
tendency of republicanism, Delolme penned the 1767 Purification des trois points de droit 
souillés par un anonyme in support of Rousseau’s argument. In the pamphlet, he criticised the 
ruling magistrates and their exercise of executive power and full control of the legislature. What 
happened in Geneva was a perversion of its popular constitutional principle and although it still 
employed the name of a republic, the lack of the separation of powers rendered it under the total 
influence of the rule of the few. Delolme in 1767 proposed a democratic solution to this problem, 
insisting that the General Council was constitutionally “sovereign, nation, and law”.241 
Some scholars believe that Delolme, as the author of the 1767 work who “upheld there the 
Sovereignty of the People against the theory of Orders within the state”, went through “a 
significant change in a ‘conservative’ direction, from ideas resembling those of Rousseau to ideas 
resembling those of Montesquieu”, after three years of living in England.”242 To say that he 
adopted a more “conservative” and “Montesquieuian” perspective, deviating from Rousseau, is 
however problematic and leads to misunderstandings of his programme. First and foremost, the 
label of conservatism serves no purpose in the context of eighteenth-century Geneva and later, in 
 
239 On Rousseau’s critical stance on both the democratic représentants and the ruling magistrates’ 
constitutional programmes see Richard Whatmore, "Rousseau and the Representants: The Politics of the 
Lettres Ecrites de la Montagne." Modern Intellectual History 3, no. 3 (2006): 385.  
240 Rousseau was asked for help by the democratic représentants to respond to Trochin’s attack and the 
publication of Lettres écrites de la montage was “carefully orchestrated” by the group ibid., 388. 
241 Cited and translated by Richard Whatmore, Against War and Empire: Geneva, Britain, and France in 
the Eighteenth Century, Yale University Press, 2012, pp. 96. 
242 Palmer, R. R. The Age of Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760-




England, as the issue of concern was not authority versus liberty but rather, what liberty means in 
the modern political conditions of representative politics. Additionally, as the last part of the 
chapter will reveal, Delolme was highly critical of Montesquieu and his analysis of the English 
system and proposed his own alternative account as the result. This chapter argues that Delolme’s 
concern remained constantly about subtle constitutional usurpations by people who wield the 
governmental powers. What had changed after his exile to England was that he became convinced 
that he found more effective solutions to this problem than Rousseau’s proposition for collective 
legislation in his study of English constitutional history.  
As Palmer pointed out in his The Age of Democratic Revolution (1964), what remained 
constant about Delolme’s political standpoint despite the apparent change towards a 
Montesquieuean direction is his distrust of aristocracy.243 This chapter agrees with this line of 
argument that the main objective of Delolme’s project is to, broadly speaking, minimize the risk 
of the rule of the few in all forms. Rousseau’s programme, as sketched out in The Social Contract, 
he argued, fails to be adequately perceptive of this subtle threat in modern conditions. Even in the 
English system which he lauded, Delolme warned against constitutional usurpation by the few: 
If through the unforeseen operation of some new regulation made to restrain the royal prerogative, or 
through some sudden public revolution, any particular bodies or classes of individuals were ever to 
acquire a personal independent share in the exercise of the governing authority, we should behold the 
public virtue and patriotism of the Legislators and Great Men immediately cease with its cause, and 
Aristocracy, as it were watchful of the opportunity, burst out at once, and spread itself over the 
Kingdom.244 
In his critique of Rousseau in Constitution, Delolme found Rousseau’s proposed solution in 
Social Contract to be inadequate in both perceiving and preventing subtle forms of usurpations 
which he associated with the legislative encroachment upon liberty.  
His critique, however, comes from a position of someone who agrees with Rousseau on the 
separation between government and sovereignty. The people own the highest political power in 
the state but “the body of the People cannot act without either subjecting themselves to some 
Power, or effecting a general destruction, the only share they can have in a Government with 
advantage to themselves, is not to interfere, but to influence,—to be able to act, and not to act.”245 
For this reason, it is for the benefit of themselves that they do not exercise the power directly. The 
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distinction between the sovereign and the government has a long intellectual tradition in Geneva. 
Helena Rosenblatt uncovers the debate which centres the legacy and intellectual dominance of 
Hugo Grotius, Jean Barbeyrac, and Samuel Pufendorf in the eighteenth-century Geneva. During 
the 1730s civil strife, in replying to Jacques-Barthélemy Micheli du Crest’s claim that the nature 
of the Genevan constitution was a democratic republic, Barbeyrac argued that “the people of 
Geneva can be as sovereign as you please; it still does not exercise the acts of sovereignty 
itself.”246 In this regard, Rousseau’s Social Contract revived the distinction between the sovereign 
and the government in the lost cause of Micheli of the first half of the eighteenth-century.247 This 
disagreement between Delolme and Rousseau therefore, is best understood as a part of the 
Genevan debate on popular sovereignty. Unlike Rousseau (and Micheli) who found the city-state 
of Geneva’s constitution and its distinction between sovereignty and government to be “an 
example to the rest of Europe”, Delolme found that the sleeping sovereignty was best preserved 
in the English system although it had not been recognised by his contemporaries and his 
Constitution aims to demonstrate this.248  
Jean Barbeyrac criticised Rousseau’s Social Contract for “believing with Hobbes that men 
are born the enemies of one another, and that our worst enemies are our superiors, like him he 
remedies this by Despotism, though locating it in a different place. Whereas Hobbes gives 
arbitrary power to a Prince, Mr Rousseau (who knows no middle ground) instead gives a similar 
power to the multitude.”249  In a way, Delolme’s project attempts to provide this “middle ground” 
in combing a strong and unitary executive power, with the republican doctrine of the rule of law 
and its focus on the limitation of the governing powers by the constitution. In this regard, Delolme 
shared the democratic sovereignty assumption with his compatriot but his concern about 
legislative despotism is a mirror-image of Rousseau’s concern with a unitary executive power as 
“the particular will has greater sway and more easily dominates the other wills.”250 Although 
Delolme had the opposite opinion concerning the division of the executive power, he engaged 
with Rousseau’s analysis as it can be seen from his reference, as well as his adoption of 
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Although Rousseau’s opinions on liberty vary across his works, here I selectively focus on 
his opinion on the topic in The Social Contract’s Book 3 Chapter 15, because it is this famous 
passage concerning English liberty that Delolme referred to and commented on extensively in 
The Constitution. 251  Rousseau criticised English liberty under the topic of “Of Deputies or 
Representatives” that “The English people think it is free; it is greatly mistaken, it is free only 
during the election of Members of Parliament; as soon as they are elected, it is enslaved, it is 
nothing. The use it makes of its freedom during the brief moments [of selecting the representatives] 
it has it fully warrants its losing it.”252 For him, the idea of the representative of the people 
exemplified in the celebrated English constitution is precisely the cause of its degeneration. This 
opinion can only be understood in tandem with his depicted ideal constitution described in Social 
Contract.  
In the work, Rousseau argued that the establishment of this ideal constitution requires all to 
enter into a contract with all, creating the sovereign or the body of the people which 
simultaneously signifies the transition from the natural order based on self-interest to a moral 
order based on general will.253 The sovereign is the creature of the people, transforming “the 
multitudes” into one unified body politic whose will is the general will and the expression of it is 
the only definition of law. In this portrayal, liberty is no longer contradictory with the existence 
of the state and its enforcement of law. This is because the general will of the body politic is 
expressed through laws and when obeyed, the people only comply with the will of their own as a 
constitutive part of the sovereign. The law is no longer just an expression of an arbitrary power. 
To be in this kind of state is no longer detrimental to one’s liberty: a perfect fusion of liberty and 
authority, complying with the ultimate purpose of the state for Rousseau which is to preserve 
liberty.  
Rousseau’s critique of English liberty is based on the understanding of this ideal constitution 
delineated in The Social Contract. In the English system, the people only directly exercise their 
legislative power when they elect the representatives. In doing so, they have sealed their fate into 
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the condition of slavery defined as the lack of self-determination in politics. In the civil condition, 
freedom no longer is defined in terms of independence as it used to in the state of nature; in a civil 
society, it has to be understood in terms of one’s relation to others, hence direct participation in 
the law-making process as the definition of political liberty. Therefore, it follows that, for 
Rousseau, the existence of the representatives of the people exemplified in the English system 
hinders this essence of political liberty.  It amounts to usurpation in Rousseau’s terms as described 
in book III of Social Contract. On the origin of the representative mechanism, Rousseau argued 
that “The idea of Representative is modern: it comes to us from feudal Government,” which is 
“iniquitous and absurd.” It is the kind of government “in which the human species is degraded, 
and the name of man dishonoured.”254 This negative perception of political representation as the 
legacy of feudalism is portrayed in contrast with the glorified Roman model “where right and 
freedom are everything, inconveniences are nothing. Among this wise people, everything was 
given its just due.”255 The Roman model in Social Contract represents a form of government in 
which the sovereignty lies indivisibly in the people’s hands while the government and its 
magisterial divisions serve to administer the will of the sovereign.256  
Delolme argued that to participate in the legislation process is to have a share in the exercise 
of the government power which is a means of preserving political liberty but not political liberty 
in itself. Delolme summarised Rousseau’s definition of political liberty according to Social 
Contract as “Man who contributes by his vote to the passing of a law, has himself made the law; 
in obeying it, he obeys himself,—he therefore is free” and quickly commented on it as “a play on 
words and nothing more.”257 Commenting on the republican definition of political liberty as self-
determination, he argued that political liberty cannot possibly be equated with the act of 
legislation because, he explained, “When a law is passed agreeably to his vote, it is not as a 
consequence of his vote that his will happens to take place; it is because a number of other Men 
have accidentally thrown themselves on the same side with him:---when a law contrary to his 
intention is enacted, he must nevertheless submit to it.”258 Delolme here argued that if the idea of 
determination is the heart of Rousseau’s definition of liberty, the contingency of the voting result 
is an unsatisfactory basis for the notion of the general will which is the legislative determination 
of the body politic as well as Rousseau’s definition of the freedom of the constitution. 
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To further explain the inadequacy of Rousseau’s definition of political liberty as self-
legislation, Delolme provided examples of disadvantages that might be the consequence of this 
aspect of Rousseau’s political philosophy in Social Contract. Delolme argued that, to equate 
political liberty with the act of participating in the law-making process itself is dangerous as it 
does not provide enough critical stance on the work of the legislative branch of the government. 
This opinion is not uncommon since by the late-eighteenth century, the legislative tyranny of the 
1640s was already agreed upon by all sides on the political spectrum.259 For Delolme, Rousseau’s 
theory is dangerous because, in equating the notion of political liberty itself with the act of 
legislation, it neglects the possibility of unjust pre-conditions of the voting process as well as the 
possibility of the poor execution of those laws and their detrimental effect upon political liberty. 
This disadvantage manifests itself in the defects of the Roman Republic’s political system. 
Delolme argued that Rousseau’s admired ancient Romans “were satisfied when they saw the few 
who really governed everything in the State, at times perform the illusory ceremony of assembling 
the body of the People, that they might appear to consult them: and the mere giving votes, under 
any disadvantages in the manner of giving them, and how much soever [sic] the law might 
afterwards be neglected was thus pretended to have been made in common, has appeared to them 
to be Liberty.”260 To support these arguments Delolme also referred to Livy’s Ab Urbe Condita. 
In the book, it is described how the Roman Senate assumed the power of laying taxes in the 
disguise of the proposal to pay for the expense incurred during the war by setting up a tribute. 
“By presenting to it [the plebeian assembly] many propositions at once, and which are to be voted 
upon in lump, they [those who share either the actual exercise of the public power or its 
advantages] hide what is destined to promote their own private views, or give a colour of it, by 
joining it with things which they know will take hold of the mind of the People.”261 In other words, 
for Delolme, Rousseau’s equating political liberty with voting is an unsatisfactory definition. The 
historical example was given to both undermine Rousseau’s account of the Roman model as the 
perfect form of government in securing political liberty, as well as to demonstrate the inadequacy 
of Rousseau’s philosophical definition of political liberty defined as self-legislation. 
Rousseau’s definition of liberty as self-legislation also allows for those with the share of the 
legislative power to exploit it for their private interest. This is because, Delolme argued, in 
Rousseau’s theory, there is no room for the legislative power, as an expression of the sovereign, 
to err and therefore, to be criticised. “Those laws which are intended to be equal for all, are soon 
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warped into the private convenience of those who have been made the administrators of them---
instituted at first for the protection of all, they soon are made only to defend the usurpations of a 
few.”262 If Rousseau’s Social Contract aims to be a sketch of an ideal constitution which shows 
how one might establish a legitimate government among the people who already agree that there 
is a shared interest in forming a civil society, then “there might be no inconvenience in allowing 
every individual to have a share in the government of the community of which he is a member” 
which also follows that “in such a Society, and among such Beings, there would be no occasion 
for any Government.”263 And if it, rather, intends to propose an institutional solution to “Men as 
they are” then, it fails to address the possibility of the problem of legislative despotism. 
Delolme found Rousseau’s definition of political liberty to be a thin one because it mistakes 
political power for liberty. This line of argument was made, most famously, by Hobbes and later, 
Montesquieu in The Spirit of the Laws but Delolme’s version of it aims to address Rousseau’s 
approach to the study of Roman history, which led to his erroneous philosophical conclusion that 
liberty is self-legislation. To sum up this critique, Delolme contended that what Rousseau deemed 
to be political liberty “are functions, are acts of Government, but not constituent parts of Liberty” 
and that “To concur by one’s suffrage in enacting laws, is to enjoy a share…of Power.”264 
Rosseau’s misunderstanding of power as political liberty partly stems from his anachronism in 
the study of ancient history. Delolme commented that “for a Man to decide that a State whose 
government and interior administration he is unacquainted, is a State in which the People are 
slaves, are nothing, merely because the Comitia of ancient Rome are no longer to be met within 
it, is a somewhat precipitate decision.”265 Delolme contended that the ancient political liberty is 
not desirable for the moderns. For the ancients, “the only proper employment of a free Citizen is, 
to be either incessantly assembled in the forum, or preparing for war, ---Being valiant, inured to 
hardship, inflamed with an ardent love of one’s Country. Which is, after all, nothing more than 
an ardent desire of injuring all Mankind for the sake of that Society of which we are Members.”266 
Rousseau failed to take into account the militaristic disposition of those active citizens of the 
ancient free states which he deemed as a model perfect for the preservation of liberty. 
The Impossibility of Deliberation in Large Assemblies 
Delolme’s second critique argues generally that any large-bodied popular assembly cannot 
produce a mature decision. This is directed particularly at the possibility of Rousseau’s idea of 
general will. It is unclear whether Delolme referred to Rousseau’s notion of general will or he 
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merely meant the will of all. However, here I proceed with the latter interpretation but it is useful 
to be aware of this ambiguity in his employment of the term. For Delolme, the body of the people 
cannot unitarily act in any meaningful sense. This is because in all “numerous assemblies”, the 
problem of demagoguery is inevitable. He then proceeded to sketch out the scene. Although the 
law-making process does “materially concern them”, as law directly affects their quality of life, 
“the multitudes” are “incapable of coming to any mature resolution” by their definition of being 
the multitude. This is because “Those who compose a popular Assembly…lost as it were in the 
crowd of those who are called upon to exercise the same function with themselves,---as they know 
how their individual votes will make no change in the public resolution, and that, to whatever side 
they might incline, the general result will nevertheless be the same, they do not undertake to 
enquire how far things proposed to them agree with the whole of the laws already in being.” 
Delolme’s insight here is interesting because he did not argue that this is because the multitudes 
lack reason required in the process of political deliberation, but it is precisely because they can 
reason that their individual vote will not change the direction of the public opinion that makes 
them lack the enthusiasm in participating in the process. He summarised this argument based on 
his general observation on the nature of humans that “Men will not enter upon a laborious task, 
when they know that it can scarcely answer any purpose.”267  
This lack of enthusiasm gives rise to another more dangerous threat to political liberty because 
the popular assembly will take any hint of direction that might lead to a resolution. This includes 
“an unusual sight, a change of the ordinary place of the Assembly, a sudden disturbance, a rumour.” 
From this Rousseau’s “general will results, which is also void of reflection.”268 However, the 
worst scenario is sketched out when “those who share either the actual exercise of the public 
Power, or in its advantages” exploit their knowledge in “the management of public business” for 
their own personal ambition by giving rise “to every incident that may influence the minds of the 
multitude who are not on their guard, and who wait for some event or other that may finally 
determine them.” It is these demagogues who, in practice, “convene the Assembly, and dissolve 
it; it is they who offer propositions, and make speeches to it.” 269  For this reason, Delolme 
concluded that “the general will of all…is at bottom nothing more than the effect of the artifices 
of a few designing Men, who are exulting among themselves.”270 It is also worth pointing out here 
that this critique does not aim at rejecting voting rights but argues against its equation with 
political liberty itself. 
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Delolme’s critique of political deliberation in large assemblies resonates with David Hume’s 
point made in The Idea of Perfect Commonwealth (1752), in which Hume approached the problem 
of large political bodies as an institutional question which paves the way to his analysis of 
federalism as a possible solution to the problem of scale. Delolme, however, disagreed with Hume 
concerning his underlying assumption about political representation in his examination of the 
British Empire. 
 
Delolme’s Critique of Hume. 
 
Hume’s Of Civil Liberty (1741,1777) and The Idea of Perfect Commonwealth (1752) 
shared with Delolme the concern about the discrepancy between the ancient knowledge in politics 
and the modern political challenges. In Of Civil Liberty, Hume pointed out how earlier work on 
monarchy, such as Machiavelli’s writings, as a form of government, was extremely limited. Even 
as someone who was writing in the eighteenth century, Hume confessed that “Having, therefore, 
intended in this essay to make a full comparison of civil liberty and absolute government, and to 
show the great advantages of the former above the latter; I began to entertain a suspicion, that no 
man in this age was sufficiently qualified for such an undertaking; and that whatever any one 
should advance on that head would, in all probability, be refuted by further experience, and be 
rejected by posterity.”271 Here Hume highlighted the increasingly blurred line between the forms 
of government and their capacity to foster liberty. In other words, that liberty thrives better in a 
republic than under a monarchy becomes increasingly contestable in the light of the modern 
changes to both monarchy and republicanism.272  Nonetheless, despite “the greatest advances 
towards perfection” of the monarchical form of government in comparison to other forms, he still 
emphasized how although modern monarchies “have approached near popular ones, in gentleness 
and stability; they are still inferior. Our modern education and customs instil more humanity and 
moderation than that ancient; but have not yet as been able overcome entirely the disadvantages 
of that form of government”273  For Hume, qualities like gentleness and stability seem to be more 
commonly associated with popular government and the reason that some modern monarchies are 
able to gain some of these qualities is accredited to modern education and customs.  Agreeing 
with Hume, Delolme also pointed out how the English constitution, as a modern limited monarchy, 
is notable in its political stability as well as its mildness, especially when it comes to the area of 
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the criminal justice.274  However, despite their initial agreement on the superiority of the English 
representative system to ancient popular constitutions in maintaining political stability, both 
authors differed concerning the details of what constitutes successful political representation.  
Despite one interpretation of An Idea for a Perfect Commonwealth as a satire piece subtly 
criticizing pure theories, for Delolme, this contemporary work seriously tackles the important 
question about constitutional reform.275 In the essay, Hume proposed an ideal form of government 
to be “adjusted to the ancient fabric, and preserve the entire chief pillars and supports of the 
constitution.” 276  Using James Harrington’s Oceana which is “the only valuable model of a 
commonwealth, that has as yet been offered to the public” as his point of departure, he identified 
both its advantages and defects before proposing his own model focusing on how to preserve the 
advantages of the small republics in modern large-scale states, including a federal one. The outline 
of this proposed commonwealth is, in sum, a large state with a bicameral legislative parliament 
in which both houses are democratically elected through a two-stage process. The bicameral 
feature, he argued, would result in better political deliberation.277 
One important criticism that Hume offered is that Harrington’s model gives exorbitant power 
to the senate by allowing it to have a negative on the proposed bills. Due to this defect “The 
Oceana provides not a sufficient security for liberty, or the redress of grievances”, because it cuts 
short parliamentary debates on controversial bills.278 His alternative model proposes a bicameral 
and decentralised modern republic with numerous counties and parishes each with their own 
representative.279 What is central to Hume’s scheme is the idea that those diverse interests of each 
constituent be represented adequately. In other words, the success of political representation lies 
in its capacity to approximate the diversity of the interests of the represented. The underlying 
principle in Hume’s theory of political representation is also congruent with Hume’s opinion 
concerning the idea of private interests represented by political parties. 280 
Regarding the relationship between private interests and the establishment of government, 
Hume argued, in stark contrast with Rousseau’s idea of general will, that it is the lack of one 
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unified public interest as well as the complex nature of it that makes representative government 
desirable. Foreshadowing and possibly also influencing Delolme’s critique of Rousseau, Hume 
argued that “Had everyman sufficient sagacity to perceive at all times the strong interest which 
binds him to the observance of justice and equity, and the strength of mind sufficient to preserve 
a steady adherence to a general and distant interest, in opposition to the allurement of present 
pleasure and advantage; there had never, in that case, been any such thing as government or 
political society.”281 Another important proposition in An Idea for A Perfect Commonwealth is 
that the executive power be lodged in the senates (there are a hundred of them being chosen from 
among the ten thousand representatives of each county). “Let the senators meet in the capital, and 
be endowed with the whole executive power of the commonwealth” and have “all the prerogatives 
of the British king, except his negative.”282 
Echoing Hume regarding the inevitability of opposing private interests in modern politics, 
which makes it distinct from the ancient republics, Delolme made a similar remark on the nature 
of liberty:  
What then is Liberty? Liberty, I would answer, so far as it is possible for it to exist in a Society of 
Beings whose interests are almost perpetually opposed to each other, consists in this, that, every Man, 
while he respects the persons of others, and allows them quietly to enjoy the produce of their industry, 
be certain himself likewise to enjoy the produce of his own industry, and that his person be also 
secure.283  
Nonetheless, despite their similar opinion concerning the problematic idea of the general will 
as the basis of political authority, they differed in details on how this diversity of public interests 
should be alleviated through the mechanism of political representation. By highlighting what 
Hume failed to address, namely the unity of interest between the representative and the 
represented, Delolme further explained how Hume’s plan overlooks the advantages derived from 
having a unitary executive power. This backstory is crucial to our understanding of Delolme’s 
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Delolme’s Response to An Idea for A Perfect Commonwealth. 
 
Delolme made a rare direct reference to An Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth in his A 
Parallel Between the English Constitution and the Former Government of Sweden. For Delolme, 
this failure to understand the nature of political representation led ancient republics with popular 
constitutions to their loss of liberty and eventual ruin. By granting too much trust in their 
representatives, investing them with both legislative and the executive power, the people of the 
ancient republics were “necessarily betrayed.” 284  Hume’s proposal, while it recognises the 
importance of the representative mechanism in modern politics over popular constitutions, also 
fails to appreciate the key to the success of the political representation in the English system, 
namely the unitary executive power of the crown, which renders the unity of interest between the 
people and their representatives possible. 
In Delolme’s account, the history of power struggle between the people and the Crown shaped 
the interest of the representatives of the people against that of the royal executive power. Crucially, 
this unity of interest of the people is reflected in Delolme’s account of England as a unitary state 
in contrast with other European monarchies.285  Regardless of the historical dispute over the 
meaning of 1066, the argument significantly reveals Delolme’s stance on the formation of the 
unity of the English subject’s interest which was formed in opposition to the magnitude of the 
royal executive power. This historical condition behind the success of the English representative 
politics, he argued, is overlooked in Hume’s analysis: 
Mr. Hume, in his disquisitions on the Republican form…though so judicious an Observer, he took it 
for granted that it was enough, in order to constitute Representatives of the People, that the People, 
after electing them, should call them so; and only thought of calculating their number and exterior 
functions. But a little more attention would have informed him that the People never are represented, 
till the interest of their Representatives is identified with theirs; and if he had reflected that our 
Constitution has effected this, and made the safety of our Lawmakers depending on the goodness of 
their laws, he would have looked no farther for the model of a perfect Commonwealth, and seen that 
what he was seeking on the footsteps of Plato, was already at home.286 
It also should be highlighted how Delolme’s analysis of the English successful representative 
mechanism, based on the people’s antagonism to the strong and unitary royal executive power, 
informs his vision for a federal republic, which is distinct from what Hume sketched out in his 
Idea for a Perfect Commonwealth. Hume’s scheme, on the other hand, proposes to reconcile a 
possible opposition of interests by adopting the republican form of government both at the local 
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and the national level. This results in his calculation for a hundred counties, each as “a kind of 
republic within itself” and each containing a hundred parishes, ensuring the bottom-up channel 
through which diverse opinions can be gradually shaped before entering the national political 
arena. Hume’s scheme of a modern federal republic, in other words, relies on the thorough 
dissemination of republican principles to all the political layers of the republic. 
For this, Delolme accused Hume of falsely seeking a model for a perfect commonwealth on 
the footsteps of Plato. Instead, he highlighted the importance of distrust in securing liberty in 
modern representative politics. Drawing on the history of English constitution, he reminded the 
importance of unitary royal executive power and how its tyranny had shaped the unity of the 
English subjects in opposition to it. Hume’s proposal for the multiplicity of the executive power 
(in the hands of the senates) undermines the function of the executive power as the target of 
jealousy of the subjects which the formation of the English interest historically relied on. 
Nonetheless, Delolme also did not endorse the idea that the success of political representation 
depends by and large on the quality of the representatives as, for example, his contemporary Adam 
Ferguson believed.287 A successful political representation relies on the conditions that create 
unity of interest between the representative and the represented. The English constitutional history, 
he argued, achieved this goal as a result of the constructive tension between the people and the 
unitary monarchical power. Hume’s vision for a modern republic which proposes to split the 
executive power and vest it in the hands of senates fails to grasp this.  
 
Delolme’s Critique of Montesquieu. 
 
Montesquieu’s Prophecy and Its Legacy  
The question about the durability of the English model was popularised in Montesquieu’s 
celebrated The Spirit of the Laws and its famous prophecy on the fall Empire. It has been a subject 
of scholarly attention, recently in relation to the Skinnerian discovery of the notion of neo-roman 
or civic republican as the third missing concept of liberty beyond Isaiah Berlin’s dichotomy of 
positive and negative liberty.288 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to enter into the debate 
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concerning the locus of Montesquieu’s political thought within the liberalism versus 
republicanism dichotomy. 289  However, to be able to perceive Delolme’s originality in his 
examination of the English system, it is requisite to first examine his critique of Montesquieu’s 
account of the English constitution, as well as his concern about “the extreme liberty” which 
might undermine the constitutional separation of powers.  
It is best to first remind the reader of Montesquieu’s typology of forms of government to 
avoid possible confusion when the chapter proceeds to discuss the debate on Montesquieu’s 
opinion on the nature of the English government. For him, there are three types of government: 
despotic, monarchical, and republican. For the republican form of government, it is either ruled 
by all, in this case, a democracy, or by the few, which makes it an aristocracy. His verdict on the 
nature of the English system, however, remains a contestable subject. This chapter does not 
engage directly with this debate, but rather focuses only on his perception of the English system, 
in the same way that Delolme did in his Constitution, as a modern free state with a moderate 
government as well as his concern about its future loss of liberty.  
In the chapter “On the Constitution of England”, Montesquieu set out to explain “the laws 
that form political liberty in its relation with the constitution” (in contrast with the content of book 
12 on the laws that form political liberty in relation to the citizen.) Book 11 begins with 
Montesquieu’s warning about the misunderstanding of the word liberty. In republics, he argued, 
“one does not always have visible and so present the instruments of the ills of which one 
complains” therefore “one ordinarily places liberty in republics and excludes it from 
monarchies.”290 The role of the idea of rule of law in disguising “the ills” of the republic is 
interestingly pointed out. The second mistake commonly made in the study of liberty lies in the 
common assumption about democracy, “the people seem very nearly to do what they want... 
liberty has been placed in this sort of government and the power of the people has been confused 
with liberty.”291 He contended that political liberty is found only in “moderate government” 
defined as a political system in which “power is not abused”. After warning about limits of virtue 
in preventing the abuse of power, he concluded that “power must check power by the arrangement 
of things.”292 He here implied that the selected English system is an object of study because its 
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constitutional arrangement or “principles” manages to achieve this regardless of its form of 
government and for this reason, the English system is “one nation in the world whose constitution 
has political liberty for its direct purpose.”293 He then proceeded to delineate the separation of 
powers as well as the mechanism of checks and balances between the legislative, the executive, 
and the judicial, which is the aspect of this chapter that has been impressively well-documented.294  
The last part of the chapter is largely dedicated to Montesquieu’s speculation on how to best 
keep legislative power in the English system from usurping the constitution and avoid his ominous 
prediction of its loss of liberty. He first discussed the origin of English bicameral legislative power; 
his analysis is based on the different interests of the nobility and that of the people. “In a state, 
there are always some people who are distinguished by birth, wealth, and honour; but if they were 
mixed among the people and if they only have one voice like the others, the common liberty 
would be their enslavement and they would have no interest in defending it.”295 For this reason, 
he supported the idea that the House of Lords also possess the veto power to the House of 
Commons. For the executive power, he argued that it needs to have a check on the legislative on 
the basis that “execution has the limits of its own nature, it is useless to restrict it.”296 For this 
reason, the chapter dedicates relatively less attention to the schemes to limit the power of the 
executive power. The final passages concern his prophecy that “This state will perish when the 
legislative power is more corrupt than executive” as well as his interesting observation on the 
“extreme liberty” of the English people which is perceived with a high degree of scepticism. The 
reader is reminded of Montesquieu’s remark at the beginning of the chapter when he warned about 
the false association between democracy and liberty. One interpretation argues that Montesquieu 
distinguished between his examination of the “principles” of the English constitution and the 
direction it takes. This chapter agrees with this reading that for Montesquieu, although by nature, 
the English system is monarchy, it begins to depart from that original principle. This reading is 
supported by his argument that during the English Civil War, the English “have removed all the 
intermediary powers that formed their monarchy. They have good reason to preserve this liberty; 
if they should come to lose it, they would be one of the most enslaved peoples on earth.”297 There 
is an unmistaken concern with English extreme liberty and how it transforms the constitution 
away from its original principles in a republican direction. This also explains the emphasis on the 
prospect of legislative despotism that Montesquieu ended the chapter with. 
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Delolme and The Spirit of the Laws 
 
There are several reasons why Delolme’s The Constitution is often described as a work of a 
disciple of Montesquieu, such as their positive reception of the English monarchy, as well as their 
general anglophile outlook. I contend that, while there are such similarities, by reading Delolme 
as an unoriginal thinker who only re-wrote The Spirit of the Laws with more historical details, 
one loses sight of Delolme’s remarkable critique of Montesquieu especially concerning his flawed 
understanding of the nature of the English separation of powers and his concern about the English 
“extreme liberty” which also informs his prophecy of the fall of the Empire due to legislative 
despotism. Recent scholarship has also stressed that whatever Montesquieu thought about the 
English system, he certainly did not want France to simply emulate it, taking into account the 
historical particularities of all nations.298 
Secondary literature on Delolme mostly perceives him as variation of the Montesquieuean 
theme of separation of powers, and often a less elaborate version of it. For example, Vile, in his 
celebrated Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1977), categorises Delolme, among 
William Blackstone and William Paley, as a follower of Montesquieu, and argues that Delolme 
“failed almost entirely to give an impression of the interrelationships between the parts of the 
machinery of English government.” The argument is based on the claim Delolme relied on, in 
seventeenth century outdated fashion, that the separation of powers was based on a division of 
functions without taking into account the subtle checks and mechanisms at work by the time of 
late eighteenth century. 299  However, recent scholarship is more perceptive of Delolme’s 
contribution in spelling out the characteristics of the English constitution, especially its critical 
aspect of Montesquieu.300 McDaniel in particular demonstrates how the previous reception of 
Delolme as a disciple of Montesquieu is problematic focusing on his critique of Montesquieu’s 
Rome-Britain analogy, which underlies the famous prophecy as well as Delolme’s objective in 
correcting “what he took to be the aristocratic bias in Montesquieu’s own science of politics, with 
its strong emphasis on a neo-German system of intermediary noble ranks.”301 In a similar spirit, 
this chapter examines Delolme’s critique of Montesquieu’s in the light of their disagreement over 
the nature and the future of the English system. However, instead of focusing on their different 
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opinions concerning the historical origin of English liberty, I opt instead for Delolme’s concern 
over Montesquieu’s methodological inadequacy. 
This chapter argues that Delolme’s critique of Montesquieu should be understood in tandem 
with Delolme’s attempt to portray the English model as a model for a modern free state. This 
theme puts Delolme’s criticism of Montesquieu in perspective in the way that it weaves together 
his comments on “speculative doctrines”, the metaphor of body politic, the concern about the 
English extreme liberty, and lastly, Montesquieu’s reliance on the analogy between the Roman 
and the English model for his prediction of the downfall of the empire. 
For Montesquieu, the ancients “lived in governments that had virtue for their principle, and 
when that virtue was in full force, things were done in those governments that we no longer see 
and that astonish our small souls.” Virtue, nonetheless, is but a weak safeguard for political liberty 
and Montesquieu made it abundantly clear that he by no means sought to revive it in modern 
politics. This stance is also reflected in his parting remark in book 11 on the failure of Harrington’s 
Oceana, that Harrington “sought this liberty only after misunderstanding it. And that he built 
Chalcedon with the coast of Byzantium before his eyes.” 302  Montesquieu here pointed out 
Harrington’s fascination with ancient republicanism and how it prevented him from appreciating 
the marvel of the English constitution in preserving liberty, which the ancient states failed to 
preserve. Delolme’s criticism of Montesquieu, ironically, aims to point out the ancient elements 
in his examination of the English constitution which the author himself might not have been aware 
of, and in doing so, further supports his own argument that the English model “differs by its 
structure and resources from all those History makes us acquainted.”303  
Montesquieu himself was aware of the “speculative” aspect of his account of the English 
system in the sense that his work only focuses on the foundational principles of that constitution. 
In part 2 book 12 on the laws that form political liberty in relation to the citizen he contended that 
"it is not for me to examine whether at present the English enjoy this liberty or not. It suffices for 
me to say that it is established by their laws, and I search no further." Here it is made clear that 
Montesquieu distinguished between the principles of the English constitution and its present state. 
As a response to this, Delolme began his critique of Montesquieu in that chapter “How far the 
examples of Nations who have lost their liberty, are applicable to England” that Montesquieu as 
a “systematic” writer wrote too generally:  
When he speaks of England…his observations are much too general: and though he had frequent 
opportunities of conversing with Men who had been personally concerned in the public affairs of this 
Country…when he attempts to describe it, he rather tells us what he conjectured than what he saw.”304  
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In other words, the basis of this criticism lies in the defect of Montesquieu’s version of science 
of politics, which aims to understand politics and history in relation to certain sets of general laws 
in the way that it prevents him from perceiving the particularity of the English system.305 
Secondly, Delolme is critical of Montesquieu’s use of some terms which carry assumptions 
about virtues. The most important one is the term “luxury”, found in Montesquieu’s examination 
of the English monarchy as well as its central role in the English commercial venture. For 
Montesquieu, commercial republics suit economic commerce while for monarchies, commerce 
founded on luxury is congruent with the principle of honour associated with this form of 
government. While luxury is central in monarchies, it is corrosive in republics. For Montesquieu, 
as the English system gradually departed from its monarchical principles into a republican 
direction, its commercial spirit also prevented the cultivation of political virtues associated with 
the maintenance of republics. Put simply, while luxury used to be beneficial to the English system 
as a commercial monarchy, it becomes dangerous as the manners of the English people and their 
extreme liberty resembled more and more the characteristics of republics. 
 Delolme was highly critical of Montesquieu’s assigning such a central role to luxury in his 
examination of the English system. Although he only referred to the famous book 11 on the 
English constitution in Constitution, his criticism of Montesquieu reveals his in-depth knowledge 
of The Spirit of the Laws.306 For Delolme, luxury is a part of what he called “coefficients” in the 
study of modern politics or “such other quantities as only perplex without properly constituting 
[the balance of the constitution]”. It falls in the same category of “those brilliant circumstances 
which so greatly affect the external appearance of a powerful Society, but have no essential 
connection with the real principles of it.”307 In other words, luxury is not a part of the equation of 
what constitutes causes that produce “the equilibrium of a government”.308  For this reason, 
Montesquieu’s account of what constitutes the English constitutional balance is doomed to fail 
from the beginning. Although the cause of such confusion is not fully explored in Constitution, 
Delolme briefly discussed how such terms stem from “abundance of comparisons drawn from the 
human Body” which lead Montesquieu to “resource to Luxury in order to explain certain events; 
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and at others, to a still more occult cause, which they have called Corruption.”309 Delolme’s 
critique of Montesquieu’s language of corruption and luxury aims at exposing the implication of 
virtue which such terms sometimes carry, despite Montesquieu’s own intention to comprehend 
politics beyond the ancient worldview and vocabulary.310  
The next critique focuses on Montesquieu’s anxiety over the English “extreme liberty” which 
resembles the characteristics of citizens in democracy he warned against in the beginning of book 
11 on England. Delolme, on the other hand, was much more optimistic in the English system’s 
capacity to preserve liberty, as he ended Constitution with the way in which the personified 
goddess of liberty “has at last been able to set herself a Temple” on English soil.311 This relatively 
sanguine account of the English constitution in comparison to that of Montesquieu stems partly 
from Delolme’s different understanding of the separation of powers at work in the system. 
Montesquieu’s source of concern about the excess of liberty that the English enjoyed is 
derived partly from his background understanding of the theory of separation of powers: that they 
represent the different interest of the three orders, namely the commoners, the nobility, and the 
king. This concern, therefore, has to be understood in relation to Montesquieu’s broader 
understanding of the legal system and the interests and motivations which the institution is 
sustained with.  Focusing on his understanding of the English bicameral legislative power, 
Montesquieu believed that what underpins this institution are the distinguished interests between 
the people and the hereditary nobles. These two kinds of interests, however, are undermined by 
both the effect of the English Civil War as well as the nobility increasing engagement in 
commercial enterprise. The English parliament undermines its own principle by abolishing the 
prerogative of the nobles and the clergy, leaving itself vulnerable to the prospect of “despotism 
of all” like how he described the last days of the Roman republics. 
Delolme provided an alternative account. In his narrative, the English nobility and the 
commoners had a unity of interest in standing up against the power of the crown, which resulted 
in the equal legal protection of the subjects “in order to oppose the tyranny of the Crown”. Later, 
this equal legal projection “become a bulwark which was, in time, to restrain their [the nobility’s] 
own.”312 In this regard, Delolme’s understanding of the English separation of powers, from the 
beginning, prepares to take into account the decreasing political power of the traditional, feudal 
understanding of the nobility. This explains why, unlike Montesquieu’s account, Delolme’s 
version of the English constitution lauds the relatively powerless English nobility as one of its 
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key characteristics which makes it distinct from the experience of other European monarchies. 
Agreeing with McDaniel as well as Palmer in their opinion about Delolme’s constant concern 
about aristocratic despotism, I contend that Delolme accredited the English prevention of 
aristocratic despotism for the success of English liberty. Simply put, in contrast with 
Montesquieu’s prophecy which predicts the downfall of the British Empire due to the weakness 
of the nobility, which undermines the underlying motive of its bicameral institution, Delolme’s 
account from the beginning celebrates the English success in curbing the political power of the 
nobility. 
Lastly, Delolme rejected Montesquieu’s reliance on the Roman empire in his conjecture about 
the end of English liberty. This chapter is intended not as much as a critique of Montesquieu as 
an account of Delolme’s own elaboration on the calamity which the Roman citizens had to endure 
under its empire. Montesquieu’s error lies in his making an analogy between the ancient empires 
and the English system when “there is no analogy to be found” more than anything else. Delolme 
contended that unlike the Roman Republic’s expansion, which brings a concentration of both 
wealth and liberty in the centre, making Rome “the head of the state” and leaving the periphery 
in slavish condition, in England, “from the one end of the island to the other, the same laws take 
pace and the same interests prevail.”313 The absence of extreme inequality between the centre and 
the periphery makes it unnecessary for the English to endorse “those ferocious kinds of virtue” 
that the Romans who were constantly exposed to danger had to resort to.314 And although Delolme 
did not reject the notion that the English system, as other human artifices, has to end, according 
to Montesquieu’s prediction, his principal rejection lies in Montesquieu’s methodological error 
to draw his conclusion based on the this Britain-Rome analogy. To end this chapter, Delolme, 
nonetheless, provided an alternative examination of the English system in parallel with 
Montesquieu’s: “The English Government will be no more, either when the Crown shall become 
independent on the Nation for its supplies, or when the Representatives of the People shall begin 




The chapter reveals Delolme’s serious engagement with other prominent accounts of the 
English system and paves the way to his own delineation which allegedly best captures the 
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characteristics of the English constitution which his contemporary failed to recognise. It remains 
for us to decipher Delolme’s alternative analysis to that of Montesquieu which predicts the 
downfall of the British Empire. What is distinct about Delolme’s account is that it recognises the 
new, although relatively less well formulated, power of the people in “influencing the motion of 
the government” in the realm of civil society.316 It does so in the form of “the Censorial Power of 
the Public” as well as through the prospect of popular resistance which is institutionalised after 
the culmination of the English Civil War. For this reason, the executive power needs to retain its 
rigour in counterbalancing the power of the people in all forms including their power exercised 
through the representatives as well as their power in influence the motions of the government 
through “public censorial power”. The next chapter delineates Delolme’s account of the English 
system with an emphasis on the constructive tension between the people’s power and the modern 




























This chapter’s argument benefits from the contextualisation of Delolme in the previous 
chapters both as a part of the “selfish system” literature and as a historian of English liberty and 
constitution. It reveals how his constitutional thinking was shaped by his understanding of people 
as driven by passions such as pride and jealousy. In particular, it seeks to shed light on his account 
of the executive power and how it contributes to the preservation of liberty in modern 
representative politics. In his observation of the English representative system as “the most 
democratical [sic],” I approach his delineation as one of the nascent forms of representative 
democracy. This approach, along with previous intellectual contextualisation of his programme, 
sheds light on overlooked aspects of his constitutional thinking, namely the jealously-driven 
public whose vigilance over the executive power prevents the government’s encroachment on 
public liberty. Such an emphasis on the importance of forces in the realms of civil society and 
their constructive tension with the executive power distinguishes his work from other supporters 
of executive power, such as a Hobbesian argument which emphasises the necessity of total 
obedience, or the moderating effect associated with the office in the work of later authors such as 
Benjamin Constant’s pouvoir modérateur.317 Delolme’s unusual mix of executive power and 
public opinion in his equation of modern liberty reveals the richer and more nuanced position he 
occupies in the long and convoluted history of representative democracy. 
 
Delolme’s Idea of Liberty. 
 
Delolme’s prioritisation of personal liberty over political liberty was, of course, not new. 
Other proto-liberal authors agreed on this premise that modern representative politics rightly 
distinguishes the realms of the private and the public, with the intention of protecting the former. 
This clarification of his understanding of personal liberty as the ultimate purpose of civil society 
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with which this chapter begins, however, paves the way to a consideration of his constitutional 
thinking. In respect of this, one sees that, despite his “Hobbesian” point of departure, personal 
liberty leads to a kind of political optimism based on the belief in institutional solutions to human 
deprivation.  
In Constitution, resonating with Hobbes, Delolme defined liberty as a state of being in a 
society in which “every Man, while he respects the persons of others, and allows them quietly to 
enjoy the produce of their industry, [can] be certain himself likewise to enjoy the produce of his 
own industry, and that his person be also secure.”318  While natural liberty only exists in a 
hypothetical and pre-political state, it is described as the coarsest form of liberty, which it is 
preferable to exchange with political liberty when one enters a civil society. Possibly following 
the Pufendorfian understanding of the essence of law as “a command of a superior directed to an 
interior” regardless of the source of the sovereignty, Delolme put the face of the English monarch 
to this contention.319 Being in the civil society always entails partial relinquishment of one’s 
natural liberty, but in return one receives the legal guarantee of individual liberty, namely the 
right of property, personal security, and locomotive liberty.320 
Beginning with natural liberty, Delolme made it clear that civil liberty is superior to natural 
liberty and requires one’s relinquishing a part of it to enter into the society. He comments briefly 
on the idea of natural liberty under the topic of judicial power: 
since we must absolutely pay a price for the advantage of living in society, not only by relinquishing 
some share of our natural liberty (a surrender which, in a wisely framed Government, a wise Man will 
make without reluctance) but even also by resigning part of even our personal security, in a word, since 
all judicial power is an evil, though a necessary one, no care should be omitted to reduce as far as 
possible the dangers of it.321  
Once one enters civil society, one enjoys two forms of liberty, individual and political liberty. 
Delolme pointed out how these two forms of liberty are intertwined: without individual liberty, 
“general liberty [or political liberty], being absolutely frustrated in its object, would be only a 
 
318 Delolme, 169. On Hobbes’ understanding of liberty as the absence of impediments to motion and how, 
according to Quentin Skinner, it marks “an epoch-making moment” see Quentin Skinner, Hobbes and 
Republican Liberty, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
319 Lee Ward, The Politics of Liberty in England and Revolutionary America, (Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 322. Delolme had a legal education in the eighteenth-century Geneva in which Samuel 
Pufendorf remained one of the most important scholars in natural laws. Delolme’s definition of law as the 
expression of the sovereign is found in his Genevan pamphlet La purification des trois points de droit 
souillés par un anonyme (1767). The argument was also cited in John Lind’s Three Letters to Dr. Price, 
(1776), 22. to counter what Lind deemed to be Richard Price’s endorsement of natural law as the 
philosophical foundation of his political argument. 
320 Here Delolme followed William Blackstone’s categorises of liberty in his seminal The Commentaries 





matter of ostentation, and even could no longer subsist.”322 The task of a science of politics is to 
find the best way to minimise the threat to liberty posed by the necessary evil of the government. 
While Rousseau aimed at the philosophical reconciliation of this tension between liberty and 
authority, Delolme saw in it a constructive and creative aspect that can be manoeuvred for the 
benefit of personal liberty. It is this difference in their respective attitudes to the relationship 
between liberty and authority that underpins their differing opinions on the objective of a 
constitution.  
Delolme explicitly stated that the existence of the royal executive power is a natural threat to 
liberty, and discussed this relationship under the topic of the right of resistance.323 Citing Lord 
Lyttelton, Alexander Pope’s patron and John Hervey’s political opponent, Delolme discussed 
how the author summarised that, “If the privileges of the People of England be concessions from 
the Crown, is not the power of the Crown itself, a concession from the People?” He then expanded 
on this by arguing, “If the privileges of the People be an encroachment on the power of Kings, 
the power itself of Kings was at first an encroachment (no matter whether effected by surprize) 
on the natural liberty of the people.”324 For Delolme, the idea of natural liberty functions as a 
reminder of both why people choose to belong to a civil society, and why they should remain 
vigilant to all exercises of governmental powers, especially the royal executive power, as it is a 
natural enemy of the people. This constructive tension between the existence of the Crown and 
the people lies in the formation of the idea of personal property in England. In stark contrast with 
Rousseau, Delolme highlighted how it was this material aspect of political infringement on 
individuals that leads to organised resistance. 325  Following William Blackstone, Delolme 
demonstrated how individual liberty consisted of the right of property, personal security, and 
locomotive faculty. The monarch “cannot attempt to deprive his Subjects of their political 
privileges, without declaring war against the whole Nation at the same time, and attacking every 
individual at once in his most permanent and best understood interest.”326  
This understanding of personal liberty and its relationship to the government informs 
Delolme’s understanding of the second kind of liberty, namely political or general liberty. It is 
understood as “the rights of the Nation as a Nation, and of its share in the Government.”327 As a 
secondary kind of liberty, political liberty defined as the people’s share in the government aims 
at making the rulers fulfil their duty of protecting personal liberty. The representative mechanism 
of the parliament, in this view, aims not at approximating the sum of the individual wills or 
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mirroring the nation, but instead at minimising the threat of the government’s encroachment on 
personal liberty. This understanding of the government’s relationship to liberty is informed by 
Delolme’s understanding of human nature as esteem-seeking, which is translated into politics in 
the form of the perpetual quest for power. However, the secret behind English constitutional 
history lies in its understanding of different kinds of powers, as he argued that “all the political 
passions of Mankind, if we attend to it, are satisfied and provided for in the English 
Government.”328 To unpack this political optimism in institutional design despite his Hobbesian 
understanding of liberty, the chapter begins with the first branch of the constitutional power, 
namely the legislative power. 
 
The Restraint of Legislative Power and the Problem of Legislative Usurpation. 
 
Delolme believed that the establishment of popular sovereignty as the political ideal of 
modern constitutions begets a new problem namely the usurping of the people’s sovereignty by 
their representatives. However, it was not adequately acknowledged by his contemporaries 
despite its grave threat to liberty. This oblivion, he argued, was partly caused by failure of 
republican authors to critically engage with legislative power.329 One of the key components of 
the English system that allows it to preserve liberty lies in the way in which its institutional 
arrangement prevents this form of usurpation.  
The ideal of popular sovereignty was established after the victory of the parliamentarians after 
1688. This supremacy of the legislature is admired, but also with an unmistakeably cautious tone: 
It is, without doubt, necessary, for securing the Constitution of a State, to restrain the Executive power; 
but it is still more necessary to restrain the Legislative. What the former can only do by successive 
steps (I mean subvert the laws) and through a longer or shorter train of enterprises, the latter does in a 
moment. As its bare will can give being to the laws; so its bare will can also annihilate them: and, if I 
may be permitted the expression, —the Legislative power can change the Constitution, as God created 
the light.330 
Delolme’s analysis of the legislative power and how it might undermine liberty is remarkably 
distinct from his contemporaries especially notable commentators on possible threat on modern 
liberty such as Rousseau and Richard Price. The constitution, for him, is far broader than mere 
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legislative decree. Rather, it is a culmination of political struggles between different interest 
throughout the long history of England.331  
To preserve this precious ideal of popular sovereignty and maintain the distance between it 
and the organs of the government, the English legislative power is divided into several parts to 
maximise the control of its constitution-changing power. Delolme pointed out the difficulties of 
the limitation of the legislative power: since it possesses the power to make laws, to rely on it to 
limit its own power is analogous to having a simple faith in the strength of one’s own resolution: 
“For, whatever laws it may make to restrain itself, they never can be, relatively to it, anything 
more than simple resolutions: as those bars which it might erect to stop its own motions, must 
then be within it, and rest upon it, they can be no bars.”332 He rejected Montesquieu’s account of 
the English legislative power in The Spirit of the Laws which contends that it is consisted of two 
components, namely the House of Commons and the House of Lords. Rather, Delolme argued 
that the English legislative branch was uniquely consisted of three parts – namely the House of 
Commons, the House of Lords, and the king-in-Parliament – which therefore poses even greater 
difficulties for powerful members of parliament to conspire to change the constitution for private 
interests. “If it has been divided into only two parts, it is probable that they will not in all cases 
unite, either for doing, or undoing:—if it has been divided into three parts, the chance that no 
changes will be made, is thereby greatly increased.”333  
The House of Commons is the most powerful political body in Delolme’s delineation because 
it derives its power from the body of the people. This is materially confirmed in their sole control 
of tax. “If any other persons besides the Representatives of the People, had had a right to make 
an offer of the produce of the labour of the people, the executive Power would soon have forgot, 
that it only exists for the advantage of the public.”334 The aim of the legislature, therefore, is to 
strike the balance between two extremes: the House of Commons’ claim to be the only 
representative of popular sovereignty, and therefore to usurp the constitution; and other parts of 
the legislature becoming more powerful than the House of Commons via the interference of the 
executive power.  
To prevent powerful representatives of the people from usurping the constitution, the House 
of Lords serves a special purpose in incorporating this excessive power: “the success of the 
favourite of the People was brilliant, and even formidable; but the Constitution, in the very reward 
it prepares for him, makes him find a kind of Ostracism.”335 Delolme’s account of the legislative 
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power acknowledges the social mobility of such “favourites of the people,” whose political paths 
in the English system are markedly different from the ancient understanding of demagogues. In 
the ancient popular constitution, demagogues stand on the shoulder of the mob to seize the 
executive power and usurp the constitution. The English system, Delolme argued, by permanently 
attaching executive power to the institution of the Crown and moving successful representatives 
of the people into the House of Lords, prevented the kind of political usurpation that caused the 
ruin of ancient free states. This opinion echoes Hobbes’ De Cive, in which he argued that in 
monarchy, the path to winning praise and rank is blocked, and this therefore renders political 
usurpation more difficult than in republics.336 Most importantly, however, the existence of the 
House of Lords is an internal mechanism in the legislative branch which helps prevent one 
political body, regardless of its origins, from having a monopoly of the most powerful branch of 
the constitution.  
The second component in the legislative branch is the king-in-Parliament, distinct from the 
monarchical executive power. The most important aspect of the king’s legislative power is the 
power to convoke the parliament. While this power is not nearly as significant as the power to 
initiate laws, it crucially prevents the House of Commons from effectively exercising the totality 
of the sovereign power. A parallel mechanism of restraint is also found in the form of the Royal 
Assent. Assented bills “become the expression of the will of the highest power acknowledged in 
England…in a word, they are LAWS. And though each of the constituent parts of the Parliament 
might, at first, have prevented the existence of those laws, the united will of all the Three is now 
necessary to repeal them.” 337  The multiplicity of the components of the legislative power 
functions to prevent the monopoly of this most formidable branch of the constitution by any one 
political body, especially the House of Commons, which derives its power directly from the 
people.  
Beyond having multiple components to prevent the House of Commons from claiming 
popular sovereignty, the idea of political representation in the English system also allows for a 
critical distance between the people and their representatives. Members of parliament act as a 
trustee, rather than a delegate of the people. In virtue of this conception of the role of the 
representatives, Delolme made a similar argument to Edmund Burke’s in his famous Speech to 
the Electors of Bristol, that only in functioning as trustees do representatives become responsible 
for their own political judgements and render themselves accountable.338 Delolme also drew a 
further conclusion that, in structuring the relation thus, the people then also have the legitimacy 
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to criticise the work of their representatives, since the people themselves are not responsible for 
the political decisions made by those representatives. In granting the active aspect of their power 
to the discretion of the representative, “we will, above all, reserve to ourselves the right of 
watching and censuring that administration which will have been established by our own consent.” 
The representative mechanism allows the people to “correct them [the legislative process] the 
better, because we shall not have personally concurred in its operations.”339 This critical distance 
is crucial to Delolme’s programme, because the people also reserve a part of this political power 
to themselves, which is expressed extra-parliamentarily in the form of public opinion.  
Modern representative politics as discussed via Delolme’s examination of the English 
constitution is portrayed as a superior form of politics to direct democracy or popular constitutions, 
because popular sovereignty is effectively separated from the function of the government. The 
people “by expressly divesting ourselves of a power of which we should, at best, have only an 
apparent enjoyment, we shall be intitled to make conditions for ourselves.”340 Paradoxically, by 
delegating their political power to the representatives, the people regain a form of determination. 
This is also deliberately a sharp contrast with the Rousseauean republican account of liberty as 
self-determination through self-legislation of the people examined in Chapter Three. In delegating 
their political power, the people “insist that our liberty be augmented.”341  
 
The Executive Power. 
 
Delolme’s analysis of the usefulness of modern executive power is proposed as an alternative 
to the argument that the office’s sole function is to carry out the legislative will. For Delolme, this 
kind of constitutional arrangement fails to achieve the separation of powers between the executive 
and the legislative and consequently, cannot prevent constitutional usurpations in the form of 
legislative despotism. More importantly, this interpretation does not capture other functions of 
the modern executive power which he highlighted in his analysis of the English system. These 
functions include its activation of the sense of “jealousy” in the people, which enables a feedback 
mechanism between the realm of civil society and the parliament, and which addresses the 
problem of political apathy associated with representative politics. In this regard, the English 
system exploits an insightful understanding of human nature as driven by pride and jealousy for 
the purposes of securing constitutional stability. In other words, English liberty subsisted because 
it did not attempt to eradicate the pride of the executive power office, but channels this through 
 






political institutions and makes it the fuel that propels the engine of the government. In doing so, 
it enjoys the “inestimable advantage of knowing with certainty the general seat of the evils they 
had to defend themselves against.”342 Delolme’s initial assumption is different from that of the 
near-contemporary but slightly later work on the topic of executive power such as Du Pouvoir 
exécutif dans les grands états (1792) by Jacques Necker.343  The 1792 text argues from a critical 
position towards the 1791 French constitution and its hostility to the executive power of Louis 
XVI. It focuses on the “harmony” between different functions of the constitution. Delolme, by 
contrast, did not seek “to establish a constitutional alliance between the legislative and the 
executive” in lieu of “a system based on mistrust and jealousy,” as Necker does in his essay on 
the executive power.344 
The first point I would like to put forward is that Delolme’s positive account of the role of a 
strong executive power in preserving liberty in modern representative politics is independent of 
the institution of the monarchy. This argument should be made upfront, because some secondary 
literature overlooks this intricate proposition due to the assumption that he simply did it in favour 
of monarchism. Delolme, however, explicitly warned against this line of interpretation:  
I have been several times under apprehensions, in the course of this Work [Constitution], lest the 
generality of Readers, misled by the similarity of names, should put too extensive a construction upon 
what I said with regard to the usefulness of the power of the Crown in England…that I attributed the 
superior advantages of the English mode of Government over the Republican form, merely to its 
approaching nearer to the nature of the Monarchies established in the other parts of Europe, and that I 
looked upon every kind of Monarchy, as being in itself preferable to a Republican Government: an 
opinion, which I do not by any means or in any degree entertain; I have too much affection, or if you 
please, prepossession, in favour of that form of Government under which I was born; and as I am 
sensible of its defects, so do I know how to set a value upon the advantages by which it compensates 
for them.345 
This statement about the constructive nature of his critique of republicanism is overlooked by 
his contemporary critics as well as today’s secondary literature. With this insight, the present 
thesis elucidates his positive account of modern executive power as an integral part of his vision 
of a modern representative free state, separated from its monarchical origin. 
Moreover, Delolme also employed Rousseau’s language in the examination of the executive 
power by calling it “the Prince,” implicating the arbitrariness of the exercise of this branch of 
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governmental power. He explained, “By the word Prince, I mean those who, under whatever 
appellation and in whatever Government it may be, are at the head of public affairs.”346 Elsewhere 
in the book, he remarked on the rise of executive power as a natural component of any civil society, 
arguing that “in all States, there naturally arises around the person, or persons, who are invested 
with the public power.”347 In both cases, Delolme highlighted how his examination of the English 
executive power is not strictly attached to the monarchical framework. This reading is congruent 
with his perception of the English system as a modern free state, with little regard to the debate 
on the form of its government.348 This understanding of the nature of the executive power as an 
inevitable kind of governing power in any civil society, with or without the monarchy, is a 
prerequisite in our examination of Delolme’s exegesis of the relationship between the executive 
power and the preservation of modern liberty.  
Beginning with the executive power’s first function as a Rousseauean “Magistrate”, Delolme 
explained how the English monarch functions as “the first Magistrate in the Nation,” serving as 
the superintendence of commerce as well as the representative of the nation in respect of 
international affairs, including making war and peace. 349  The magisterial executive power 
operates only with the objective of executing the laws enacted by the parliament, and is “supplied 
necessary power for that purpose.”350 The monarch is also a part of the legislative as the king-in-
parliament. How, one might ask, can the separation of powers between the executive and the 
legislative be achieved if the king possesses the legislative veto and is the sovereign in the 
legislative branch, while simultaneously also serving as the first magistrate in the executive office? 
Delolme operated within the tradition of checks and balances which contended that, in order for 
the weaker governing power (in this case the executive) to keep in check the more powerful one 
(the legislative), the former needs a channel to “interfere” in the function of the latter.351 Thus far, 
Delolme’s opinion concerning the executive power is in line with the dominant ideology of the 
moderate Whigs after the Hanoverian succession in 1714, which was followed by a period of 
relative calm until the outbreak of the American War of Independence in 1760s. Public opinion 
concerning the nature of the constitution increasingly converged with the “Moderate Whig” 
interpretation of the English constitution as champion of parliamentary sovereignty and the king 
as the supreme legal authority of the nation.352  
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Beyond this relatively commonplace understanding of the English executive power in the 
eighteenth century, Delolme also argued that the construction of the executive power in England 
produced an unintended effect of uniting the interests of all subjects in keeping this formidable 
power always within its constitutional limits.353 This second effect is a result of the executive 
power being the object of jealousy of all subjects. The English constitution harnesses this form of 
jealousy, prevalent in monarchical history, for the benefit of individual liberty by keeping the 
people politically active and vigilant of the government. Delolme argued that “[i]f we cast our 
eyes on all the States that ever were free, we shall see that the People ever turn their jealousy, as 
it was natural, against the Executive Power.” 354  Delolme saw political indifference as an 
important threat to political liberty, and one characteristic of modern representative politics. The 
English system overcomes this obstacle due to its preservation of the pride of the executive office. 
He concluded that: “Let therefore the less informed part of the People, whose zeal requires to be 
kept by visible objects, look if they choose upon the Crown as the only seat of evils they are 
exposed to; mistaken notion on their part are less dangerous than political indifference.”355 Since 
in modern representative politics, the people only indirectly participate in the law-making process 
via their representatives, it is crucial to keep them politically active post-election. Putting the face 
on the powerful and unitary executive power, be it the monarch or otherwise, triggers natural 
jealousy which propels the engine of modern representative government that requires constant 
feedback from the body of the people. 
Lastly, the English system, by understanding that the executive power naturally arises in any 
civil society regardless of the form of government, finds that the best way to keep it within bounds 
was by making it unitary and financially dependent on the representative of the people.356 By 
making the executive power “for ever fixed” in the single hand of the monarch, who is a natural 
object of jealousy of the subjects, the English system makes it possible for it to be limited. 
Secondly, the English constitution granted to the House of Commons the exclusive right to 
subsidise the Crown.357 “The right to grant subsidies to the Crown, possessed by the People of 
England [through their representatives], is the safe-guard of all their other liberties, religious and 
civil.”358 The people have this indirect influence on the motion of the government through their 
representatives, who have the sole control over money bills. Due to this arrangement, “the Royal 
Prerogative, destitute as it is of the power of imposing taxes, is like a vast body, which cannot of 
 
353 Paradoxically, “It was the excessive power of the King which made England free, because it was this 
very excess that gave rise to the spirit of union, and of concerted resistance.” See Chapter 2 for Delolme’s 
re-working of the history of English liberty 
354 Delolme, (2007), 140. 
355 Ibid., 326. 
356 “The Executive Power is more easily confined when it is one.” Ibid., 150. 
357 The historical development of this measure is fully discussed in Chapter Two. 




itself accomplish its motions; or, if you please, it is like a ship completely equipped, but from 
which the Parliament can at pleasure draw off the water, and leave it aground,—and also set it 
afloat again, by granting subsides.”359 Another effect this second scheme in keeping the executive 
power in check is that it gives a sense of pride to the House of Commons. Unlike the House of 
Lords, “who enjoy a dignity which is hereditary, as well as inherent to their persons, and form a 
permanent Body in the State…the Commons completely vanish, whenever a dissolution takes 
place” and therefore “their very being depends on their power of granting subsidies to the 
Crown.”360 To conclude his examination of the second scheme of limiting the executive power, 
by making it financially dependent on the Commons, Delolme remarks that, in seeking to keep 
all governing powers in check, it is useless to try to make laws and hoping that they will comply. 
“Laws made to bind such Powers in a State, as have no superior power by which they may be 
legally compelled to the execution of them (for instance, the Crown, as circumstanced in England) 
are nothing more than general conventions, or treaties, made with the Body of the People.”361 
Instead of relying on the imaginary political being of the body of the people and their authority, 
Delolme argued that the English system’s success in limiting all governmental powers, including 
the executive power, is due to its making them dependent, and therefore mutually accountable to 
one another. 
With this understanding of the positive effect of the tension between the executive and the 
legislature, I proceed to delineate Delolme’s idea of separation of powers. This is in contrast with 
a radical form of separation of powers found in, for example, the short-lived French constitution 
of 1791, that had a unicameral parliament. Delolme made it explicit that the freedom of the 
constitution arises from the way “the Government [powers] constantly balance each other.”362 
This dynamism is key, and it is made possible by the king’s power to appoint ministers, because 
it provides a channel of influence between the two branches. Delolme’s account also resonates 
with Hume’s essay Of the Independency of the Parliament, which argues, “We may…give to this 
influence [the king’s power to appoint ministers] what name we please; we may call it by the 
invidious appellations of corruption and dependence; but some degree and some kind of it are 
inseparable from the very nature of the constitution, and necessary to the preservation of our 
mixed government.”363 This soft version of separation of powers is informed by Delolme and 
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Hume’s understanding of the English system after the establishment of popular sovereignty post-
1688 that made the legislature the most powerful branch of the government. 
Delolme further explained the king’s power to appoint ministers as an in-built mechanism of 
“periodical reformation” which ensures that all constitutional powers remain within their limits 
without the risk of causing political antagonisms.364 It is an “admirable expedient!” which, “by 
removing and punishing corrupt Ministers, affords an immediate remedy for the evils of the State,” 
caused by the naturally arbitrary nature of the executive. Further, by getting rid of the king’s 
ministers after the dissolution of each parliament instead of directly tackling the corrupt holder of 
the executive power, it “takes away the scandal of guilt” and “authority” remains “united.” This 
gives people confidence that justice has been meted out in respect of the violation of the 
constitutional limit of the executive. This is done without causing the kind of stir to which 
“Machiavel attributes the ruin of his Republic” – by which latter Delolme refers to The History 
of Florence, which discusses how the city-state failed to deal with the influence of its powerful 
citizens.365 More importantly, “the mildness of the operation,” insofar as “it is only to be applied 
to the usurpations themselves, and passes by, what would be far more formidable to encounter, 
the obstinacy and pride of the usurpers,” alleviates what might otherwise be a tipping point and 
possible constitutional crisis. By acknowledging the importance of the pride associated with the 
executive office, the English system avoids direct confrontation with it and punishes it indirectly 
through its ministers.366 
For Delolme, the English system effectively strikes the balance between a dangerously 
powerful executive and an extremely feeble one. For this reason, he concluded that “[t]he power 
of the Crown is supported by deeper, and more numerous, roots, than the generality of people are 
aware of, as has been observed…and there is no cause anxiously to fear that the wresting any 
capital branch of its prerogative, may be effected, in common peaceable times, by the mere 
theoretical speculations of Politicians”.367 Delolme warned that any reformers of the constitution 
should be reminded that the executive “[p]ower, under any form of Government, must exist, and 
be trusted somewhere”; and whether it be “in the hands of Magistrates” in a republic or in a limited 
monarchy, or transferred to “a Senate, or Assembly of Great Men,” in neither case will the 
executive power become easier to limit.368 This caution against the constitutional implications of 
republican reform was added in the 1781 edition of Constitution, a year after the Rockingham 
Whig called for the Economical Reform which aimed at reducing the Crown’s political 
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influence.369 Delolme cautioned against the over-correcting of the constitution by dividing the 
executive power and vest it in the hands of those who already possess the legislative power: “those 
who think [executive] Power, when parcelled and diffused, is never so well repressed and 
regulated as when it is confined to a sole indivisible seat…those persons who know that, names 
by no means altering the intrinsic nature of things, the Representatives of the People, as soon as 
they are vested with independent authority, become ipso facto its Masters.”370 The fusion of the 
executive power with the legislative power even at the expense of the monarch’s political 
influence still poses grave threat to public liberty. He explicitly criticised republican reformers 
for failing to recognise that in modern politics, the constitutional usurpations became more subtle 
and no longer was limited to the executive violation of its constitutional limits. To conclude his 
point, he argued that the reformers who thought “that the prerogatives of a King cannot be too 
much abridged, and that Power loses all its influences and dispositions and views of those who 
possess it, according to the kind of name used to express those office by which it is conferred” 
would cause more harm than good with their constitutional reform programmes.371  
Delolme’s relatively positive account of the executive power therefore is best understood as 
a constructive critique of the language of civic republicanism. As it does not distinguish the idea 
of popular sovereignty from the government, civic republicanism’s legislative supremacy makes 
it blind to modern threats of legislative despotism. Delolme’s analysis of the English system, in 
contrast, relies on the idea of sleeping sovereign. While the principle of popular sovereignty is 
accepted and established, the English government operates to preserve the ideal by assuming that 
all forms of governing powers are to be limited especially the legislative power which is the most 
powerful branch in a modern free constitution. The executive power’s rigour is crucial to both the 
pride of the office and its role in activating the sense of jealousy on the side of the people to keep 
them politically active and vigilant of the government. This extra-parliamentary role of the 
executive power is central to the nurturing of political forces in the realm of civil society. 
 
Liberty of the Press as “Public Censorial Power” and the Right to Resistance 
 
Beyond the parliamentary level of the balance of powers, the executive power also has its role 
as the “counterpoise” of the people’s power, which is recognised in Delolme’s account of the 
English system in the form of “Public Censorial Power” or the expression of public opinion with 
 
369 Delolme’s reception in British politics is discussed in detail in Chapter Five. 





the benefit of press freedom.372  This novel kind of political power alongside the traditional 
tripartite conception of legislative, executive, and judicial powers, is central to his analysis of 
England’s success in balancing authority and liberty. Although it was acknowledged by his 
contemporaries such as Jeremy Bentham, secondary literature has paid insufficient attention to 
this innovative aspect of his argument for representative democracy.373 By recognising the status 
of public opinion as a form of political power in its own right, Delolme crucially links the realm 
of civil society to parliamentary politics and simultaneously supports his argument for the benefit 
of a strong executive power. This is because the executive pride activates the “public censorial 
power” by exploiting the sense of jealousy inherent in human nature. Moreover, with the notion 
of public censorial power, Delolme’s vision of a modern free constitution also gives more weight 
to political deliberation in and beyond the parliament than what he deemed to be an incomplete 
understanding of a modern free constitution outlined by Rousseau and Price which only focus on 
the act of law-making in relation to political liberty. 
In order to highlight Delolme’s contribution to the important debate on the role of liberty of 
the press in the English constitutional history, I first begin with the historical background of this 
important topic. English history has always been accused of being written with a party bias of one 
form or another, and the topic of the liberty of the press is a good example of this allegation. In 
the first half of the eighteenth century, the liberty of the press became topical under the powerful 
Whig government of Robert Walpole and their censorship of the press. Viscount Bolingbroke’s 
The Craftsman was also one of the main targets of this oppressive policy.374 The authors of The 
Craftsman tactfully drew from the Whig tradition to argue that the liberty of the press has a special 
place in the constitution as a cornerstone of other kinds of liberty. To achieve that objective, they 
relied on the old Whig publication on the liberty of the press from the seventeenth century. 
Eckhart Hellmuth examines various texts on liberty of the press that was re-published by The 
Craftsman.  
The Craftsman no. 117 reveals an important aspect of the liberty of the press in English 
constitutional history, namely its role in securing England’s status as a free state regardless of the 
form of government. It is only via the limitation of all governing powers that a monarchy can 
remain adequately restrained, and that the freedom of the state can therefore be assured. It is 
written that “[t]he Liberty of Writing…is…necessary to the Being of a free Government.”375 This 
association is remarkable because it shows how the definition of a free state is not limited to 
merely a republican form of government, an opinion which is also later shared by David Hume 
 
372 Delolme, Constitution, 199. 
373 Chapter five discusses Bentham’s reception of Delolme’s “public censorial power” in detail. 
374 Eckhart Hellmuth, “Towards Hume – the discourse on the liberty of the press in the age of Walpole,” 
History of European Ideas, 44:2, (2018): 159-181, 161. 




as well as Delolme. Similar to them, Bolingbroke and other Craftsman writers also aimed to 
distinguish the “ancient Whig principles,” such as liberty of the press, parliamentary supremacy, 
and trial by jury, from the distorted Whig principles under Walpole. In other words, Bolingbroke’s 
aim was to discredit Walpole as a betrayer of both the ancient constitution and true Whig 
principles. 
Delolme argued that no European monarchies or republican states, regardless how powerful, 
granted their subjects as much liberty in criticising the monarch as did England. Referring to the 
Law of the Twelve Tables, he contended that “[i]n the Roman Commonwealth…the liberty of 
writing was curbed by the severest laws,” while “with regard to the freedom of speech, things 
were but little better.”376 In contrast, in England, liberty of the press allowed the English people 
to influence the law-making process beyond their power to appoint representatives:  
to every Subject a right to give his opinion on all public matters, and by thus influencing the sentiments 
of the Nation, to influence those of the Legislature itself (which is sooner or later obliged to pay a 
deference to them), procures to him a sort of Legislative authority of a much more efficacious and 
beneficial nature than any formal right he might enjoy of voting by a mere yea or nay, upon general 
propositions suddenly offered to him, and which he could have neither a share in framing, nor any 
opportunity of objecting to, and modifying.377 
David Hume, in his Essay on Liberty of the Press, as Eckhart Hellmuth suggests, took the 
status of the liberty of the press to another level by going beyond its role as an indicator of general 
liberty to its function as an anti-governmental force. Delolme, in this regard, systematically 
incorporated it into the constitutional balance of power by clarifying its relation to the legislative 
power.378 Despite the extremely limited suffrage of eighteenth-century England, the liberty of the 
press, in Delolme’s narrative, allows all subjects to influence the motions of the government by 
addressing their grievances and concerns to the broader public. Although, on closer appraisal, the 
proposal does not solve the problem of the loss of the individual voice within the crowd which 
Delolme identified as the problem of the civic republican definition of liberty, the emphasis is on 
the possibility of political deliberation instead of “a mere nay or yea” that suffrage provides.379 
He deliberately juxtaposed the benefit of public censorial power in encouraging the process of 
deliberation with a republican understanding of liberty equates liberty with the people’s 
participation in the law-making process. In this regard, Delolme’s programme also aims to 
alleviate the problem of limited participation inherent in modern representative politics. He 
argued that, in a free constitution such as England’s, there will always be differences among 
classes of people in their access to information concerning public affairs. Putting such information 
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in print, and making it widely available, is the pre-condition for the people’s political deliberation. 
“Time, and a more favourable situation (to repeat it once more) are therefore the only things 
wanting to the People; and the freedom of the press affords the remedy to these disadvantages. 
Through its assistance every individual may, at his leisure and in retirement, inform himself of 
everything that relates to the questions on which he is to take a resolution.”380 In this regard, 
liberty of the press is also necessary for the formation of the public itself, strictly speaking, 
because it makes possible communication among subjects in various parts of the country.  
The English liberty of the press is also crucially a guarantor of republican liberty, defined as 
freedom from political domination. It is the characteristic that distinguishes one’s status as a slave 
of a good master from that of a genuinely free person. The freedom of the press is 
[a] privilege which, by raising in the People a continual sense of their security, and affording them 
undoubted proofs that the Government, whatever may be its form, is ultimately destined to insure the 
happiness of those who live under it, is both one of the greatest advantages of Freedom, and its surest 
characteristic. The kind of security as to their persons and possessions which Subjects who are totally 
deprived of that privilege, enjoy at particular times, under other Governments, perhaps may intitle them 
to look upon themselves as the well administered property of Masters who rightly understand their own 
interests; but it is the right of canvassing without fear the conduct of those who are placed at their head, 
which constitutes a free Nation.381 
This comment on the republican understanding of liberty as freedom from domination reveals 
the extent to which Delolme was familiar with republican writing, despite the lack of explicit 
reference to it. Moreover, this important quote reveals how, for Delolme, liberty of the press as a 
guarantee of general liberty is crucial to his argument that a free constitution does not have to be 
a republic. In fact, his examples of Rome and Venice also provide further proof of this claim. In 
the footnote on the same page, Delolme makes further remarks concerning the increasingly less 
important distinction between monarchy and democracy, arguing that “[i]f we consider the great 
advantages to public liberty which result from the institution of the Trial by Jury, and from the 
Liberty of the Press, we shall find England to be in reality a more Democratical [sic] State than 
any other we are acquainted with. The Judicial power, and the Censorial power, are vested in the 
People.”382 Here he uses the term “democratical state” in a modern sense, which is not tied to the 
form of government but can be used to describe democratic processes within the different 
branches of the constitution itself. Being democratic therefore can also mean the provision for 
direct participation by the people in judicial decision via the trial by jury, as well as to directly 
participate in exercising the “Public Censorial Power” of the government. To uncover this notion 
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of “censorial power” and place it in his account of the English system also serves as an entry point 
into early attempts to understand the constructive aspect of the tension between the people and 
the government, especially the executive power, which renders the idea of sleeping sovereignty 
an attractive philosophical foundation for modern constitutionalism. 
Delolme first discussed the origin of the liberty of the press in England when he examined 
the aftermath of the English civil war, describing it as the formal establishment of “the key-stone” 
in the “arch” of the English constitution.383 The term “censorial power” appears in the chapter 
“On Liberty of the Press,” which is a continuation of his examination under the topic “the powers 
which the people exercise themselves.” Highlighting the inadequacy of representative politics in 
absorbing individual concerns into the parliamentary discussion, he observes how “[m]en, in 
several States, have been led to seek for an expedient that might supply the unavoidable deficiency 
of the legislative provisions, and being to operate, as it were, from the point at which the latter 
begin to fail: I mean here to speak of the Censorial power; a power which may produce excellent 
effect, but the exercise of which (contrary to that of the legislative power) must be left to the 
People themselves.” 384  Emphasising the complimentary role of the Censorial Power to the 
legislation process, Delolme here also warns that this form of power must be exercised by the 
people directly themselves, unlike the legislative power, which he contended should be exercised 
via representatives. This parallel function with the legislative power is further explained. The 
legislation’s “proposed end” is not to have all individual intentions acknowledged, but to issue 
laws that are most conducive to the public good. The former ideal is simply impossible in a large-
scale modern state, and “when carried into practice, to the greatest inconveniences, we must not 
hesitate to lay it aside entirely.”385 The “censorial power” is the remedy for this neglect of the 
voice of individuals during legislation.386  
Beyond its complimentary role to the legislative power, this power, as Chapter Two argues, 
has also been obtained through history “by the English Nation, with the greatest difficulty, and 
latest in point of time, at the Expense of the Executive power.”387 This argument has to be 
understood in relation to the role of the public “censorial power” as a pre-condition for popular 
uprisings. Resonating with Rousseau, Delolme believed that the people’s power is sovereign. 
Unlike Rousseau, however, he held this not due to the underlying natural rights of mankind, but 
because of the sheer magnitude of this raw political power. The “censorial power” plays an 
important role in making the prospect of popular resistance feasible, and in so doing, functions as 
a warning to the government against encroachments on liberty. Delolme explained that “it is with 
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respect to this right of ultimate resistance, that the advantage of a free press appears in a most 
conspicuous light. As the most important rights of the People, without the prospect of a resistance 
that overawes those who should attempt to violate them, are little more than mere shadows.”388 
The latent power of popular resistance keeps all the governing powers in check. Nonetheless, 
it must be noted that Delolme valued the prospect of popular resistance, but not the unleashing of 
it. In this regard, Delolme also underlined the importance of the modern mechanism of 
representative politics in maximising channels through which the people’s power can be 
expressed, and how it is superior to popular constitution in securing liberty. Liberty of the press, 
which is the “key-stone in the arch of the history of the constitution of England,” goes hand in 
hand with “the Doctrine of Resistance, that ultimate resource of the oppressed,” and both play 
important roles in replacing the doctrine of the divine right of the king with “the more solid and 
durable foundations of the love of order.”389 Nonetheless, the importance of resistance by the 
subjects to English liberty, as well as other kinds of political powers, when it becomes 
incontestable, it inevitably destroys the fragile equilibrium of the constitution and becomes 
destructive to liberty of the subject itself. Aligning with Rousseau in his separation between 
sovereignty and government, Delolme argued that “the only share they [the people] can have in a 
Government with the advantages to themselves, is not to interfere, but to influence – to be able to 
act, and not to act.”390 In this regard, the notion of “public censorial power” and its role as a pre-
condition of popular resistance can be perceived as Delolme’s attempt to demonstrate how the 
principles of the English system already was successful in balancing authority with liberty. In 
other words, the English constitutional history shows how the constructive tension between the 
strong but effectively limited executive power with the people’s power is the “solid and durable 





Approaching Delolme’s analysis of the English system as a pre-history of representative 
democracy in the same spirit as Tuck’s Sleeping Sovereign (2016) shows that the former opens 
up several issues in the history of eighteenth-century political thought. It belongs to the strand of 
an argument for representative democracy, which seeks to replace the loss of the monarchical 
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authority in European politics with a legally limited executive power regardless of the title. This 
strand of liberal constitutionalism is mostly associated with figures like Germaine de Stael, 
Benjamin Constant, and Jacques Necker.392 However, what is distinct about Delolme’s analysis 
is that he employed the English experience to advance his argument for utilising the distrust 
between the people and the executive power for the benefit of constitutional stability, as well as 
to provide channels of influence between the realm of civil society and the government. His 
support of a strong and unitary executive power and his argument for liberty of the press are two 
sides of the same coin. However, the latter almost disappears completely due to limited and 
anachronistic framework of conservatism employed to study his work. By uncovering his intricate 
analysis of English constitutional history, the chapter also reveals how it is also put forward as a 
precursor of the modern representative constitution. This is made explicit in his criticism of Hume 
that “the model of a perfect Commonwealth…was already at home.”393 His overlooked position 
in the long history of modern representative democracy, with his unique account of the 
constructive tension between the executive and the people, is therefore a fruitful investigation. 
Moreover, by uncovering Delolme’s forgotten and distorted legacy, one also obtains an insight 
into early formations of representative democracy and its struggle to preserve popular sovereignty 
as the political ideal, as well as its difficult relationship with executive power. The thesis proceeds 
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Delolme’s position in the eighteenth-century British politics is marked by a divided 
legacy between his positive account of strong executive power and his support for liberty of the 
press. While both are deeply intertwined with Delolme’s analysis of the English free constitution, 
each aspect of his programme was exploited for various and opposing political agendas during 
the era’s constitutional crises. In this regard, the examination of different readings Delolme’s 
work in the British context serves as a prism for wider debates about the stability of the British 
constitution and whether it was amenable to reform. Moreover, his position within the debate on 
constitutional reform reflects the ongoing difficulty which modern representative democracy has 
with the notion of executive power and its relationship to liberty.  
Prior to this thesis, scholarship on Delolme’s influence in the British politics often focuses on 
his role as a staunch critic of civic republicanism. This line of investigation includes David 
Lieberman’s “the mixed constitution and the common law” which juxtaposes his account of the 
English constitutional balance of power with Richard Price’s to highlight their contrasting visions 
on the nature of political liberty which underpinned their different stances on the inalienable and 
natural right to resistance and the American controversy.394 This approach overlooks Price’s 
positive account of Delolme despite their different accounts of liberty. Price in his Additional 
Observations on the Nature and Value of Civil Liberty (1777) admired Delolme’s positive account 
of the separation of functions as well as the combination of deliberation and execution in the 
English constitution.395  Delolme was also known to some of his contemporaries as being a 
supporter of strong monarchical executive power and a self-consciously anti-republican author. 
Catherine Macaulay, for example, perceived his Constitution as a rival account to her own The 
History of England from the Accession of James I to that of the Brunswick Line (1763). She 
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mentioned Delolme in her letter to Ralph Griffiths concerning a controversial review of her work. 
In an unmistakably sarcastic tone, she wrote:  
Do you not know that the principles and notions with which that history is replete are now exploded as 
antiquated absurdities? Do you not know that Mr de Lolme has, since that history was published, 
condescended to enlighten this country on the grand object of politics and shewn them the true 
excellencies inherent in the British Constitution? Do you not know that the advantage of a strong 
government, an implicit confidence in our rulers and an influence in the crown superior to all 
opposition by the legal power it has over parliaments, by the prerogative of extending the peerage, and 
the advantage it has of dispensing irresistible favours among the commons are now held out as 
excellencies which set our constitution on a pinnacle of perfection.396  
This strand of reception might have been supported by Delolme’s reputation among Pitt’s 
ministry and their supporters. For example, the Monthly Review in 1775 reported on how Delolme 
was cited by Pitt the younger himself as well as the Earl of Camden who sat in the House of 
Lords.397 Gilbert Stuart who translated Delolme’s Constitution also portrayed him as an anti-
republican “advocate for power”. Stuart lamented how Delolme’s erroneous account of the 
Norman Conquest as the origin of English liberty was the cause of his misunderstanding of the 
English constitution.398 This strand of reception, while not incorrect, often overlooks the wider 
programme on the modern free constitution, of which his account of executive power is only one 
component among others. Consequently, it risks downplaying the constructive nature of 
Delolme’s critique of republicanism.  
In contrast with this contemporary caricature of Delolme as a simple “advocate for power”, 
this chapter shows that late eighteenth-century readings of Delolme were more nuanced. 
Delolme’s readers in the 1780s already recognised the distinction and relationship between his 
notion of “public censorial power” and the legislative power and how the former prevents the 
usurpation of the latter. This second strand of reception is adopted by critics of the British 
government, found in the work of “Junius” and John Cartwright, among others. This chapter thus 
shows how Delolme’s role in British politics was more complex than previously portrayed once 
considering his idea of press freedom and its reception among English dissenters and 
constitutional reformers. The chapter also elucidates previously overlooked aspect of his political 
thought, such as his Observation on the Late National Embarrassment (1789) concerning the 
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Regency Crisis of the same year. The essay prompted an intriguing exchange between him and 
William Godwin which reveals their clashing narratives of 1688 that underlines their different 
understandings of a modern free constitution which underpin their responses to the regent 
question. This exchange between him and Godwin ends the chapter by portraying Godwin’s 
republican approach in contrast with Delolme’s modern narrative of the history of English liberty. 
In this regard, it also foreshadows the tension between what later becomes a broadly liberal view 
of a balanced constitution which aims to prevent concentration of powers, and the republican-
democratic vision which demands that all modern political institutions should reflect the ideal of 
popular sovereignty. Nowhere was this clash clearer than the debate on modern executive power 
which is reflected in the Regency Crisis. 
   
Delolme and the Critics of Constitutional Reform. 
 
Delolme’s work was seized upon especially firmly by contemporaries in the 1780s who were 
concerned about the constitutional implications of weakened executive power and the related 
dangers of demagoguery. For many constitutional reform enthusiasts, the decline of the British 
Empire marked by its loss of the American colonies, as well as the scandal of the East India 
Company, called for a serious re-evaluation of the power arrangement which gave rise to the crisis. 
There was a concern about the Crown’s political power became too dominant due to George III’s 
increased patronage due to the military demand of the war with the colonies. In 1780, the 
Rockingham Whig launched a call for “Economical Reform” which included a range of policies 
such as the abolition of offices and sinecures with a concerted aim to reduce the Crown’s influence. 
As Thomas Townshend explicitly stated: “the first great consideration [of the Economical Reform] 
was the lessening of the influence of the Crown, which in the opinion of the people”.399 Calls for 
parliamentary reform in the 1780s also occurred amidst popular discontent against the 
government’s unwavering commitment to the war with the American colonies, despite decreasing 
public support. Beyond parliament, discussions on constitutional reform also became increasingly 
topical with the looming threat of popular uprisings.400 London saw days of utter mayhem caused 
by the Gordon Riots which gained their own momentum beyond the anti-Catholic label of its 
origin.401 For many, it was either reform or revolution, and extra-parliamentary measures were 
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adopted to achieve parliamentary changes, exemplified by the Friends of Liberty’s programme.402 
The question about constitutional reforms, including the call for more frequent elections, therefore, 
often had a deeper meaning as a demand to move parliamentary politics towards the popular 
direction, and the institution of the Crown was an obvious target. Critics of republican 
constitutional reforms were concerned with the problem of the constitutional balance of power 
caused by weakened executive power as well as the rise of demagoguery associated with 
republican politics. Delolme’s work presented them with conceptual tools to highlight these 
problems amidst the discussion about reforms and their implications for the constitutional stability.  
An anonymous Essay on Constitutional Liberty (1780) was among the work that criticises the 
compatibility of republicanism as a baseline for constitutional reform programmes. Its argument 
for a strong and unitary executive power resonates so much with Delolme’s work that some assign 
the authorship to Delolme himself although the authorship of the work remains contested. For 
Whatmore, the essay reiterates the same point made in Constitution that “republicanism was a 
doctrine for backward states; in the modern world it would lead to domestic disorder and 
ultimately the collapse of a state. In Britain’s case it would cause reiteration of the scenes of 
Charles the First’s time”.403 This chapter, however, treats the work as a part of Delolme’s British 
reception. The main reason for doing so concerns the argument about property relations in the 
work. In this pamphlet, it is argued that a republican government must be supported by a system 
of equal property relation that can only be found in an agrarian society. Delolme never drew this 
conclusion, not even in his later work after Constitution.404 His approach to the study of politics 
remains coherent. He examined relations between different kinds of political powers through their 
historical development and excluded modes of subsistence from the scope of his science of 
politics. Despite the Scottish Enlightenment’s influence on his work, he never adhered to the 
conjectural theory approach. It seems peculiar that property relations should suddenly become the 
central argument of this 1780 work.  Moreover, unlike all the work written by Delolme, the essay 
does not shy away from citing Thomas Hobbes.405 The author of Leviathan is referred to in the 
criticism of the doctrine of natural right. 
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The essay introduces the antagonism between modern “constitutional liberty” and civic 
republican liberty as the main theme which holds the work together. The first part of the essay is 
dedicated to arguing why republicanism is incompatible with the English system. For the author, 
republicanism cannot fully function without changing property relations back to the former, less 
advanced stage of agrarian society, as opposed to the current commercial one. It cannot be 
established because societies with advancement in the arts and sciences are always accompanied 
by inequalities of property ownership. Republican liberty was therefore incompatible with the 
material reality of Britain. The author claimed that at least “The demagogues of the old were so 
far honest and consistent. They knew and confessed their plan of liberty could never be reduced 
to practice without agrarian laws, and that anything short of these was downright mockery”.406 
For this author, eighteenth-century demagogues preached legislative supremacy without 
admitting the necessity of the agriculture-based economy which the commercial English society 
was not. To further emphasise this point, the author also exploited the examples of ancient 
republics and the Levellers to provide a contrast between limited monarchy and the mixed 
constitution of England and other republics. From the property relation argument, the author 
claimed that the republican reform in question would ultimately lead to legislative unicameralism 
since “to say that the power of the House of Commons ought to be proportional to the property 
of the whole commons, is saying, that the other branches of the legislature ought to be 
annihilated”. 407  In contrast, with a republican or popular constitution, the English mixed 
constitution reflected the diversity of opinions and interests of a commercial society and relied on 
a different, and allegedly more effective, scheme to secure liberty than a republic. 
The essay moves on to Delolme’s account of the English constitution which provides an 
alternative view on an appropriate constitutional arrangement for the English commercial society. 
England consisted of several occupations and consequently, diverse interests of different groups 
unlike the agriculture-based republic. The author concluded that contrary to republican principles, 
which rely on perfect economic equality to achieve political liberty, in England “It is a 
coincidence of interests produced among all the different ranks throughout the kingdom in 
consequence of the political arrangements established at the [Norman] Conquest, to which Mr. 
De Lomé [sic] ascribes the origin of our liberty, and the extensive provisions laid down in favour 
thereof in Magna Charta”.408 Agreeing with Delolme, the author contended that in the English 
narrative, it was the unintended consequence of the strong executive power of the Crown which 
rendered the union of resistance by all subjects a viable unifying interest to keep the governmental 
powers in check.  
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The commercial nature of English society and the consequent diversity of interests also called 
for a modern understanding of legislative power. The author of the essay found Delolme’s account 
of “public censorial power” and its complimentary role to the people’s legislative power 
illuminating. In an agriculture-based republic, the legislative will reflects the homogeneity of the 
population and therefore, “when the laws are imposed by a society, among whose members great 
uniformity of character prevails; every one perceives them to be what he thinks they ought to be. 
This is what the institutes of every real republic supposes to be the condition of mankind. The 
legislative and censorial powers differ in no respect. The conducts of him to adhere to the laws, 
meet with the approbation of everyone”.409 In an advanced society, with the rise of arts and 
commerce, as well as the consequent diversity of interests, the author pointed out, “when his 
country imposes its laws upon him, the feelings of his heart do not in every respect coincide with 
their decisions”.410 In an advanced society like the English one, the legislative power therefore 
had to be separated from the public censorial power. The legislative branch in this mixed 
constitution did not aim at reflecting the interest of the people, but rather, to partly represent them 
in parliament while the people reserved a part of their power in the form of public opinion. The 
public censorial power was another contestant and was the power which the individuals reserve 
to exercise themselves. “The censorial and legislative powers of a mixed state are thus 
distinguished by Mr. Delolme”.411 The essay recognises how Delolme’s dual notion of public 
censorial power and the legislative power supports Delolme’s broader argument for the 
superiority of representative politics in modern conditions and simultaneously calls for a re-
evaluation of using republican principles as the guideline for British constitutional reform. 
The essay’s argument was made amidst the background of contemporary complaints about 
the increase in tax and the influence of the Crown in parliament.412 The position of the author was 
to address the danger of over-correcting the constitution by making the legislative power the only 
dominant power with the proposition to abolish the king’s power to appoint ministers and to grant 
pensions. The author argued that the current form of the constitution was “the plan that was finally 
established at the Revolution”, referring to the political and legal settlements after the English 
civil war with the parliamentarians’ victory.413 To reduce the executive power to the point of 
irrelevance in comparison with the legislative was to pervert the principles of the mixed 
constitution at the expense of constitutional liberty which was the true legacy of the Revolution. 
After the post-Civil War settlement, the people, “Being cured of republican whimsies, it has fixed 
the constitution at the true poise of a mixed government, or; in other words, has brought about a 
 
409 Essay on Constitutional Liberty, 46. 
410 Ibid. 
411 Ibid., 47. 
412 Essay on Constitutional Liberty, 74. 




coincidence of the principal interests of all the different orders within the kingdom”.414 In the 
English constitution, the constitutional arrangement prevented the executive from abusing its 
power with various mechanisms, including the House of Common’s monopoly of its purse.415 
They ended the essay with Delolme’s analysis: “Our present reformers are all chargeable in this 
respect; they go to work as if our government was a republic, and not a monarchy… Mr. De 
Lolme justly considers as ruinous to our constitution: We have seen the temporary prepossessions 
of the people made use of to make them concur in doing what would prove the ruin of their liberty. 
We have seen plans of apparent improvement proposed, and forwarded by men who proceed 
without a due knowledge of the true principles and foundations of government…”416 The essay 
crucially distinguished the English free representative constitution from the republican ones. The 
legacy of 1688 lies in the way in which it paved the way for the English constitution to cope with 
the increasingly diverse interests of modern society which the author argued, was overlooked by 
the republican reformers. 
Delolme’s work was also employed to criticise constitutional reforms in the imperial context 
of the scandal of the East India Company in 1780s. Aided with the popular discontent against the 
government, Fox proposed the 1783 India Bill to reform the company. The Bill proposed a 
“legislative remedy” to the corruption and maltreatment committed by the Company. For the 
Opposition, however, it was an attempt by the ministry to gain political power through the 
monopoly of the Company in the name of constitutional balance.417 Such criticism against Fox’s 
India Bill was found in the work of William Pulteney, The Effects to Be Expected from the East 
India Bills Upon the Constitution of Great Britain If Passed into a Law (1784) which used 
Delolme’s Constitution as an authoritative text to argue against the potential patronage gained by 
the Fox-North coalition through the control of the Company. For the coalition government, they 
foresaw parliamentary deadlock and political instability as their slim majority could not outweigh 
Pitt and more importantly, his royal support and patronage.  
William Pulteney (1729-1805) was an independent member of the House of Commons from 
the 1760s, representing Cromartyshire in the Highlands. Formerly William Johnstone, he was 
Adam Smith’s student. His, as well as his siblings’ careers were part and parcel with the project 
of the British Empire. They were officials of the East India Company, governor of West Florida, 
and proprietors of sugar plantations in Grenada.418 The pamphlet published was his speech in 
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parliament, made in 1783, during the debate on the corruption scandal of the East India Company, 
although it was published later in 1784 after the Bill was already defeated. Pulteney criticised the 
East India Bill of 1783, which was co-drafted by Edmund Burke, and proposed in parliament by 
Charles James Fox, then a part of the Fox-North coalition in power. Fox contended that the Bill 
intended to eradicate the system of patronage created by the economic and political power of the 
East India Company, which had become a vehicle for the private interests of the “nabobs”, 
employers of the Company who brought conspicuous wealth from along with the corrupting effect 
of “Asiatic despotism and luxury”.419 The Company was on the verge of bankruptcy despite its 
commercial monopoly on the subcontinent.  
Pulteney disagreed that the main threat to the English constitution was the way in which 
“Ministries had serviced the expansion of court power by exploiting the passivity of 
Parliament”.420 He admitted that the corruption and misconduct of the East India Company was 
true. His objective in writing the piece, however, was to shed light on the constitutional 
implication of the Whigs’ proposition to take control of the Company. The scandal came to light 
through the dubious economic and political influence of the returning nabobs which stirred public 
discontent with the Company. In other words, Pulteney warned against overcorrecting the 
constitution that would affect the mechanism of the English system to keep “the Favourite of the 
People”, using Delolme’s terminology, in control.  
With the help of Delolme’s arguments, Pulteney drew the attention of the public from the 
arguments concerning the effects of the proposed bill on the corruption committed by the East 
India Company to the principles of the English system. He argued that “we all know that its 
outward form, consists of King, Lords, and Commons: But many are not apprised of the particular 
cause, that our Government has not been hitherto subject to those fatal disasters, which have 
attended all former systems, where the People have enjoyed a great share in the Government of 
their Country. I will shortly state my idea of it, but I do not claim the merit of the discovery; I 
take it from a most ingenious Author, to whom the Republic of Letters and Mankind in general 
are greatly indebted”.421 This passage is Pulteney’s introduction to Delolme’s argument and his 
examination of the English system’s “particular cause” that diverted from the traditional 
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understanding of the mixed constitution, namely the strong executive power which keeps the 
legislative branch under effective control.  
This “particular cause” rendered the English system unsusceptible to the problem of the rule 
of the few which caused the downfall of the ancient republics. Pulteney here drew the parallel 
between Delolme’s warning against the problem of demagoguery and the rise of Fox, “the man 
of the people”, as described by Horace Walpole in his journal of 1780.422 Similar to the 1780 
Essay on Constitutional Liberty as well as in Delolme’s own account of the English system, 
executive power was perceived as a counterforce to powerful politicians with popular support. 
The initiation of the economic and political influence through the parliament’s sole control of the 
East India Company would change the constitutional balance to the side of “the Popular Leaders” 
and allow them to “master the Crown”. The effect of Fox’s India Bill, Pulteney argued, would 
make the legislative branch overpowering and “the ambition of every man would take a new 
directions; the Leaders [the people’s representatives] would from that moment come to have a 
separate personal interest distinct, from that of the People”. 423  Pulteney warned against 
“aristocracy”, or the rule of the few which he deemed to be a result of  a weak executive power. 
His caution refers to the rise of Fox if the Company was to be transferred to the Parliament.  
Pulteney directly cited Delolme’s analysis about the problem of the rule of the few to support his 
criticism of Fox’s India Bill.424 Delolme’s argument against legislative despotism and for a strong 
executive power here served a political purpose to undermine Fox’s power supported by this 
popularity. For Pulteney, Delolme’s prophecy about the constitutional usurpations by the few 
accurately predicted the rise of the Foxite Whig. However, the Bill was passed in the House of 
Commons but was eventually defeated in the House of Lords, with the help of George III and led 
to the dismissal of the Fox-North coalition.  
Another intriguing reception of Delolme’s work as a warning against republican reform 
projects is Christopher Keld’s 1785 An Essay on the Polity of England. Keld was a relatively 
obscure contributor to the constitutional reform debate from Yorkshire, and his work is often cited 
to compare his position against Edmund Burke’s on the king’s power to appoint ministers.425 The 
516-page long work, however, addressed a much larger issue of the public discontent which began 
with the government’s unscrupulous treatment of the American colonies that led to the loss of 
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that part of the Empire. It tackled Delolme’s interpretation of the constitutional outcome of the 
English Civil War and its implications for contemporary debates on electoral reform, including 
demands for universal male suffrage. Keld argued that the present framework of most discussions 
on constitutional reform blamed the Crown’s influence and the lack of the people’s representation 
for corruption and inefficiency. This distorted understanding of the nature of the constitution 
clouded the real issue of legislative despotism. Despite the richness of the historical analysis of 
the work and for the focus to this chapter, I limit the scope of the study to his account of the 
English legislative sovereignty and its implication for the constitutional crisis. 
Keld argued that there had been a grave misunderstanding on the nature of the English 
constitution. Erroneously, “a notion prevails that the Crown enjoys the sole power of the 
government. In general, the Crown and the government means the same thing…He [the king] 
alone was blamed by some for the latest contest with the colonies, at present the states of 
America”.426 After 1688, he contended that “the king is called sovereign, yet, in truth, the real, 
supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrollable authority, in which the jura summi imperii, or the 
rights of sovereignty reside, is vested not in the monarch only, but in the kings, lords, and 
commons united; in other words, in the legislature”.427 What, then, has become of the institution 
of the Crown within this framework of legislative sovereignty? Keld argued that the monarch 
became “little more than the great Administrator of the government” with the pomp and the status 
of the fountain of glory which facilitates the fulfilling of its duty.428 The king-in-parliament and 
legislative sovereignty, not a popular constitution, was the true legacy of 1688. The constitutional 
framework, he argued, allowed for the discussion about the House of Commons that became 
exceedingly overpowering over other elements of the constitution.  
Keld criticised propositions to reduce the power of the Crown, exemplified by the 1780s 
Economical Reform, as well as discussions on the constitutionality of the king’s prerogatives on 
the ground that they fail to understand “the true principles of the constitution” which made it 
superior to republican or popular ones. Should the executive power be reduced to “no more than 
grants from the people,” the House of Commons then became “the people's 
representatives…holding a place greatly superior to any they had ever yet pretended to.”429 Keld 
here crucially alluded to the legacy of 1688 in distinguishing popular sovereignty from the 
representative government, resonating with Delolme’s analysis of the English sleeping popular 
sovereignty. Describing the scene in the reign of Charles I, Keld diagnosed the split of the 
executive power as the source of the subsequent burst out of civil war. “From that moment the 
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constitution was dissolved…the executive power, as Mons. De Lolme expresses it, becoming 
double, and a perpetual co-ordinate authority being erected, an authority controulable [sic] by no 
one, accountable to no one ; a contention for power as naturally arose, and became inflamed into 
a civil war, ' as the sparks fly upward.'”430  The division of the executive power during the 
Commonwealth period led to tyranny, but the change of the tyrant in power “was only a change 
of tyrants, but never of tyranny” as problem is inherent in popular constitutions. Keld also 
similarly reminded the public of the nature of the English constitution post-1688 and how its 
celebrated English liberty depended upon the unitary executive power as well as the well-
controlled legislative power. These critics of republican constitutional reforms, examined in the 
first strand of Delolme’s British reception, intriguingly addressed the threat of the rule of the few 
gained by the mixture of popular support and novel sources of financial and political power from 
the extensive Empire. These critiques of the overpowering legislative power especially owned 
and exercised by popular politicians like Fox can be understood independently from their support 
of the monarchical executive power. 
Delolme himself acknowledged how his argument for a strong but well-limited monarchical 
executive power might be perceived as a simple endorsement of royal power when the true subject 
matter of his programme was liberty and how it can be preserved in modern conditions. He 
amusingly remarked on such misunderstandings of his work that, “I feel a kind of pleasure, I must 
confess, to observe on this occasion, that though I have been called by some an advocate for 
Power, I have carried my ideas of Liberty farther than many Writers who have mentioned that 
word with much enthusiasm”.431 With this remark by Delolme, the chapter proceeds to the second 
line of his British reception which focuses on his role as a supporter of liberty of the press which 
was still a hotly debated issue especially in the last decades of the eighteenth-century. 
 
Delolme and Liberty of the Press. 
  
By the late-eighteenth century, the British intellectual milieu already was conversant with the 
topic of liberty of the press, as it was widely discussed under Walpole’s press restriction policies. 
The issue was one of the most important subjects concerning the exchange between Bolingbroke 
and the Craftsman writers and Walpole’s supporters such as the Court Whig John Hervey.432 In 
1760s, the Wilkes movement questioned the legitimacy of the parliament in claiming popular 
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sovereignty. They proposed, for example, how the English celebrated trial by jury was a more 
respectable representative body than parliament.433 The decreasing trust in the parliament was 
also accompanied by anti-government pamphlets with vitriolic language. The 1777 edition of 
Hume’s Essay on Liberty of the Press contains an important additional observation which, as 
Hellmuth points out, reveals Hume’s attempt to disassociate the essay with the Wilkes campaign 
which he detested. He added how: “It must however be allowed, that the unbounded liberty of the 
press, though it be difficult to propose a suitable, perhaps impossible remedy for it, is one of the 
evils, attending those mixt forms of government”. 434  Delolme coined his notion of “public 
censorial power” in this context. In building his argument, and possibly with the help of Hume’s 
essay, he also endorsed the special status of the liberty of the press as an important part of the 
English constitution to keep the government in check by the public.435  
The best known and most widely circulated use of Delolme’s work to support arguments for 
press freedom was the Letters of Junius, a prominent criticism of George III and his government. 
Junius published a letter in November 1768 which addressed the question being vehemently 
debated by the public, namely whether “the Justice of our Laws, and the Liberty of the 
Constitution have been essentially violated in the Person of Mr. Wilkes.”.436 By 1769, Junius’ 
letters were already popular enough to effectively set the agenda for the British public’s 
discussions concerning the American crisis. For one contemporary observer, the letters “become 
the principle Theatre…where the Grand battles are decided.”437 Junius was one of the factors 
which contributed to the wide readership of Delolme’s Constitution especially among the republic 
of letters. For example, the Monthly Review for October 1775 made a remark that “The reputation 
of this book [Constitution], the French original of which is known to many Readers, hath not been 
a little increased by the great character given of it by the celebrated Junius. He speaks of it more 
than once with high encomium and has recommended it to the Public as a performance, deep, 
solid, and ingenious.’’438 
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Junius’ preface to the collection of his letters begins with the eerie ambience during the reign 
of Charles I with the heightened censorship before the outbreak of the civil war. “This glorious 
privilege [of liberty of the press] may be security to the King, as well as a resource to his people. 
Had there been no star chamber, there would have been no rebellion against Charles the First, the 
constant censure and admonition of the press would have corrected his conduct, prevented a civil 
war, and saved him from an ignominious death.”439 Following Delolme, he argued that in modern 
politics, the liberty of the press and public opinion indirectly shapes the government’s actions. He 
wrote highly of Delolme’s analysis as “ingenious, deep and solid” and went on to quote 
Constitution on the importance of liberty of the press in maintaining the wider liberty of the state: 
In short, whoever considers what it is that constitute the moving principle of-what we call great affairs, 
and the invincible sensibility of man to the opinion of his fellow creatures, will not hesitate to affirm, 
that if it were possible for the liberty of the press to exist in a despotic government, and (what is not 
less difficult) for it to exist without changing the constitution, this liberty of the press would alone form 
a counterpoise to the power of the prince. If, for example, in an empire of the east, a sanctuary could 
be found, which, rendered respectable by the ancient religion the people, might insure safety to those 
who should bring thither their observations of any kind; and that, from thence, printed paper should 
issue, which, under a certain seal, might be equally respected; and which, in their daily appearance, 
should examine and freely discuss the conduct of the cadis, the bashaws, the vigir, the divan, and the 
sultan himself; that would introduce immediately some degree of liberty.440 
Junius’ reception of Delolme resonates with the development of the notion of liberty of the 
press that was already acknowledged as a “counterpoise to the power of the prince”. He also 
referred to the underlying esteem-seeking human nature or the “invincible sensibility of man to 
the opinion of his fellow creatures” which makes the counterpoise mechanism possible. Even 
though he did not further engage with Delolme’s delineation of the English system, the reception 
is historically crucial as it popularised Constitution among critics of George III’s government. 
Junius’ reception of Delolme is more politically important than philosophically significant due to 
his relatively limited engagement with Delolme’s work. His reception by Jeremy Bentham, by 
contrast, is marked by both personal relations as well as a more philosophically inclined reception. 
Bentham and his intellectual companion, John Lind, were among the few who we know were 
in personal contact with Delolme, which makes their reception of his notion of “public censorial 
power” particularly intriguing. Between 1770s-1780s, both of them were involved in systematic 
responses to Richard Price’s Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty (1776). Philosophically, 
they found Price’s notion of liberty erroneous. The incorrect understanding of liberty, they argued, 
led to an equally grave political consequence. The confusion of liberty with self-determination 
 





was, for Bentham, at the heart of the American controversy. Confident of the importance of his 
programme, he wrote that: “If I explain these matters clearly I may be a means of giving perpetuity 
to the constitution of my country, I may stifle in embryo or rather intercept the conception of all 
manner of political disputes, prevent civil wars, fix the peace of empires, and save the lives of 
millions”.441  Bentham’s reception of Delolme’s proposal, that liberty of the press should be 
understood as constitutive of “public censorial power”, is best understood in this context. 
There is evidence that Bentham occasionally met Delolme from his personal letters to his 
close friends John Lind as well as Samuel Romilly, a lawyer and a legal reformer who came from 
a Swiss Huguenot background like Delolme. His name was mentioned occasionally, for example, 
in Samuel Romilly’s letter dated January 1782 to Reverend John Roget, who also came from 
Geneva. In the letter, Romilly amusingly asked for the whereabouts of Delolme. He wrote: “Has 
Mr. Berenger heard anything of Delolme? His bookseller here has had no news from him since 
he left Ostend, from which, I believe some other circumstances, it is supposed that he is in Bastille; 
and it is likewise supposed that the crime he is accused of being the author of the invectives 
against M. de Vergennes which appeared in the Courier de Londres. It is true that he is not the 
author, but no matter for that. It is the policy of the arbitrary court to make sure of all those whom 
they suspect [are brought in]”.442  Delolme’s connection to Bentham appeared most explicit 
through Bentham and Lind’s contribution to the American dispute between 1775-1776. In 
Bentham’s letter of 22– 23 January 1777, Delolme is mentioned as a preliminary French translator 
for John Lind’s An Answer to the Declaration of the American Congress (1776), although the job 
was not finished and was later transferred to A. J. P. Fréville.443 Moreover, Bentham also made a 
passing comment about Delolme’s financial struggles in his personal letter which seems to 
suggest that he was a part of Bentham’s circle.444 
Lind’s Three Letters to Dr. Price (1776) criticised Price’s notion of civil liberty as well as the 
doctrine of natural right as the basis for the study of politics. Price endorsed a popular constitution 
as a result of his understanding of liberty as the people’s participation in the law-making process. 
Lind refuted Price, invoking Delolme’s authority: “the disadvantages of entrusting the work of 
legislation to the people at large, do not depend on local or transitory circumstances, but on causes 
universal and permanent; causes which acquire new energy in proportion as the nation increases 
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in numbers and in wealth.”445 The legislative supremacy of one political body without a check by 
adequately strong political powers inevitably leads to aristocracy in disguise. “In no time or 
country have the people at large had discernment to perceive, or leisure to learn, or steadiness to 
pursue, the best, or indeed any effectual means of guarding against the power and artifices of the 
few. The open outrages of a Coriolanus or an Appius they may perhaps repel; but they will be 
over-awed by the authority of a Scipio, and dupes to the artful blandishments of a Marius or a 
Cæsar. He who flatters with skill, will surely make them stilts to his ambition”.446 Here Lind also 
resonates with Delolme’s point about the advantage of representative politics which allows people 
to deliberate, unlike a direct or popular constitution in which the political advantage of alacrity 
outweighs well-formulated arguments. 447  In the footnote, Lind accredited Delolme for this 
analysis: “This subject has been fully illustrated by Mr. De Lolme in his excellent treatise on the 
English Constitution; which offers the best defence perhaps that was ever written of a limited 
monarchy against the madness of republican principles”.448 
Bentham’s early reference to Delolme already reveals his interest in Delolme’s analysis of 
the English system which goes beyond the checks and balances between the executive and the 
legislative, the approach which Bentham found to be inadequate and misleading. In his 1776 A 
Fragment on Government, he criticised William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of 
England (1765-9) and its negative view on political reform, citing the role of tradition in English 
common law. In Bentham’s portrayal of the work, Blackstone’s support of the status quo is based 
on the linguistic ambiguity especially concerning the executive power and the legislative power 
which he found to be inadequately distinguished from each other. Bentham ended this chapter on 
the British constitution by denying Blackstone’s originality, pointing, instead to Delolme’s 
superior counterpart: 
Thus much for the British Constitution; and for the grounds of that pre-eminence which it boasts, I 
trust, indeed, not without reason above all others that are known: Such is the idea our Author [William 
Blackstone] gives us of those grounds.—‘You are not satisfied with it then’, says someone.—Not 
perfectly.—‘What is then your own?’—In truth this is more than I have yet quite settled. I may have 
settled it with myself, and not think it worth the giving: but if ever I do think it worth the giving, it will 
hardly be in the form of a comment on a digression stuffed into the belly of a definition. At any rate it 
is not likely to be much wished for, by those, who have read what has been given us on this subject by 
an ingenious foreigner [Delolme]: since it is to a foreigner we were destined to owe the best idea that 
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has yet been given of a subject so much our own. Our Author [Blackstone] has copied: but Mr. DE 
L’OLME has thought.449 
From this citation as early as 1776, a year after Delolme’s English edition was published, 
Bentham was already familiar with the work’s arguments. Nonetheless, it is also possible that he 
had access to the original French version which was published in 1771. Either way, the quote 
confirms that Bentham in his first printed work was assisted by Delolme’s account of the English 
constitution in his criticism of the idea of a balanced constitution which he later abandoned 
entirely. 450  Bentham’s admiration of Delolme stems from his difference from Blackstone’s 
analysis of the English system which credits the harmony between the executive, the legislative, 
and the judicial. Delolme’s account, in contrast, focuses on how the English system’s success 
stems from its ability to correct problems faced by a popular constitution, such as the inadequacy 
of legislation in maintaining order. In the English system, by contrast, the institution of public 
opinion “begin[s] to operate, as it were, from the point at which the latter [the legislative power] 
begins to fail”.451 Bentham picked up on this analysis on the complimentary role which public 
opinion plays in the English system to parliamentary politics. While this aspect of Bentham’s 
reception has been examined, it has not yet been linked to Delolme’s stance on popular 
sovereignty and its survival in modern politics in which the task of the constitution is to provide, 
in Bentham’s words, “security against misrules”, which both authors deemed the language of 
natural right and virtue fail to expound.452 
Delolme’s influence upon Bentham’s reform programme is most illuminating in one of his 
French manuscripts. The work concerns the issue of public opinion and its special role in 
preventing “misrules”, by influencing and limiting the legislative power. De Champs, in her 
Enlightenment and Utility, argues that, for Bentham, public opinion as a tribunal is presented as 
an effective limit on office holders, despite the fact that the legislative power cannot be submitted 
to positive laws.453 Moreover, it functions complimentarily to legislation in the realm of moral 
conduct. Delolme expounded the relationship between “the public censorial power” and “the 
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proposed end of Legislation” which “is not…to have the particular intentions of individuals, upon 
every case, known and complied with, but solely to have what is most conducive to the public 
good on the occasions that arise.” Individual opinions that are not incorporated into the law-
making process, however, become an invaluable check upon the law in the form of the Public 
Censorial Power. It “determine[s] upon those cases which lie out of the reach of the laws, it cannot 
be tied down to any precise regulations.”454 Delolme was given credit by Bentham as the pioneer 
who “accurately assessed the immense weight of that invaluable means, the immense prize of 
such an invaluable piece in the political clockwork of government.”455 It was Delolme’s work in 
which Bentham found the new status of the public opinion and the liberty of the press in modern 
politics as a “censorial power” of political authority. This new kind of political power, exercised 
by the public, presents a new way to think about constitutional liberty beyond the old framework 
of the balance of powers. Bentham already began to examine the limitations of this approach in 
his Fragment.  
Delolme’s “public censorial power” also has a wider implication as a form of expression of 
the people’s power. Like Delolme, Bentham shunned the idea that sovereignty is a unitary 
supreme political force. His constitutional code focuses on the distribution of power among 
institutions, rather than on the unitary and supreme notion of the sovereign.456 In this regard, both 
Delolme and Bentham began their political enquiry with the question of security and their projects 
aim at defining security with the rise of new political institutions of which power cannot be 
understood as executive, legislative, or judicial. Bentham’s reception of Delolme resonates with 
the thesis’ approach to Delolme’s programme which expounds a new conception of modern 
democracy based on multiple novel institutions that provide various modes of expression of the 
popular will. This new conception is also in contrast with the more unified notions of popular 
sovereignty which characterised the political thought of Rousseau. 
Apart from the new institution of public opinion, another parallel channel of the people’s 
power is through the institution of the trial by jury. In trial by jury, one’s innocence is only 
determined by their peers. Similarly, the “fictitious tribunal” of the court of public opinion 
exercise “moral sanction” to those who are found guilty such as the representatives of the people 
that fail to protect the public interest. Bentham, like Delolme, accepted that sovereignty lies in the 
people, but argued that the challenge for constitutional reformers was to delineate the best 
institutional arrangement that can preserve this ideal.457 Junius and Bentham’s admiration for 
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Delolme’s account of English freedom of the press and the notion of the public censorial power 
were well-established among constitutional reform enthusiasts. 
After Junius and Bentham, Delolme’s reputation as a champion of press freedom became 
more prevalent, especially at the peak of the debate on the topic in the 1790s. For example, critics 
of the British government often fused this argument with the language of natural right and self-
determination. An Address to the Freeman of Liverpool (1790) is a prime example. The 
anonymous pamphlet depends Fox’s India Bill which was defeated in the House of Lords due to 
George III’s interference. It also criticises the lack of independence of some MPs including “Mr. 
G”, a “vox et praeterea nihil---the avowed and dependant friend of Mr. Pitt; the Shadow echo and 
instrument of his father”.458 The author appealed to “the immutable laws of nature, the unalienable 
[sic] rights of reasonable beings, and the genuine principles of liberty, every one mould give his 
vote in electing those delegates” alongside Delolme’s account of the “public censorial power” 
which was cited on the front cover of the pamphlet.  
Despite Fox’s 1792 Libel Act, a royal proclamation was issued to launch a full-scale 
prosecution of authors of seditious writings. The government’s open attack on press freedom 
prompted the establishment of the society of Friends to the Liberty of the Press in December 1792. 
The society interestingly consisted of members who were both parliamentary and extra-
parliamentary opposition.459 Delolme’s work was well received by some members of the society, 
including John Cartwright, for his support of the liberty of the press as the cornerstone of the 
English constitution. In this regard, his programme offers a conceptual tool, as well as a historical 
perspective, which shed light on the close relationship between the liberty of the press or “public 
censorial power” and their legislative power.  
Cartwright’s A Letter to a Friend at Boston was published in 1793. The author was a peculiar 
figure in the British politics in the late eighteenth-century. His royal navy career path ended when 
he became interested in politics and argued for the right of the American colonists to govern 
themselves. He was also one of the founding members of the Society for Constitutional 
Information along with other notable members including John Thelwall and John Horne Tooke. 
The objective of the Society was stated to be: “To procure short parliaments and a more equal 
representation of the people” as well as to nurture “The communication of sound political 
knowledge to the people at large”.460 The year that this letter was published was the year before 
the Habeas Corpus was suspended under William Pitt amidst the fear that several seditious groups 
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would emulate the French Revolution’s sentiment against the established constitution. 
Cartwright’s reference to Delolme reveals how the rational dissenter employed arguments in 
Constitution to protest against Pitt’s alleged perversions of the constitution, liberty of the press 
among others, in the name of order and security. This A Letter to A Friend at Boston, Lincolnshire 
was written in 1793 and was also addressed to “Commoners who have associated in support of 
the constitution’’. By that time, Cartwright was already a well-known reformer and was working 
with his allies to advance the cause in Lincolnshire.461  In the letter, Cartwright asked his friends 
to understand his motives behind the attempt to gain countryside support for parliamentary reform. 
Like Junius, Cartwright identified liberty of the press as an integral part of the English constitution. 
If, while that constitution very rightly restrained the licentiousness, it did not at the same time expressly 
cherish, protect, and encourage the liberty of the press, as an invaluable blessing; and authorise the free 
discussion of all political questions, particularly respecting the national government; as means of 
permanency of the state; and happiness of the people; it would not, I confess, in my opinion, be entitled 
to much of that admiration bestowed upon it by De Lolme and other writers; or which I have been 
accustomed to entertain of it myself.462 
Interestingly, Cartwright here echoed Delolme as well as Hume in his last edition of the essay 
on liberty of the press as he pointed out its role as a “means of permanency of the state”. This 
enlightened outlook on liberty of the press as an extra-parliamentary stabilising factor is 
insinuated in Delolme’s discussion on the “public censorial power” as a form of political power 
beyond the people’s power to appoint their representatives. This scheme is informed by their 
shared belief that a modern free constitution while endorsing popular sovereignty, should aim at 
preventing any one political entity to monopolise it. The public censorial power, in this regard, 
prevents the House of Commons from claiming such a right, resonating with Christopher Keld’s 
argument about the legacy of 1688 discussed in the first half of this chapter.  
 
Republican and Constitutionalist Visions for England in the Regency Crisis. 
 
The chapter ends with Delolme and William Godwin’s contribution to the debate on the 1789 
Regency Crisis as it best elucidates their contrasting understandings of the nature of the English 
constitution which informs their accounts of the executive power. William Godwin, best known 
for his Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1793), also worked closely with the Foxite Whig 
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during the 1789 crisis concerning the means of achieving the government office.463 Godwin’s 
engagement with Delolme epitomises the clashing visions of a modern, free constitution which 
was most explicit in their disagreement on the locus of the executive power in the English system. 
On the one hand, Delolme endorsed the idea of sleeping sovereignty which separates popular 
sovereignty from government. His approach focuses on the institutional arrangements to prevent 
concentration of power and the monopoly of the claim to represent the people, an integral part of 
this arrangement is a strong and unitary executive power. Godwin, on the other hand, established 
popular principles at the heart of the English constitution and consequently, saw George III’s 
illness as an opportunity to re-arrange the power relation between the parliament and the Crown 
to empower the former. This disagreement on the constitutional principle also cannot be 
separately understood from the historical and political context of the Crisis as Godwin was an 
active supporter of Fox. 
The Regency Crisis of 1789 was triggered by George III’s final episode of mental illness. The 
Fox Opposition saw the opportunity to strengthen their power by exploiting Fox’s personal link 
to the Heir Apparent by proposing the full transferring of the executive power to Prince of Wales. 
William Pitt the Younger the then prime minister, on the other hand, initially counted on George 
III’s full recovery as he saw the political defeat of his party should the Prince of Wales assume 
the total executive power. This underlying issue of party interest further complicated the debate 
on how to proceed with the question of the Regent. Delolme was aware of the opportunity to 
present his research to the public, regarding the topic of executive power and its relationship to 
modern liberty to be his area of expertise. He produced an 81-page work titled Observations Upon 
the Late National Embarrassment, and the Proceedings in Parliament Relative to the Same (1789). 
This essay has been neglected by scholars as somewhat lesser in quality in comparison with his 
other works.464 The chapter hopes to rectify this and bring to the fore the work as a continuity of 
his interest in the English system as a model of modern free, representative constitution. Delolme 
exposed what he deemed to be contradictions in both Pitt and Fox’s arguments concerning the 
transferring of Georg III’s royal power.   
Delolme contended that the right of the regent is by nature a future right, the exercise of which 
depends on the death of the monarch. The difficulty of the discussion arose because the king was 
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still alive despite the incapacity to express his will and therefore to provide political directions as 
the executive power. The conversation about the regent’s power, therefore, was redundant. More 
importantly, it was a threat to the constitutional principles which the politicians either failed to 
comprehend or purposefully ignored to preserve their political interest. For him, the legislative 
power belongs to three constitutive parts namely the House of Commons, the House of Lords, 
and the king-in-parliament. The power to convoke the parliament is exercised by the monarch to 
prevent the monopoly of the legislative power by the House of Commons, the most powerful 
constitutive part of the parliament. 
Pitt, despite his claim to protect the authority of George III, proceeded to assemble at 
Westminster despite the absence of the royal assent. Delolme pointed out the contradiction in his 
action: He “now affirmed that those rights which the Prince [regent] did not possess, were 
possessed by the Parliament, and that the Parliament were empowered to assume that royal 
authority which was denied the Prince”. 465  These “rights” of the monarch prevents the 
concentration of power in the legislative branch and consequently should not be exercised by the 
legislative houses themselves. Pitt erroneously compared the political crisis of George III with 
the situation during the English civil war. Pitt portrayed “the situation of the present 
Parliament…as being similar to that in which the Convention Parliament stood; who, in fact:, 
assumed the royal authority to themselves and disposed of the same in what manner they thought 
expedient”.466 Delolme accused Pitt of purposefully assumed the royal authority to solidify his 
own political power, exploiting the national crisis. The legacy of 1688 was central to the 
constitutional crisis in 1789.  
In Delolme’s understanding, the constitutional settlement after the Civil War did not only aim 
at preventing royal absolutism but also legislative despotism. With the reduction of the royal 
executive power to the point of insignificance, the English constitution risks being exposed to a 
“shifting without end from one kind of subjection to another”, repeating the chaotic scene of the 
Interregnum.467  Pitt’s comparison between the Regency Crisis of 1789 with the Convention 
Parliament of 1689 reflected his erroneous understanding of the nature of the English constitution. 
Delolme argued that “the existence of the Parliament now met at Westminster, is depending both 
upon the life and the will of the King” while the Convention Parliament in 1689 first and foremost 
declared that the throne was vacant to connote how that parliament was “self-assembled”.468 The 
Convention Parliament, in this regard, is portrayed as directly honouring popular sovereignty and 
did not distinguish the constitution-making power from the operative power which the 
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government exercises. In other words, the Convention Parliament was a popular constitution 
without a Rousseauean government-sovereignty distinction unlike the eighteenth-century English 
constitution. The latter succeeded in preserving modern liberty precisely because of its 
representative mechanism which preserved the people’s power by preventing its usurpation with 
its constitutional arrangements which included the unitary executive power of the monarch.469   
The decision of Pitt’s government to assemble without George III connoted the fact that the 
present parliament “professed an intention to procure the royal assent” through the Parliament’s 
Declaration which states that it was “their [Parliament’s] Right and Duty” to be “assembled and 
lawfully, fully and freely representing all the Estates of the People of this Realm”, violating the 
usurpation-prevention scheme of the a constitution based on the distrust of all powers.470 The 
implication of this criticism is severe. Pitt either acted intentionally like the anti-monarchy of the 
Glorious Revolution or he proclaimed that the executive power now belonged to him, an ipso 
facto monarch.471 When the parliament resumed on the ground that they “freely representing all 
the Estates of the Realm”, they exercised “more power, greatly more, than the King himself would 
enjoy, if he was present…If the King was personally governing, he would not be allowed to 
declare his opinion about Bills presented to him, without the power of framing [them]: and the 
Parliament would only be allowed to frame Bills, without the power afterwards of asserting 
them”.472  Pitt, in this regard, assumed the sovereign power which neither the King nor the 
legislative branch owned. 
Delolme’s position concerning the nature of the English system post-1688 is best understood 
when juxtaposed with William Godwin’s assessment of the Regency Crisis, as well as his critique 
of Delolme. Their different understanding of the English system also anticipates two visions of 
what constitute a modern, free constitution. Delolme believed that the distinction between 
government and sovereignty which is the key to a representative constitution has to be preserved 
with the institutional arrangement that prevents any one political body to claim its right as the 
sole representative of the sovereign power. Godwin, on the other hand, adhered to the democratic 
principle which he believed, has to be applied to all political institution at every level of the 
constitutional structure. This disagreement between them is most explicit in their different 
account of the English monarchical executive power. 
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In 1788 Godwin penned a pamphlet concerning the right of the parliament to resume without 
the royal assent from George III.473 In The Law of Parliament in the Present Situation of Great 
Britain Considered (1788), he argued that English personal freedom, and its celebrated liberty of 
the press, “are secured to us by the popular nature of our constitution. The monarch of a despotic 
state might grant them, but it would be always in the power of himself, his successors, and their 
ministers to take them away again. In England they are in the hands of the nation at large. We can 
never lose them, but by our own fault; they will last, as long as our constitution continues 
undebased and unaltered”.474  Godwin’s position is that in the case of emergency such as the illness 
of George III, the English constitution as a popular constitution could legitimately self-assemble 
as well as appoint a regent. In other words, for Godwin, English monarchy was a kind of 
delegation of popular power to exercise the executive power of the constitution. 
In this line of argument, the absence of the king as a magistrate of the executive power, should 
not put the political deliberation process of the parliament to a halt since the person of the king 
was merely the vehicle of that power. He disagreed with Delolme’s contention that “the presence 
of the king, either real or represented, was absolutely requisite at the first meeting,” or that it was 
that presence, “which gave life to the legislative bodies”.475 In Godwin’s account, the king did not 
“give life” to the legislative since the sovereign power belongs primarily to the body of the people. 
The monarch served an operative purpose to carry into action the legislative will and did not own 
any of the sovereign power in a popular constitution. To this citation, Godwin commented that 
“Upon this passage it is obvious to remark, that the authority of Mr. De Lolme is more decisive 
than that of judge Blackstone, but that, as might be expected from a writer, who is neither an 
English lawyer, nor a native of this country, it is neither so scientifical [sic], nor so conclusive”.476 
Similar to Bentham, Godwin noticed that Delolme was more elaborate than Blackstone in his 
account of the executive power.477 He argued how “the constitution of our government must be 
extremely imperfect, if it does not include in it provisions for an extraordinary emergency. This 
inclusion may be derived, either from precedent, if the case has occurred before; or from the spirit 
of the constitution candidly applied, in a new case; or from considerations, partly of one kind, and 
partly of the other”.478 Godwin insinuated that since the sovereign power after 1688 had already 
been settled to belong to the people at large, in the case of emergency the Parliament should be 
able to cope with the difficulty on the basis of  “the spirit of the constitution candidly applied” 
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namely to allow the representatives of the people, directly representing popular sovereignty, to 
proceed with the parliamentary deliberation to set up a regent. 
For Godwin, the monarch’s only duty in the constitution is to exercise the executive power 
while for Delolme’s the existence of the office prevents the usurpation of the constitution by those 
who possess legislative power as well as the popular leaders who have popular support. Godwin’s 
proposal of returning the power to appoint a regent to the representatives of the people in the 
parliament therefore is incompatible with Delolme’s vision of a free constitution in which popular 




Delolme’s contribution to the British politics of the eighteenth century reveals the multiple 
ways by which his vision a modern, free constitution is employed by various actors of opposing 
political agendas. By exploring his divided legacy as an advocate of a unitary executive power 
and a champion of liberty of the press, his British reception foreshadows the decline of this strand 
of representative democracy which values the constructive tension between the executive power 
and the people as well as the executive power and the legislative power. His proposal for strong 
executive power was used to argue against “republican” reforms such as the Rockingham 
Economical Reform programme. Pulteney’s employment of Delolme touches upon what he took 
to be the threat of aristocracy, as Fox, “the Favourite of the People” attempted to gain patronage 
through the possession of the East India Company. This concern about foreign dominations and 
its effect in disturbing the checks and balance mechanisms via financial controls resonates with 
Delolme’s concern about Ireland examined in chapter two. The extra-parliamentary dynamics of 
commerce and economic powers highlighted by Delolme as important aspects of a modern 
constitution rendered his work especially useful during the controversy concerning the Company 
and its dubious position within the British Empire. Delolme’s analysis of liberty of the press as a 
crucial extra-parliamentary force of the English system also played an important part in his 
contribution to British politics. Read by prominent critics of the government including Junius and 
John Cartwright, the notion of “public censorial power” also occupies an interesting role in 
Jeremy Bentham and John Lind’s response to Richard Price. Bentham lauded Delolme as a 
pioneer who acknowledged the institution of public opinion as a form of power.  
Lastly, by examining his contribution to the debate on the Regency Crisis of 1789 as well as 
his criticism by Godwin, the chapter ends with a comparison between their clashing visions of a 




as, an “errand boy” of the legislative power which only serves the purpose of delivering the 
legislative will. Delolme, on the other hand, gave more weight to the threat of legislative 
despotism inherent in a representative constitution and highlighted the usefulness of the English 
executive power in preventing this modern threat by making use of the jealousy between the 
executive power and the legislative power, as well as between the executive power and the people 
in the form of public censorial power. Their disagreement on the nature of the English executive 
power and its relation to popular sovereignty also anticipates clash between liberal 
constitutionalism, with its aims to prevent concentration of power, and popular democracy which 
seeks to apply democratic principles to all political institutions as well as in the arrangement of 




























The chapter explores the historical importance of Delolme’s political thought through his 
reception in America. In so doing, it also goes beyond the framework of balance of powers which 
regards him as a “conservative” supporter of a strong executive power. By seriously 
contextualising his arguments in the American constitutional debates, it elucidates the explicit 
tensions between executive power and the people’s representation, and between different visions 
of sovereignty and government during the formation of modern republicanism.  
While Delolme’s historical impact on the founding generation has long been recognised, 
most scholars who refer to his work often do so merely in the form of lip service. In The Relative 
Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought (1984), 
he is the third-most-cited author in 1780s American political writing.479 For example, his legacy 
is noted in  Fatovic’s “Constitutionalism and Presidential Prerogative: Jeffersonian and 
Hamiltonian Perspectives”, with little in-depth engagement with Constitution as a historical 
writing.480 Recently, Nelson in his The Royalist Revolution (2014) successfully unveils a forgotten 
aspect of American Revolution which nuances the shibboleth of the tyrannical George III versus 
the republican American colonists. He presents the political importance of the Stuart theory of 
the English constitution to the colonists’ resistance against the British parliament. In doing so, he 
also begins to explore Delolme’s position in the debate on the English royal executive power’s 
complex relationship with the American colonies. He highlights the significance of Delolme’s 
argument that, to grant the American colonists the right to send a direct subsidy to George III 
would have been to give the Stuarts a posthumous victory.481 In other words, despite Delolme’s 
positive account of the monarchical executive power, he disagreed with Benjamin Franklin’s 
argument that the subsidy was simply a means of the colonists to introduce themselves to the 
monarch with little constitutional implications. Nelson rightly calls attention to the distinction 
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between Delolme and the “patriots”, exemplified by Rufus King, who sought to “turn back the 
clock on the English constitution”.482 Delolme, on the other hand, was not a part of the Stuart 
theorist group despite his argument for a unitary and strong executive power.  
Nelson already raises an interesting question namely on what ground did Delolme make 
his argument for a strong executive power, and who else in the American constitutional debates 
share this view with him? Prior to this study, Delolme is often regarded as a conservative 
intellectual influence on John Adams concerning the natural tendency for society of orders that 
underpins the idea of balance of powers. This “conservative” interpretation stems from Adams’ 
misreading and popularisation of Delolme’s work. This line of interpretation crystallised his 
legacy as a supporter of social and political hierarchy after his reception by the Anti-federalist 
authors in contrast with the egalitarian principles of Jeffersonian agrarian republicanism through 
the reception of his work by John Stevens.483  
This chapter, by examining the American reception of Delolme in its historical context 
and armed with the framework of a modern representative constitution, sheds light on the richness 
and complexity of Delolme’s contribution to the formation of American modern republicanism 
beyond the anachronistic label of conservatism. It traces the reception and transformation of 
Delolme’s legacy by Alexander Hamilton, John Adams, John Stevens, and Melancton Smith. 
Hamilton’s reception reveals his recognition of Delolme’s wider programme of a modern 
representative free state which has a strong executive power as an integral part of it. Focusing on 
the constructive aspect of “jealousy” between the ruler and the ruled, Hamilton used Delolme’s 
argument to support the creation of “energetic republicanism” as a response to the political and 
fiscal challenge after the failure of the Continental Congress. This approach is congruent with 
recent studies on Hamilton’s political thought which seeks to defend active but restrained 
executive power, hinting at the desirable extent of executive authority in a successful American 
constitutional separation of powers. 484 This objective in preserving liberty in the conditions of a 
large-scale modern state which guided Hamilton’s reception of Delolme is later obscured after 
the publication of John Adams’ Defence. Adams’ emphasis on the role of history as the object of 
study of science of politics to support his own argument for legislative bicameralism and a 
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hierarchical social structure. John Stevens criticised Adams and Delolme’s vision of science of 
politics as limited by the authority of history while his approach regards politics as an experiment 
with endless possibilities including a unicameral legislative parliament and plural the plurality of 
executive power. 
Stevens’ caricatured account of Delolme as a monarchist also crucially became a perfect 
target for criticism by the Jefferson circle who sought to expose the myth of English liberty and 
portray the American model as the way forward for a modern free state. The French translation 
of John Stevens’ critique of Adams and Delolme was employed to revoke the legacy of the 
English model on the eve of the French Revolution in 1780. The translation and reception also 
solidified Delolme’s reputation as an advocate for power at the expense of political liberty. 
However, Delolme was also read by an important anti-federalist namely Melancton Smith who 
raised an issue about the limit of political representation in a large-scale modern state which 
requires the political innovation of multi-layered sovereignty to preserve the hard-won republican 
principles.  
The re-examination and contextualisation of Delolme’s arguments in America reveals the 
formation of his legacy as a balanced constitution theorist. More importantly, while his reception 
in the previous chapter is deeply intertwined with the historical debate on the origin of English 
liberty, Delolme’s influence on the American founding generation, in contrast, saw the historical 
dimension of his science of politics in decline. The challenge to form theoretical explanations of 
the new federal republic resulted in a divorce between Delolme’s constitutional thinking and the 
historical analysis that gave rise to it. 485  Delolme’s influence in debates on the American 
constitution, in this regard, exemplifies the manner in which critiques of civic republicanism 
contribute to the formation of liberalism. As Kalyvas and Katznelson emphasise regarding the 
convergence between the two traditions, the present study brings to the fore aspects that were 
omitted in the process and their implications for today’s modern representative democracy.486 
 
Delolme’s Executive Power in America. 
 
Alexander Hamilton has enjoyed attention recently with the re-evaluation of his legacy which 
includes his role in pioneering what became the field of public administration as well as his 
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economic initiations that led to the establishment of the American National Bank.487 However, 
Hamilton is possibly best known for his archetypal federalist vision of strong central government 
and presidential power. Hamilton’s vision of American modern republicanism is best understood 
as a response to the failure of the Confederation Congress and the financial crisis which stemmed 
from the founding generation’s inability to manage the burden of the revolutionary debt. While 
Hamilton’s historic role in the crisis is well-documented, by examining Delolme’s influence on 
Hamilton’s understanding of executive power, this chapter highlights Hamilton’s account of 
“jealousy” as a creative force in politics and its role in creating stability by exploiting the 
constructive tension between the executive power and the people. By tracing Hamilton’s reception 
of Delolme, light will be shed on their shared vision of modern representative free constitution 
that benefits from the scale of modern states to manoeuvre jealousy through the institutional 
design for the purpose of political stability. The chapter reveals how Hamilton’s reception of 
Delolme’s positive account of jealousy in guaranteeing accountability is an integral part of his 
vision of American energetic republicanism. 
Hamilton was an avid reader and was familiar with the work of Hume, Smith, Machiavelli, 
Hobbes and Montesquieu. Thus, it was not surprising that the notion of “jealousy” became a 
crucial part of his political vocabulary.488 In his historic speech at the 1788 New York Ratifying 
Convention, Hamilton called for a strong central government to tame “an extreme spirit of 
jealousy” which gave birth to American independence: 
In the commencement of a revolution, which received its birth from the usurpations of tyranny, nothing 
was more natural, than that the public mind should be influenced by an extreme spirit of jealousy. To 
resist these encroachments, and to nourish this spirit, was the great object of all our public and private 
institutions. The zeal for liberty became predominant and excessive. In forming our confederation, this 
passion alone seemed to actuate us, and we appear to have had no other view than to secure ourselves 
from despotism. The object certainly was a valuable one, and deserved our utmost attention: But, Sir, 
there is another object, equally important, and which our enthusiasm rendered us little capable of 
regarding. I mean a principle of strength and stability in the organization of our government, and vigor 
in its operations…Without this establishment, we may make experiments without end, but shall never 
have an efficient government.489 
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Resonating with the eighteenth-century idea of the selfish-system, Hamilton described “an 
extreme spirit of jealousy” as a positive political force which overthrew British tyranny. However, 
while it was useful for a revolutionary purpose, jealousy became an obstacle in forming lasting 
political organisations. This was explicit in the failure of the Confederation Congress. Hamilton 
lamented how “the particular states show a jealousy of all power not in their own hands; and this 
jealousy has led them to exercise a right of judging in the last resort of the measures recommended 
by Congress, and of acting according to their own opinions of their propriety or necessity.”490 His 
proposal for a strong federal government and the presidential office, with the help of Delolme’s 
argument, is best understood as an institutional solution to this problem. 
Before beginning the examination of Hamilton’s analysis of the benefit of a strong executive 
power and the notion of jealousy, I first address the criticism that prompted him to pen the 
justification. The accusation of “monarchy” emerged after the War of Independence and is most 
explicit in Edmund Randolph’s response to James Wilson’s proposal of a unitary executive power. 
Randolph warned that such an extensive scope of power of the president would result in “the 
foetus of monarchy.” 491  Hamilton in the Federalist Paper No. 67 titled “Concerning the 
constitution of the president: a gross attempt to misrepresent this plan of the plan detected”, 
responded to this kind of criticism. He argued that his opponents, by “Calculating upon the 
aversion of the people to monarch […]have endeavoured to enlist all their jealousies and 
apprehensions in opposition to the intended president of the United States; not merely as the 
embryo, but as the full grown progeny of that detested parent.”492 For Hamilton, this pessimism 
regarding the monarchy was conflated with the executive power. Federalist Papers No. 68-69 are 
devoted to expose this claim as a political ploy. “It is impossible not to bestow the imputation of 
deliberate imposture and deception upon the gross pretence of a similitude between a king of 
Great Britain, and a magistrate of the character marked out for that of the president of the United 
States. It is still more impossible to withhold that imputation, from the rash and barefaced 
expedients which have been employed to give success to the attempted imposition.”493 Hamilton 
opposed the kind of weak central government as initiated by the Article of Confederation (1781) 
which had proved to be inadequate in uniting the fledgling nation amidst the post-war political 
and financial difficulties. The challenge for Hamilton in advancing his argument to the American 
public was twofold. Firstly, he had to convince them that a strong executive power was not a 
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remnant of British monarchical power and, secondly, that it was not contradictory, but rather 
beneficial, to the kind of republicanism that was suitable for America. 
The Federalist Paper No. 70 begins with a comment on republicanism and its opposition to a 
strong and singular executive power. “There is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a 
vigorous executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The enlightened 
well-wishers to this species of government must at least hope, that the supposition is destitute of 
foundation since they can never admit its truth, without, at the same time, admitting the 
condemnation of their own principles.”494 The very existence of the United States of America 
after the 1787 Philadelphia Constitutional Convention and the creation of the federal republic 
proved the claim about the incompatibility between a strong executive power and republicanism 
to be mistaken.495  
Hamilton rejected the parallel made between his proposition and the British monarchical 
executive power as misleading. His own position, he argued, was based on the insight that a plural 
executive could not be held accountable. “The experience of other nations will afford little 
instruction on this head. As far, however, as it teaches anything, it teaches us not to be enamoured 
of plurality in the executive.”496 Hamilton contended that the plurality of executive power renders 
accountability difficult and gives rise to the contestation of power between political groups. 
Repeating Delolme’s argument in Constitution, Hamilton categorically rejected the proposition 
of a presidential council with binding advice, a scheme which some of the American states had 
already adopted.497  To further demonstrate that Hamilton’s proposition did not aim at emulating 
the British monarchical executive power, he delineated the difference between Britain as a 
kingdom and America as a republic and the implication this has to their different management of 
the executive power. As the king can do no wrong, “Nothing, therefore, can be wiser in that 
kingdom, than to annex to the king a constitutional council, who may be responsible to the nation 
for the advice they give. Without this, there would be no responsibility whatever in the executive 
department.”498 Hamilton tactfully reaffirmed his position that America and England are two 
different kinds of states especially concerning the nature of their executive power before he 
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proceeded to make his most important point namely that the scepticism towards the idea of a 
unitary executive power was a misplaced and obsolete republican perspective. 
Hamilton’s point is interesting because he turned the argument about the redundancy of 
European and especially English history against his critics. “The idea of a council to the executive, 
which has so generally obtained in the state constitutions, has been derived from that maxim of 
republican jealousy which considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men, than of a 
single man. If the maxim should be admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend, that 
the advantage on that side would not counterbalance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite 
side. But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the executive power.” The division of the 
executive power would give rise to contestation for power among the council members. The 
scheme was originally designed to hold the monarchical executive power accountable since the 
monarch could not be directly accused. The executive council therefore was not necessary to the 
republic of America. Referring to the authority of Delolme, Hamilton explained how the unity of 
the executive power is instrumental in channelling jealousy to effectively limit that office.  “I 
clearly concur in opinion in this particular with a writer whom the celebrated Junius pronounces 
to be ‘deep, solid, and ingenious,’ that ‘the executive power is more easily confined when it is 
one:’ that it is far more safe there should be a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of 
the people; in a word, that all multiplication of the executive, is rather dangerous than friendly to 
liberty.”499 As a remedy for individual state jealousy, the unity of the presidential power renders 
the office “a single object for the jealousy and the watchfulness of the people”, echoing Delolme’s 
account of the constructive tension between the English monarchical power and the people. 
Moreover, as the experience of the weakness and the lack of unity of the Confederation Congress 
proved to be detrimental to public good, Hamilton concluded his essay with a warning against the 
grave effect of repeating the same mistake by dividing the executive office and making it 
subordinate to the legislative power.  Concluding his argument, Hamilton insisted that “[a] feeble 
executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase 
for a bad execution: and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in 
practice, a bad government.”500  
Similar to Delolme’s emphasis on the political implications of the rise of commercial society, 
Hamilton carefully observed the institutional innovations required to cope with the modern 
challenges of a large-scale free state, having served various offices during the revolutionary years 
and post-independence challenges. Like the creation of a strong and unitary executive power, the 
government management of public debt while at first glance might seem like a potential threat to 
individual liberty, at a closer look at the challenges of the modern conditions of the 
 




unprecedentedly large-scale republic. He argued how public debt could help “strengthen our 
infant Government by increasing the number of ligaments between the Government and the 
interests of the individuals.”501 His vision of an American modern representative constitution is 
part and parcel with his economic ambition for the republic. In Hamilton’s reception of Delolme, 
one begins to see the adaptation of Delolme’s argument to fit the political agenda of American 
politics. In Hamilton’s case, one sees the transformation of Delolme’s monarch-subjects jealousy 
in the English monarchical executive power into the American presidential office. 
Another crucial federalist reception of Delolme is by John Adams as it was through his 
interpretation that Delolme’s reputation as a conservative royalist emerged. Adams’s Defence was 
written as a response to Turgot and Price’s criticism of the idea of checks and balances. Turgot 
wrote his 1778 private letter to Price addressing this issue, which was later translated into English 
to be included in Price’s 1784 Observations on the Importance of the American Revolution. In the 
letter, Turgot criticised the obsolete idea of “equilibrium” which was the product of European 
monarchical violence and inequality. The doctrine, he argued, “in England may be a necessary 
check to the enormous influence of royalty” but in America, it could not be of any use in the 
republic “founded upon the equality of all citizens.” 502  American independence not only 
suggested a new model of government in the form of a federal republic but also it importantly 
signified a new direction in the course of history, breaking away from the European experience 
especially that of Britain. The American states “are the hope of the world. They might become a 
model to it” on the condition that America must “take care to avoid what your [British] ministerial 
writers are frequently saying She will be---an image of our Europe.”503 Interestingly, Turgot’s 
verdict was based on his assumption that the balance of powers in the English system was a 
mechanism to limit the royal power therefore it follows that such schemes would become 
redundant America.  
Adams found Turgot and Price’s understanding of human nature to be inaccurate as it is 
purely theoretical and lacks historical grounding. Consequently, their republican programme 
becomes a questionable political project. In his letter XXVI to Price published in Defence, Adams 
refers to Delolme’s understanding of human nature and power to support his argument for 
bicameral legislature and a unitary and strong executive power. Adams begins by addressing the 
similarity between his understanding of man and Price’s. “You [Price] and I admire the fable of 
Tristram Shandy more than the Fable of the Bees, and agree with Butler rather than Hobbes. It is 
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weakness rather than wickedness which renders men unfit to be trusted with unlimited power.”504 
However, he criticized Price for failing to recognize the political implications of it. He cited 
Delolme’s appeal to experience in the understanding of power: “Experience evinces, that the 
happiest dispositions are not proof against the allurements of powers which has no charms but as 
it leads on for new advances. Authority endures not very idea of restraints, nor does it cease to 
struggle until it has beaten down every boundary.” 505  Adams and Delolme derived their 
understanding of human nature and politics through the history of republics and their downfall.  
For this reason, the best hope for a free representative constitution is to pitch the powers 
against each other. A unicameral legislative power which Price and Turgot endorsed, Adams 
argued, is doomed to failure: “upon the first day of its existence, [a single assembly will] be an 
aristocracy; in a few days, or years at least, an oligarchy; and then it will soon divide into two or 
three parties, who will soon have as many armies; and, when the battle is decided, the victorious 
general will govern without or with the advice of any council or assembly, as he pleases: or, if the 
assembly continues united, they will in time exclude the people from all share even in elections, 
and make the government hereditary in a few families.”506  Adams shared with Delolme the 
opinion that the rule of the few is the existential threat to modern representative constitution 
especially after the establishment of popular sovereignty if there is inadequate institutional design 
to prevent concentration of power. He therefore regarded Delolme’s analysis of the English 
system as “the best defence of the political balance of three powers ever written”.507  
Appleby argues that “De Lolme proved to be a compelling influence not because of the 
uniqueness of his analysis on history and politics, but because he had developed a comprehensive 
rationale for conservative reformism which gave coherence and precision to Adams' own strongly 
felt convictions.”508 This “conservative” reading of Delolme keeps recurring and obscures the 
complexity of his overall argument for a free representative constitution based on the distinction 
between popular sovereignty and government. Disagreeing with Appleby’s analysis of Adams’s 
reception of Delolme, this chapter argues that, in order to appreciate the connection between 
Delolme and Adams, one needs to look at the bigger picture, namely at Adams’s numerous 
writings on the relation between politics and history. It was through the authority of history that 
Adams hoped to convince the American public of the compatibility between republicanism and 
the theory of balance of powers, resonating with Delolme’s examination of the English 
constitution. The question did not relate to the monarchy or republicanism as Appleby suggests 
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but rather, what kind of republican principles should be preserved and modified to fit the 
challenges of the new republic. Adams therefore was responsible for the popularization of his 
erroneous interpretation of Delolme’s theory of a balanced constitution as underpinned by the 
notion of society of orders, an opinion which Delolme did not hold. Adams’ misreading of 
Delolme also includes the nature of the relationship between the executive power and the people. 
Mayville’s John Adams and the Fear of American Oligarchy (2014) recognises Delolme’s 
influence on Adams’ concern about the rule of the few in disguise of a republic but also follows 
Adams’ misreading of Delolme that “the chief magistrate” is “the natural ally of the people.”509 
Adams erroneously assumed that Delolme, like him, understood the executive office as a seat of 
neutral power which moderates party distinctions to maintain the stability of the parliamentary 
politics. In other words, the important notion of “jealousy” between the people and the executive 
got lost through Adams’ interpretation of Constitution.  
Moreover, it was Adams’ reading of Delolme’s idea of balance of powers, and not Hamilton, 
which prompted a crucial response from the Jeffersonian circle in and beyond America. “A 
Farmer of New Jersey” or John Stevens in his Observations on Government (1787) extensively 
criticised what he deemed to be the Adams-Delolme’s idea of balance of powers. Stevens’ 
pamphlet also has historic importance as it was selected by Thomas Jefferson and his French 
connections to translate into French as a response to arguments made by Adams. Stevens’s 
pamphlet, alternatively, proposes that the science of politics for the new Republic of America 
should be understood as an experiment, breaking away from the shackles of European history and 
philosophy which was nothing but a history of chance and violence under monarchical despotism. 
 
Critics of Delolme’s Executive Power. 
 
By tracing the criticism of Adams’s account of Delolme, one also gains an entry point into 
the early disputes on American federal republicanism at the centre of which was the relationship 
between history and politics. For the Jeffersonian circle, America epitomised the materialization 
of the doctrine of natural rights as the foundation of a truly modern republic, free from the history 
of European monarchical despotisms and the feudal legacy of society of orders. I first examine 
here John Stevens’s Observations on Government (1787), then look at the editorial annotation of 
the French translation, focusing on its political importance as an antifederalist response to Adams’ 
dubbed “Anglomania”. In light of American independence, the horizon of republicanism was 
 




significantly expanded and became a source of inspiration for Europe and especially in France. 
The French Américanistes saw this as an opportunity to promote the republican cause and 
undermine the English parliamentary model which had been influential among French reformers. 
James Madison sent John Stevens’s pamphlet to Filippo Mazzei in 1787 and the French 
translation was accompanied with extensive annotations.510 Crucially, Delolme’s account of the 
English constitution, and its wider underpinnings, appeared as the major target of the French 
editors of Stevens’ book. 
John Stevens is best known as a pioneer of steam engines in America, but he was also deeply 
engaged with the debates on the constitutional design. The pamphlet’s full title is “Observations 
on Government, including some Animadversions on Mr. Adams Defence of the Constitutions of 
Government of the United States of America and Mr. De Lolme’s Constitution of England by a 
Farmer of New Jersey” and according to Joyce Appleby, was “ignored at home” but “became a 
smashing hit in France”511. Alongside Adams’s Defence, another equally important target of 
Stevens’s pamphlet is Delolme’s Constitution. In fact, despite several differences between 
Adams’s arguments in Defence and Delolme’s Constitution, Stevens always criticised the works 
together, arguing that that they both favour the aristocracy and monarchy. The objective of the 
pamphlet was to demonstrate how the English model was a misfit for America. Stevens employed 
Delolme’s Constitution as a straw man to attack the disadvantages he found that the system was 
prone to and to support his own proposals. The idea of the balance of powers is central to 
Stevens’s critique of Adams. 
At the beginning of the pamphlet, Stevens denounced Adams’s Defence.  He dubbed the 
author “a state empiric, who prescribes one single remedy for all disorders” and how the idea of 
orders and balances was a boastful “political nostrum”.512 This is because, in America, there was 
no balance of orders. According to Stevens, “in America the balance is nine-tenths on the side of 
the people: indeed there is but one order… Thus, then we have neither ‘Balances’ nor ‘Orders’”513. 
Despite Stevens finding the idea of balances and orders inconsistent, he argues that because of its 
prominence among men of letters in Europe, Americans should “bestow utmost care and attention 
towards investigating this subject, so particularly important to us at this time”514. Here Stevens 
referred to the upcoming Constitutional Convention in September of the same year of 1787. 
Stevens perceived the issue of constitutional design as down to those who have a pessimistic view 
of human nature hence their penchant for the idea of balance of powers against those who seek to 
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“make one more generous effort in favour of human nature” and “risque [sic] her from the 
opprobrium which these writers have cast upon her.”515 Stevens was fighting against those who 
do not believe that “man is capable of governing himself.”516 To clarify his view on human nature, 
Stevens also briefly gave his own account as follows: 
Man is by nature a gregarious animal. Interest urges him, with an impulse almost irresistible, to 
associate with his kind; and reason and experience convinces him how necessary society is to his 
welfare. In a solitary state his corporeal powers are exceeded, and his mental faculties are nearly 
equalled by many other animals. It is astonishing indeed to reflect to what a degree the powers of his 
body and faculties of his mind are increased and enlarged by means of society. But tho’ the influenced 
of passion, and not always comprehending that “true self-love, and social, are the same,” he is often 
inducted to violate the natural rights of his companions: Hence the necessity of civil government517. 
Stevens’s positive account of human nature and the idea of natural sociability offers a sharp 
contrast with the understanding of Delolme and Adams of humans as basically self-interested and 
passion-driven. More importantly, contrary to Adams and Delolme who treated history as an 
object of study of science of politics to find underlying principles that govern all human 
interactions, Stevens perceived the study of politics as an experiment. He argued that “to this day, 
no fair experiments have been made of the effects which the various forms of which government 
is capable, would produce.”518 Delolme and Adams, on the contrary, emphasised how the political 
world is always the product of history and therefore, the best way to make sense of the present is 
to see it in light of the past. For Stevens, not all forms of government had been tried adequately, 
especially in the history of the Old World. To jump to the conclusion that an extremely democratic 
system would not last was a mistake. Making a comparison between the study of politics and 
natural philosophy, Stevens argued that “it has been discovered that it is only from a great variety 
of well conducted experiments that a system of true philosophy can be established.”519 The main 
reason that Stevens rejected history as the only source for the study of politics was because “all 
that history furnishes us any account of, were the effect either of chance or violence.” 520 
America’s political thought, on the contrary, would be based not on the study of the accidentality 
of history but on the intentionality of America’s realisation of “an original compact entered into 
by every individual of society, wherein a certain form of government is chalked out and 
established.”521 In Stevens’s version of the science of politics, the formation of government in 
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human nature that had been drawn from those historical catalogues was not only inaccurate but 
also implicitly justified the status quo and denied the possibility of progress. In this regard, 
although Stevens, Delolme and Adams appealed to “experience”, Delolme and Adams 
emphasised on the self-interested human nature that can be distilled from history as a catalogue 
of experience. Moreover, since the human nature if unchangeable, institutional designs become 
the only hope to channel passions for the public good. Stevens, on the other hand, approaches 
politics as an open-ended progress and insisted on the inadequacy of history for the understanding 
future forms of republicanism. 
Stevens continued to reject the very term “English constitution”, arguing that “I cannot find 
that the people of that country have anything like what a subject of these States would denominate 
a constitution.”522 He equated a state’s constitution with the aforementioned definition of the 
original compact. Stevens pointed out how “the written Constitution as we now know it was the 
offspring of the Revolution of 1776, which rapidly resulted in royal charters being rewritten as 
the constitutions for independent states. These new constitutions (Pennsylvania’s is the most 
striking example) tended to transfer the powers of the royal governor to representative assemblies 
whose power was virtually unlimited. Within a few years, however, the pendulum had begun to 
swing the other way.523” Here Stevens refers to the 1784 Pennsylvania State Constitution which 
became unicameral with its elimination of the office of governor (to the horror of Adams who 
describes it as “so democratical [sic] that it must produce confusion and every evil work.”)524  
At the heart of Stevens’s pamphlet lies an attempt not just to criticize the Old World theorists 
of checks and balances along with their pessimistic account of human nature but also to offer an 
alternative. Stevens’s argument is founded on the idea of original compact that is no longer just 
abstract but, according to Stevens, came into being among the American states. Unlike those who 
favour the balance of powers theory and argue for “the impossibility of effecting a change”525, 
Stevens maintains that the American model is the way forward for humanity. American states 
should not look for political guidance from the wisdom of the Old World where “orders” were 
deemed necessary for the stability of a regime and equality perceived by the people as 
destabilising. On the contrary, America has its own unique beginning where the social compact 
made available in real terms combined with “the perfect equality which exists amongst us. We 
have no such thing as orders, ranks, or nobility; and notwithanding [sic] all that Mr. Adams and- 
Mr. De Lolme have said in this subject”.526 Delolme and Adams in this pamphlet are presented as 
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the epitome of Anglophiles with all their misunderstanding of politics due to their erroneous 
approach to the study of politics that relies solely on history without taking into account the open-
ended nature of human progress in every field of knowledge and especially politics which, for 
Stevens, is “an art, which of all others is of the greatest consequence to happiness in this life”527. 
Stevens’s critique of Delolme and Adams cannot be separated from his advocating of the new 
political model of the American states. For example, his criticism of Delolme’s arguments for the 
strong and unitary executive power of the Crown paves the way to his own proposal for the 
multiplicity of the executive power. Despite the discrepancy between what Delolme proposes in 
Constitution and how Stevens reads it, this pamphlet still interestingly summarises the political 
argument between the federalists and the antifederalists who had different visions for America as 
the first modern republic. For Stevens, English history demonstrates that the Crown is “the cause 
of all intestine wars and civil broils, not the opposite. Security of the subject does not stem from 
the Crown’s unitary executive power but “depends wholly on a proper delegation of power.”528 
For Stevens, “there is scarce a page of the history of England but contains ample testimonials to 
the contrary” of the argument that the English system’s virtue is its stability.529  Stevens’s account 
of English history proposes that it is not the design of the constitution per se that is the key to the 
English success, if indeed any. For him, rather, the celebrated English liberty is the product of the 
extra-constitutional and illegal schemes of taking up arms against their monarchs. To support this 
argument, Stevens offered an account of the events before the Glorious Revolution, and at the 
same time criticized Delolme’s argument that the English system is durable and stable.  
The last part of the pamphlet is dedicated to Stevens’s suggestions of what the constitutions 
of American states should be like. He began by referring to an argument against “extremely 
democratic states […] The governments in these states [American states] are in fact nothing more 
than social compacts entered, into for the mutual advantage of the individuals of, whom the 
society is composed. But say these gentlemen, Mr. De Lolme, Mr. Adams, etc. governments so 
extremely democratic, can never last long: be its construction whatever it may, without Orders 
and Balances, it is impossible to prevent a government from degenerating into a tyranny: the 
legislature will finally engross all power to themselves, and for prevention of this no other remedy 
can be devised that will prove effectual”530 
Stevens then expressed his opinions concerning the design of a constitution that reflects his 
more optimistic account of human nature in contrast with that of Delolme and Adams. Stevens 
firstly addressed the issue of legislative tyranny, a topic that is also a main concern not only for 
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Delolme and Adams but also for a number of Americans having witnessed the overpowering 
British colony and peripheral towns that were under-represented by the legislative branch. “I will 
readily admit that where the legislative power is confined to one assembly of representatives, 
without any check or controul [sic] placed in the hands of the executive or judicial, the 
apprehensions of his evil may not be altogether without foundation.”531 However, Stevens did not 
find the English bicameral legislature as an adequate solution to legislative tyranny. 
Unlike Palmer, I disagree with his argument that Steven meant “it is of course wise to have a 
second chamber of legislation and to give the executive and the judiciary a power of restraining 
the legislature.”532 The focus rather is on a negative that is “lodged in the hands of the executive 
and judicial powers…in order that they may be able to defend themselves from the encroachments 
of the legislature.” 533  The institutional arrangements of the American constitution “are 
experiments in government entirely new; they are founded upon principles peculiar to 
themselves”. 534   Addressing the uniqueness of the American challenge, Stevens did not 
conclusively rule out unicameral legislature. For Stevens, American state constitutions, “whether 
consisting of an assembly only, or of an assembly and senate, are chosen by the 
people[…]circumstance renders our governments most democratic that ever have existed 
anywhere.”535 Unlike the English system with extremely limited suffrage, the American state 
constitutions already showed how “extremely democratic states” can last. Stevens equated 
democracy with the principle of election in contrast with Delolme’s vision of modern 
representative politics that champions the distinction between popular sovereignty and the 
balanced governmental powers. Stevens’ idea of democratic government, on the other hand, 
foreshadows the establishment of electoral process as the most important indicator of modern 
democracy.  
Stevens concludes the pamphlet with his recommendation for “an effectual Foederal [sic] 
Government” despite his high praise of the Constitutional Convention. He suggested that the 
executive power should be divided into three departments: the president, the chief justice and the 
superintendent of finance. “There three great executive officers, to constitute a council to revise 
all bills which have passed the house of representatives and the senate, in the same manner as by 
the constitution it is directed to be done by the President.”536 Stevens also insisted on an election 
for the president every three or four years, in contrast with Hamilton’s plan that advocates 
presidency for life. This presents a clear break from what Delolme proposes in Constitution that 
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a unitary executive is a requisite to balance out the immense legislative power. For Stevens, “The 
powers must necessarily be trusted in the hands of the President are amply sufficient to preserve 
his respectability and independence, were they greater, he might become dangerous”.537 The 
division of executive power into three branches gives the power of appointing judges to the chief 
of justice and that of managing federal revenues to the superintendence of finance. The three 
branches combined form a council to revise all bills passed by the House of Representatives; a 
responsibility previously held solely by the president. Stevens’s suggestion to amend the 1788 
Constitution is a clear attempt to divide the executive power on the grounds that an executive too 
strong will be detrimental to liberty. Unlike in Delolme’s account which believes that the 
executive power has a role to play in securing the constructive tension between the people and 
the government as well as to counterforce the immense legislative power, Stevens followed 
Rousseau in his account that the executive power’s sole and prime responsibility is to deliver the 
will of the legislative or what Mansfield deems an errand boy interpretation of the office.538 To 
divide power for managerial purposes therefore is an understandable proposition. 
 The political importance of Stevens’s response to Adams’s account of Delolme is best 
captured in the editorial annotation of the French translation, Stevens’s Examen du gouvernement 
d’Angleterre, compare aux constitutions de états unis.539  The editorial annotation written by 
Condorcet, Dupont de Nemours and J.A. Gallois, explicitly juxtaposes the English model with 
America, the latter of which was deemed the true model of modern republicanism. Note II, in 
particular, offers an extensive critique of Delolme’s Constitution as the epitome of what they 
deemed “Anglomane”. Not only did Delolme deliberately cloak his eulogy of the English 
constitution with an impartial tone of science of politics, he also disguised historical facts in order 
to maintain his theory.540  The editors criticised Delolme of wrongly assigning the origin of 
English liberty to the Norman Conquest as “the principle of equality was unknown during that 
time!”541  England rested its liberty on parliament but the institution failed to be “the actual 
representation of the nation” because of the arbitrary and extremely limited suffrage that allowed 
the Crown to corrupt the majority of the electors of the largest part of the House of Commons.542 
Concerning the reputation of English legal protection of the subjects, the editors acknowledged 
the benefit of the Habeas Corpus but also criticised Delolme’s failure to recognise the centrality 
of laws related to landed property which prevents land owners from being exploited by the 
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government. The editors observed how it was Delolme’s Genevan background which made him 
insensitive to the importance of agriculture in a large state.543 Most erroneously, they argued, 
Delolme viewed the king’s power to dissolve the parliament which is in fact “an act of despotism” 
as a “guarantee of liberty.”544 Stevens’s French translation presents America as the epitome of a 
modern free constitution founded upon an “original pact” prior to the establishment of the 
government. “The people of the United States are the first to have perceived that it is not necessary 
to begin legislation with a “contract” (as if among enemies), but rather by the exposition of the 
principle of all contracts” referring to the Declaration of Rights.545  In contrast, the English 
Constitution as described by Delolme rests its inadequate understanding of liberty on the 
competition between political powers and biased historical accounts.  
Stevens’s French translation perfectly summarises the vision of American republicanism 
based on the civic republican understanding of a free state as agriculture-based, democratic and 
one that champions basic rights. Delolme’s historical approach, by contrast, values the rise of 
commerce and the constructive force of political competition through institutional arrangements 
which prevent a concentration of power rather than honouring the elective principle. Underlying 
their differences was the absence of the sovereignty-government distinction in Stevens and his 
translators’ understanding of modern democracy. Delolme, on the other hand, relied on the 
distinction which also underpins his positive account of the modern executive power. 
 
Delolme and American Multi-Layered Sovereignty. 
 
Beyond the first strand of Delolme’s reception which focuses on his advocacy of a strong and 
unitary executive power, he was also read by the anti-federalists in much more nuanced ways than 
previously assumed. The term anti-federalist has long been recognized as a simplification of often 
contrasting arguments for a strong state government. It was the label that was used in order to 
group together the critics of the ratification of the 1787 Constitution. They largely shared a 
concern about the threat to liberty posed by the creation of a powerful central government and the 
presidential executive power.546 Prior to the present study, Delolme’s work has been associated 
with the federalist cause with his support of a unitary and strong executive power and his positive 
reception by Hamilton and Adams. With the examination of his reception by the anti-federalist 
“Federal Farmer”, the chapter shows how Delolme’s arguments were also employed to show the 
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limit of political representation in a large-scale modern state which calls for the creation of the 
multi-layered sovereignty. 
“Letters from a Federal Farmer” enjoy remarkable popularity as shown by their extensive 
distribution and widespread readership.547 Although the authorship of these pamphlets is still 
disputed, the two most accepted nominations are Richard Henry Lee, Virginia's delegate to the 
Confederation Congress, and Melancton Smith, a prominent New York anti-federalist548 with 
later secondary literature supporting a stronger case for Melancton Smith. 549 The chapter agrees 
with this argument. Historically, Smith was crucial as the person who led other antifederalists to 
eventually change their stance and vote to accept the constitution in New York despite the 
federalists being outnumbered in the first place. Although enough other states had already ratified 
the constitution that it theoretically did not matter whether New York approved the draft or not, 
the New York Ratifying Convention was still politically significant due to the state’s enormous 
economic power. Therefore, the debate itself was also designed to be communicative and 
informative to the American public regardless of the result from the Convention. Smith’s 
arguments in his numerous public letters reveal how political representation was one of the most 
crucial topics of the constitutional debate. 550  For him, the proposed 1787 Constitution 
inadequately represent the diverse interest of the population. However, the size of America made 
it impossible to adhere to the ideal that the representative’s interest should mirror that of the 
constituents’. 
The idea that naturally suggests itself to our minds, when we speak of representatives is, that they 
resemble those they represent…but it should also comprehend that kind of acquaintance with the 
common concerns and occupations of the people, which men of the middling class of life are in general 
much better competent to, than those of a superior class. To understand the true commercial interests 
of a country, not only requires just ideas of the general commerce of the world, but also, and principally, 
a knowledge of the productions of your own country and their value, what your soil is capable of 
producing, the nature of your manufactures, and the capacity of the country to increase both.551 
To support his argument for the creation of a multi-layered sovereignty due to the limit of 
political representation in a large-scale modern state like America, Smith revoked Delolme’s 
authority. First, he begins with his high praise for Delolme’s analysis in Constitution. Americans 
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found “a valuable idea respecting representation, to be collected from De Lo[l]me, and other able 
writers, which essentially tends to confirm my positions: They very justly impute the 
establishment of general and equal liberty in England to a balance of interests and powers among 
the different orders of men.”552 This passage reveals how Smith followed Adams’ interpretation 
of Delolme’s idea of balance of powers to be underpinned by the different social orders. Citing 
Delolme, he traced the origin of English liberty to the resistance against the Norman Conquest. 
After the foreign invasion, “The barons and people, who recollected their former liberties, were 
induced, by those oppressions, to unite their efforts in their common defence: Here it became 
necessary for the great men, instead of deceiving and depressing the people, to enlighten and court 
them: the royal power was too strongly fixed to be annihilated, and rational means were therefore 
directed to limiting it  within proper bounds.”553 This “fortunate” circumstance which united the 
interest of all subjects against the foreign kings gradually gave birth to the English king-in-
Parliament and the bicameral legislative assembly. This unique form of representation was the 
secret behind the celebrated English liberty. Smith asked: “Why in England have the revolutions 
always ended in stipulations in favour of general liberty, equal laws, and the common rights of 
the people, and in most other countries in favour only of a few influential men?” For him, “The 
reasons…are obvious: In England the people have been substantially represented in many respects; 
in the other countries it has not been so.” 554  The people’s representatives in the House of 
Commons rendered the “government of England so mild and favourable to the body of the 
people”.555 The English “genuine balance founded in the actual state of things”. The political 
representation mirrored the interests of the people, the nobility and the king. 
However, Smith’s was quick to point out how Delolme’s analysis of English liberty must be 
approached carefully. This is due to the difference between the sizes of England and America. 
The English were “one people compactly settled on a small island, with a great city filled with 
frugal merchants, serving as a common centre of liberty and union”. The Americans, on the other 
hand, “are dispersed” in several states which consist the extensive republic.556 It is therefore 
impossible for America to follow the English model of a unitary and small state with one 
homogenous body of the people and one commercial centre. The English sleeping sovereignty 
model of mixed constitution entered the American constitutional debate partly via Adams’ 
Defense. Smith did not reject the model per se as he wrote: “I have often lately heard it observed, 
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that it will do very well for a people to make a constitution, and ordain, that at stated periods they 
will choose, in a certain manner, a first magistrate, a given number of senators and representatives, 
and let them have all power to do as they please”. However, “this doctrine…may [only] do for a 
small republic.”557  On the small island the representatives can be hoped to share “the interests, 
the view, feelings, and genuine sentiments of the people themselves.” This scheme, however, “can 
never be admitted in an extensive country…in a numerous representation the abuse of power is a 
common injury.”558 Smith, like Adams erroneously assumed that Delolme’s checks and balances 
reflects the three orders of the people, the nobility, and the monarch. Therefore, Smith deemed 
this “doctrine” to be incompatible with America with its extensive republic with diverse interests. 
The difference between England and America leads to Smith’s own proposal of the multi-
layered sovereignty: 
The body of the people must have this true representative security placed somewhere in the Nation; 
and in the United States, or in any extended empire, I am fully persuaded can be placed nowhere, but 
in the forms of a federal republic, where we can divide and place it in several state or district legislatures, 
giving the people in these the means of opposing heavy internal taxes and oppressive measures in the 
proper stages.559 
By dividing sovereignty between the state and the central government, Smith hoped that the 
former is adequately empowered to counterforce the immense power of the federal government. 
Beyond the political innovation of the multi-layered sovereignty, Smith as well as other anti-
federalists also called for a legal bulwark against the newly-created strong central government as 
they felt the legislative reach would fall short in the vast political arena of the new federal republic. 
The Bill of Rights (1791) aimed to amend this flaw especially with the 4th and the 5th Amendment 
which prohibit the unreasonable search and seizure, cruel and unusual punishment, compelled 
self-incrimination and deprivation of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. In 
Letter XVI dated 20 January 1788, the Federal Farmer discussed the necessity of a bill of rights 
for the new constitution giving weight to the liberty of the subject and legal protection, using 
Delolme’s Constitution as an authoritative text to support his claim. Smith wrote: “Gentlemen 
who oppose a federal bill of rights, or further declaratory articles, seem to view the subject in a 
very narrow imperfect manner. These have for their objects, not only the enumeration of the rights 
reserved, but principally  explain the general powers delegated in certain material points, and to 
refrain those who exercise them by fixed known boundaries.”560 For Smith, the limitation of 








the previous example of Habeas Corpus who suggests that “Perhaps it would be better to 
enumerate particular rights the people entitled to in these proceedings, as has been done in many 
of the [American] states, and as has been done in England.”561 Stressing the importance of the 
enumeration of these legal protections as rights, Smith cited Delolme to make his argument. He 
wrote how “A celebrated writer observes upon this last article562, that in itself it may he said to 
comprehend the whole end of a political society.”563 Here Smith referred to Delolme’s definition 
of liberty as the legal protection of a person and equality before the law which Delolme argued to 
be the ultimate purpose of a civil society. For Smith, the creation of a federal state according to 
the new constitution, although as a response to the challenges that the confederation encountered, 
was like going from one extreme to another without examining a middle ground. By focusing 
merely on the lack of central power which costed the collapse of the Confederation, the new 
constitution overcorrected the republic by depriving the people of their hard-won political power 
in its inherently anti-popular politics institutional design. 
At the end of this significant pamphlet, Smith referred to Delolme as an authoritative figure 
whose wisdom was acknowledged among the American patriots but could not be taken at face 
value due to the differences between America and England as states. Appealing to patriotism, 
Smith concluded the text: “I feel an aversion to the disunion of the states, and to separate 
confederacies; the states have fought and bled in a common cause, and great dangers too may 
attend these confederacies. I think the system proposed capable of very considerable degrees of 
perfection if we pursue first principles. I do not think that De Lolme, or any writer I have seen, 
has sufficiently pursued the proper inquiries and efficient means for making representation and 
balances in government more perfect. It is our task to do this in America.”564 
 
Conclusion. 
   
Delolme’s American reception during the constitutional debates saw a gradual divorce 
between his constitutional thought and the historical analysis. It also crucially informs us about 
the formation of his legacy as a “conservative” and a monarchist. Hamilton’s Federalist Paper No. 
70 adopts Delolme’s account of the jealousy-driven constructive tension between the people and 
the executive power to support his argument for a powerful but restrained presidential power. 
 
561 Ibid.,149. 
562 “that no person shall be exiled or molested in his person or effects or otherwise than by the judgement 





This scheme, Hamilton argued, is the way forward for modern liberty because it effectively 
guarantees the accountability of the executive power by keeping the people politically active. 
John Adams, on the other hand, erroneously interpreted Delolme’s idea of checks and balances 
to be underpinned by the society of orders. John Stevens and the Jeffersonian circle caricatured 
this line of interpretation into a conservative and a monarchist defence of the society of orders à 
la ancient regime. His reception by Melancton Smith, however, reveals how his work was also 
used by an anti-federalist to support their argument for Bills of Right as well as the multi-layered 
sovereignty of the federal republic due to American exceptionally large territory. However, it is 
Adams and the Jeffersonian narrative of Delolme which becomes the mainstream reception of 
Delolme as a theorist of balance of powers and an advocate for a monarch-like executive power, 























Delolme’s argument for modern representative democracy through his examination of the 
English system was gradually eclipsed by his legacy as a supporter of a strong executive power. 
The persistence of this caricatured account is also explicit in the nineteenth-century reception. 
The period was a crucial one in the history of the convergence of republicanism and liberalism in 
the debate on modern representative constitution. After 1789, popular sovereignty became, for 
many, an uncontested ideal of politics and the ground on which contesting accounts of political 
legitimacy were fought. On the other side of the same coin, the unprecedented violence of the 
French Revolution also haunted Europe’s political imaginations and the question of political 
stability prompted nineteenth-century liberals to question inherent defects in popular politics as 
well as to turn their eyes back to the British parliamentary model for constitutional ideas. The 
locus of the executive power within a modern free constitution was among the most contested 
issues in the discussion about the post-revolution institutional arrangements.  
The conclusion covers snapshots of Delolme’s reception in France, Germany, and America 
by exploring modern representative democracy’s difficult relationship with the executive power 
via Delolme’s nineteenth-century reception.  It also challenges the argument that advocating for 
strong executive power simply indicates traces of conservatism.565 Rather, I propose that the topic 
of executive power is a particularly fruitful research topic for historians of liberal representative 
democracy once it is examined in tandem with the notion of public opinion as both a guarantor 
and a limit on governmental powers in various arguments for modern representative constitution. 
This conclusion does not aim to be a comprehensive account of Delolme’s nineteenth century 
reception per se. It merely addresses potential future research on the long and convoluted history 
of representative democracy and the locus of the executive power within it. 
Executive power was the target of public anger in France before the breakout of the revolution 
of 1789.566 Most felt that the very idea of unitary executive power and its necessity was simply a 
part of the grand myth which had protected the ancient regime until then. Jean-Joseph Mounier, 
one of the French Monarchiens, found himself among the minority who believed in the advantage 
of a unitary executive power and legislative bicameralism in preventing constitutional usurpations 
and securing political stability much needed in the post-revolutionary context. Similar to Delolme, 
 
565 For example, William Selinger and Gregory Conti. "The Lost History of Political Liberalism." History 
of European Ideas 46, no. 3 (2020): 341-54, 348. It is remarked that “Guizot is a very useful figure for 
illustrating the ideological contours of nineteenth-century liberalism. As his commitment to stronger 
(critics might say ‘heavy-handed’) executive-led government became increasingly undeniable during the 
1840s, he would come to self-consciously identify as a conservative.  
566 This issue has been well-documented see, for example, Rosanvallon, Good Government, 29-30.  
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Mounier’s cause was not the protection of royal absolutism which he later was accused of because 
of his advocate for the royal veto power. Instead, agreeing with Delolme, Mounier was concerned 
about the creation of unitary legislative power as it might create another form of extremism after 
the abolishment of royal absolutism. “In a state where all sovereign power rested without 
restriction with the people there would be neither political liberty nor personal liberty.” 567 
Referring to Delolme in his Considerations sur les gouvernements, et principalement sur celui 
qui convient a la France (1789), Mounier wrote: “Delolme has very judiciously observed that the 
division of the executive power entirely enervates it, and that is a misfortune for the state, whereas 
the division of the legislative power on the contrary produces great advantages, in slowing down 
the pace of legislation, and rendering it wise and reflective. It is necessary in effect to ensure a lot 
of slowness and prudence in the establishment of laws, and a lot of promptitude and activity in 
their execution.”568 Resonating with Delolme’s position, Mounier argued that the establishment 
of popular sovereignty and its manifestation through the legislative power would give rise to a 
constitutional usurpation in the name of the people. It is erroneous to simply assume that the 
executive power is the only enemy of liberty in the modern representative politics. Civic 
republicanism was inadequate in addressing this novel issue in modern politics. Similar to 
Delolme, it was only recently that Mounier’s position has been seriously examined as an attempt 
to save modern liberty during the turbulent years after the fall of Robespierre.569 Delolme was an 
important source of the French liberals in forming constitutional alternatives to what they thought 
of as republican radicalism and its inherent tendency towards legislative despotism.  The key to 
the preservation of modern liberty, agreeing with Delolme, is the distinction between popular 
sovereignty and the government achieved through the multiplication of the representatives of 
popular sovereignty. 
The rise of the neutral monarchical executive as a stabilising element in a liberal constitution 
is also exemplified in Delolme’s reception by the German Vormärz liberal such as Friedrich 
Christof Dahlmann. Dahlmann not only translated Constitution to German in 1819 but also wrote 
an extensive preface to the edition. Here I emphasise the absence of Delolme’s original notion of 
the constructive tension between the monarchical executive and the people which is replaced by 
the rise of liberal ideal of neutrality that eclipsed Delolme’s strand of constitutional thinking. 
Early studies on his intellectual influence often engage with his work offhandedly as an 
inaccurate account of the English constitution influenced by Montesquieu’s idea of the separation 
 
567 Jean-Joseph Mounier cited in Aurelian Craiutu, A Virtue for Courageous Minds: Moderation in 
French Political Thought, 1748-1830, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012),  
568 Jean-Joseph Mounier, Considerations sur les gouvernements, et principalement sur celui qui convient 
a la France (Versailles, 1789), 35. 
569 For a concerted effort in uncovering strands of French moderate, liberal political thought of this period 
see Aurelian Craiutu, A Virtue for Courageous Minds: Moderation in French Political Thought, 1748-
1830, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
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of powers.570 Contrary to this strand of reading which undermines Delolme’s account of executive 
power due to his alleged penchant for monarchy, this chapter takes seriously Dahlmann’s 
commitment to liberalism as the ideological framework of his political programme and aims to 
survey how he did not find the strong executive power of the monarch to be incompatible and 
even complimentary to his constitutional vision for the modern Hanover in the light of the failure 
of radical republicanism of 1789.  
I begin with Dahlmann’s political position, which illuminates his preference for the English 
system. It is best expressed in his statement against Ernst August, Duke of Cumberland’s attempt 
to annul the deceased King William IV’s 1833 limited monarchical constitution. Dahlmann led 
the Göttingen Seven’s protest against August’s annulment of the limited monarchy constitution, 
arguing that “I fight for the immortal king, the legal will of the government, when—with legal 
weapons—I resist what the mortal king does in violation of existing laws.”571 His vision of the 
liberal constitutional monarchy aimed to strike a balance. It allegedly proposed a third alternative 
between the contesting French-style radical republicanism and absolute monarchy. By doing so, 
he successfully appealed to the thriving bourgeois of the nineteenth-century Hanover. This protest 
became the cause célèbre which unleashed a four-year constitutional crisis and simultaneously 
solidified the rise of the public as a crucial counterforce to the government and simultaneously 
shaped moderate constitutional liberalism as an oppositional front in German politics of the 
nineteenth century.572 
Agreeing with Delolme, Dahlmann perceived the issue of political stability as central to the 
protection of individual liberty and property, the aim of a modern free state.  In the preface 
(Vorrede) of the 1819 German edition, Dahlmann expressed his hope that the translation of 
Delolme’s Constitution would render “the politicisation of the German public and the realization 
that state order and bourgeois freedom are to be combined.”573 The English system, he argued, 
achieved this goal with its intricate institutional arrangement which was formed organically 
 
570 The For example, Hammel argues that “throughout the Vormärz, German constitutional thought only 
refers to the English model through the classic interpretation of Montesquieu and De Lolme, and thus 
collects the image of an English monarchy characterized by the separation of powers and by the solidity 
and political importance of the monarch” In this reading, German liberals had "a very weak inclination… 
for a critical examination of English institutions" beyond the immediate political purpose of renouncing 
radical republicanism. Jacky Hammel, Le constitutionnalisme allemand (1815-1918): Le modèle 
allemand de la monarchie constitutionnelle, (Paris: PUF, 2002), 151-152. 
571 cited in James Sheehan, German History, 1770-1866, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, pp. 616. 
572 Hanover and Göttingen,1837 James M. Brophy, Victorian Review, Volume 36, Number 1, Spring 
2010, 9. 
573  “[Dahlmann] erhoffte [sich] von der Veroeffentlichung der Neuuebersetzung eine Politisierung der 
deutschen Oeffenlichkeit und die Erkenntnis, dass Staatliche Ordung mit buergerlicher Freiheit zu 
verbinden sei” Vorrede, Die Verfassung von England, Jean-Louis Delolme, transl., Friedrich Christoph 
Dahlman, 1819, 223. 
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throughout its long history.574 This account of an organic development of the constitution was 
portrayed in contrast with the American constitution with its written social contract that was 
praised by the liberal rationalist vision exemplified by Karl von Rotteck, a Vernunftsrechtler, who 
was highly critical of the English constitution.575 By contrast, the institution of the Crown in 
Dahlmann’s organic vision of the constitution was part and parcel within the constitutional fabric 
in English constitutionalism.  
The English monarchical executive power, and its power to intervene in the legislative 
process via the king’s ministers, for Dahlmann, was an effective preventative mechanism in 
counterbalancing the formidable legislative power. This successful preventative measure of the 
Crown manifested through the absence of the employment of the monarchical legislative veto 
power since the reign of Queen Anne. He observed how "the fact that in England, the royal veto 
has hardly been used for a century and a half" was not proof of the impotence of the King, but 
"rather illustrates the richness of the English Constitution in preventive 
means (Vorbeugungsmittel).”576 In other words, strong but limited executive power is a part of 
the constitutional fabric of the English mixed constitution as opposed to a republican one. In such 
constitutions, following Delolme, the legislative power exploited its supremacy in representing 
the people’s power to establish a form of the rule of the few in disguise.  
Intriguingly, Dahlmann did not think that the 1832 Electoral Reform was a perversion of the 
mixed constitution principles. In fact, for him, “the constitutional organs have never been so 
purified as at present” and that “the British Parliament has found its internal balance” and that the 
chambers “carry in themselves their own centre of gravity.”577 The analysis reveals Dahlmann’s 
vision of the English system as honouring the idea of popular sovereignty through the powerful 
House of Commons working closely with the monarchical executive. Despite some scholars’ 
opinion that Dahlmann’s sympathy with monarchy marks his “moderate” position among the 
Vormärz liberals, his reception of Delolme points to his penchant for a strong executive power 
due to its position and function within his vision of liberal parliamentarism rather than its 
monarchical features. In this regard, the conclusion agrees with the reading of Jellinek’s seminal 
Regierung und Parlament in Deutschland that Dahlmann, in his Politik, “is very energetically 
 
574 Another important aspect of Dahlmann’s translation of Constitution was the supposed shared Saxon 
root of the English and the German, resonating with Montesquieu’s account in The Spirit of the Laws. On 
this particular issue, Dahlmann criticised Delolme of misunderstanding of the root of English liberty as 
stemming from the resistance against the Norman Conquest in 1066. 
575 See Karl von Rotteck, Allgemeine Geschichte von Anfang der historischen Kenntnis bis auf unseren 
Zeiten, Brunswick, 1844. For secondary literature on the topic see, for example, Charles E. McClelland, 
The German Historians and England: A Study in Nineteenth Century Views, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1971, 51-55, 69-70. 
576 Friedrich Christoph Dahlman, Politik, auf den Grund und das Mass der gegebenen Zustände 
zurückgeführt, 2nd edition, (Berlin, 1847) 120, note 14. 
577 Ibid., 83 and 84. 
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committed in favour of parliamentary government.”578 Like Delolme, Dahlmann embraced the 
parlimentarisation of the executive power as an integral part of a liberal constitution which 
enhances political stability. 
Delolme and Dahlmann’s complex understanding of the importance of a rigorous executive 
power within a liberal constitution was later obscured by another strand of reception of the English 
monarchical power by conservatives like Johann Gotthelf Beschorner. This line of reading 
highlights political neutrality as the most valuable characteristic of the institution. Beschorner 
formulated the idea that the English monarch is only a “nominal king”, the Realkönig being the 
ministers. The Parliament, and not the monarch, “is the authentic and true governor of 
England”.579 
Delolme’s complex influence among the German liberals later was overshadowed by the 
caricature of his work as an inept disciple of Montesquieu who misunderstood the nature of the 
English constitution. Moreover, the positive account of a strong executive power became equated 
with one’s support of monarchism and a kind of a badge of conservative tendency. By the closing 
of the nineteenth century and Bismarck’s project of German unification, Delolme and Dahlmann’s 
argument for an English-style parliamentary system, as well as the importance of the executive 
counterforce to the legislative power, completely vanished due to Bismark’s hostility towards 
Britain. In this regard, the German reception of Delolme also resonates with the triumph of 
Constant’s analysis of the Crown’s political neutrality and its moderating function within a liberal 
constitution.  
In the nineteenth-century America, Frederick Grimké’s Considerations Upon the Nature and 
Tendency of Free Institutions (1848) epitomizes the completion of Delolme’s transformation into 
a conservation theorist via his American reception. In Grimké’s reading, Delolme’s programme 
is presented as pro-monarchy and oblivious to the force of the civil society in modern politics. In 
forming a strand of American liberalism, Grimké employed Constitution to juxtapose the politics 
of the Old World with American exceptionalism, and in so doing, also disregarded Delolme’s 
strand of representative democracy along with its complex account of the locus and function of 
executive power in a modern free constitution.  
Considerations Upon the Nature and Tendency of Free Institutions is considered by some 
historians as “the most thorough analysis of the philosophical meaning of the American 
experiment” despite the author’s obscure position in American constitutional history.580 Frederick 
 
578 George Jellinek, Regierung und Parlament in Deutschland, (Leipzig and Dresden, 1909) 16. 
579 Grundzüge eines Gemeinwesens oder Beleuchtung der englischen Staatsverfassung und allgemeine 
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Grimké was the brother of Sarah and Angelina Grimké, well known for their contribution to the 
abolitionist movement. The Considerations also featured in the required reading in the class titled 
"Progress of Society" at the University of Virginia after it was first published and a second edition 
also appeared in 1856.581 The work covers a wide range of topics under the aspiration of “political 
science” which seeks to find general principles for modern free states with an emphasis in freeing 
American political scientists from the political bias of the Old World. Resonating with John 
Stevens’ Observations discussed in the previous chapter, Grimké, in the nineteenth century, 
similarly juxtaposed Delolme’s account of executive power with his, in order to reveal both the 
analytical errors, and the context-specific nature, of Delolme’s arguments in Constitution. In this 
regard, Grimké also reflected upon the 1848 presidential election and the proper locus of 
presidential power in American federal republicanism.  
At the heart of his critique of Delolme is the failure to acknowledge the rise of the public as 
a limiting force of the executive power. The stability of the English system, he argued, was a 
result of the powerful public which gradually rose to prominence in the last decades of the 
eighteenth century. “The power out of the government more nearly balances the power within, 
and produces the two opposite effects of confining and yet giving stability to the regal authority. 
This is evidently attributed to the altered structure of the society, and not the unity of the executive 
power.”582 In other words, Delolme mistook correlation for causation by leaving out powers in 
the realm of the civil society. While this reveals how Grimké missed Delolme’s crucial analysis 
of the “public censorial power” and the rise of commercial society in Constitution, Grimké’s 
reception of Delolme crucially epitomises and foreshadows his subsequent reputation as an 
advocate for power with a flawed approach. Grimké made a remark on this “error” in Delolme’s 
programme. “When De Lalme [sic] wrote, the English house of commons was just beginning to 
acquire a due weight in the constitution: the people were making slow but steady advances in the 
acquisition of knowledge and property; public opinion, for the first time in the history of society, 
showed signs of becoming a power of commanding influence of the state…[and] begin to press 
with an enormous weight upon the executive authority.”583 Grimké also probably aimed to revoke 
Delolme’s famous argument for a unitary and strong executive power praised by Alexander 
Hamilton and John Adams as well as other sympathisers with the Federalist vision of American 
republicanism, in contrast with his own Jeffersonian position. 
To invigorate his critique, Grimké provided a brief history of the executive power. The initial 
purpose of the office, he argued, is “to give a character of unity to the authority of the state”.584 
 
581 Arthur A. Ekrich Jr., “Frederick Grimké: Advocate of Free Institutions,” Journal of the History of 
Ideas (1950): 75-92, 76. 
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583 Grimké, 412. 
584 Grimké, 414. 
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The increasingly complex structure of modern politics, however, compelled “the prince” to divest 
the executive power in other political bodies and in doing so, unintentionally created “a 
counterpoise to his authority”.585 This modern necessity, which limited and reduced the regal 
executive authority, also proved to be remarkably beneficial to the society. The complete 
separation of executive power from hereditary monarchs was further proved to be useful for the 
people as the American case demonstrated. He explained how while “The prince consulted 
materially the interest of the society when he laid down some of his prerogatives, although it was 
only for the sake of his convenience. But the people [who are assigned to cover the duty of the 
monarchical executive] go straight forward to the same end, as soon as they possess the electoral 
franchise in its fullest extent” and thereby hold the executive power directly accountable to the 
people.586 The American model proved itself to be the way forward for modern free constitutions 
and the history of the Old World was nothing more than a myth that only waited to be exposed. 
In this regard, Grimké also firmly rejected the authority of history in his notion of political science. 
Grimké then moved on to address the relationship between popular mandate and the 
presidential office and its implication for political stability via his examination of Delolme’s work. 
For Delolme, direct presidential elections would give the executive power the perfect scheme to 
claim popular sovereignty and consequently, risking constitutional usurpations. This is because 
there would not be enough distrust in the office on the side of the people to keep their watchful 
eyes on its motions. In other words, the people would see the office as their direct and sole 
legitimate representative with inadequate critical distance for the check mechanisms to function. 
Grimké targeted this aspect of Delolme’s programme because it had implications for the question 
about the popular mandate of “the chief magistrate” triggered by the 1848 presidential election. 
He pointed out how Delolme failed to acknowledge the redemptive value of the democratic 
principle in taming political discord. Grimké contended that “the popular election of chief 
magistrate in the United States has never led to any political disturbance. The elective principle 
cures the mischiefs which have been apprehended from the contests of parties”.587 The popular 
mandate that supports the presidential office will “not be left to stand upon the debatable ground 
of opinion. The office will be less dazzling, but it will on that very account be less open to 
attack”.588 By this, he referred specifically to America as a modern republic with “a constitution 
ordinance” which settles once and for all the contest for executive power which directly tied with 
popular support. For Grimké, instead of relying on the tradition and the pomp of the monarch, a 
popular executive certified by electoral processes would be even more effective in the prevention 
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of contestation of power than the institution of the crown, which relies on the airy notion of 
tradition and superstition. 
Grimké was not concerned about the executive power’s monopoly of popular sovereignty, 
because in modern America, he argued, a new power rose to prominence as a representative of a 
popular will. America’s political success in making executive power serve public interest: 
can only be ascribed to the growth of a new power in the state, to wit, that which is represented by the 
popular will. And that this new power will acquire still more influence, and ultimately succeed in 
modifying the whole constitution of the executive, is as certain as any event which is the subject of 
human speculation. It was formerly sufficient to study the mere mechanism of government in order to 
explain the phenomena of government, but it is now necessary to look a great deal further in the 
structure of the society as the most important element in the character and working of the political 
institutions.589 
Despite his extensive criticism of Delolme, Grimké’s programme, in fact, is strikingly similar 
to Delolme’s account regarding the function of public opinion in counterbalancing the executive’s 
sole claim to popular sovereignty. In Delolme’s account, the English “public censorial power” 
influence the motion of the government by indirectly shaping the agenda of the parliamentary 
discussions and in so doing, also prevents the government and especially the executive from 
claiming the full authority of the people. Strikingly, Grimké failed to acknowledge Delolme’s 
notion of public censorial power and juxtaposed his own account of American executive power 
with Delolme’s English counterpart. Similar to most of Delolme’s American reception, Grimké 
relied on the caricatured account of Delolme as an advocate for strong monarchical executive 
power, a remnant of ancient politics, without genuinely engaged with his wider programme of a 
modern representative free state. The nineteenth-century reception foreshadows the reduction of 
Delolme’s complex ideas concerning modern representative constitution to a caricatured account 




While democratic sovereignty is relatively well-established, its institutional manifestation 
through the arrangement of governmental powers is being scrutinised more than ever amidst 
today’s rise of plebiscitary executive power as well as the decline of faith in parliamentary politics. 
With the examination of Delolme’s ideas for modern representative democracy in his analysis of 
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the English system, the thesis provides the twenty-first century readers new perspectives on the 
meaning of modern representative democracy. 
Delolme’s work presents an account of modern executive power as an integral part of a 
successful modern representative democracy. This forgotten strand is uncovered in this thesis, 
first, through a re-examination of his locus within the eighteenth-century debate on modern liberty. 
His approach of science of politics takes the passion-driven human nature and the Genevan 
question on how to preserve the distinction between government and sovereignty as its point of 
departure. He contended that the institutional arrangement of powers was behind the English 
success in preserving liberty. This history of English negative liberty had the formation of the 
executive power and its extra-parliamentary relation to the people at the centre of the narrative. 
Disagreeing with Montesquieu, he argued that the fall of the nobility as an intermediary power 
did not put the English system in a vulnerable position. On the contrary, the English system had 
the unique constructive tension between the body of the people, its representatives, and the 
monarchical executive power, which exploited distrust to prevent any political body from 
claiming the authority of the sole representative of sovereignty. It was the defining moment in the 
long-standing attempt to distinct sovereignty from government. His contemporaries such as 
Jeremy Bentham recognised Delolme’s originality in linking the realm of civil society with 
modern representative constitution through his notion of public censorial power, paving the way 
to deeper understandings of modern liberty beyond one’s participation in the law-making process 
and the checks as well as the balances between the executive and the legislative power. The 
exportation of his account of a strong and unitary executive power in the modern representative 
constitution to America in Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist Paper No. 70 saw the divorce of his 
idea from its historical analysis. At the same time, the reading of his work by the Jeffersonian 
circle also set the main tenet for later receptions of his political thought under the label of 
conservatism. The establishment of political neutrality exemplified in Delolme’s nineteenth-
century German reception, replaced the idea of distrust which was the centre of Delolme’s vision 
for a functioning representative democracy as it kept the people active and vigilant on the 
executive power as well as their representatives in the parliament.  
Delolme’s forgotten ideas on the English system offers a glimpse of how liberty might be 
preserved in modern representative democracy and presents the readers with fresh looks on the 
role of executive power in modern politics. In the age of “the presidentialization of democracies” 
with the rise of popular vote of the head of the executive power, Delolme’s ideas are useful in our 
reflections on the meaning of democracy in modern representative politics.590 At the heart of his 
analysis, he warned against the fusion of popular sovereignty with the actuality of political power, 
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whether it is in the form of the executive or the legislative claim as the representative of the people, 
including the raw power of popular uprisings. His caution is illuminating in today’s politics as the 
executive branch becomes synonymous with the government while referendum (which claims the 
authority of a popular mandate) as a constitutional solution to controversial issues becomes 
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